
















Referent: Prof. Dr. Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Erik Hölzl
Tag der Promotion: 02. April 2019
Table of Contents
List of Tables vi
List of Figures viii
Introduction and Summary viii
1 Performance Curiosity 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Distribution choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.3 Expected Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.4 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4.1 Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.2 Distribution Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.3 Expected Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4.4 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix 1.A: Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix 1.A.1: Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix 1.A.2: Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
i
2 The Big Robber Game 39
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.1 Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2.2 Power Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 The Big Robber Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.1 Robbers’ Choices: To Rob or Not to Rob . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.2 Decision Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.3 Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.4 The Selﬁshness of Big Robbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 Does the Big Robber Question Aﬀect Behavior? . . . . . . . . 67
2.4.1 The more selﬁsh robbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.2 The less selﬁsh robbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.4.3 The victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5 Donations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6 Models of Social Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3 The Reinforcement Heuristic in Normal Form Games 91
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3.1 Classiﬁcation of the Decision Situations . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3.2 Choice Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.3.3 Cumulative Reinforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.4 Response Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix 3.A: Frequency and Response Times by Game . . . . . . 111
Appendix 3.B: Additional Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
ii
4 Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies 117
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2 Predictions for Multiple Behavioral Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3 Experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3.2 Classiﬁcation of Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.4.1 Cognitive Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.4.3 Cognitive Load and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.4.4 Replication and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.5 Reinforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.6 Inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5 Cognitive Load in Economic Decisions:
How To Tell Whether It Works 161
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.2 Working Memory and Cognitive Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.3 Experiment 1: Cournot Oligopoly Under Light Cognitive Load 168
5.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.4 Experiment 2: Cournot Oligopoly Under Heavy Cognitive Load172
5.4.1 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 172
5.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.5 Experiment 3: Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.5.1 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
5.6 Experiment 4: Bayesian Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.6.1 Experimental Design and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.6.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182




1.1 Treatment Overview: Distribution and Information Revelation. 14
1.2 Experiment 1, Probit Regressions on Performance-based
Choices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Only Winner Treatment in Experiment 2. . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Experiment 2, Probit Regressions on Performance-based
Choices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Experiment 1, Additional Probit Regression on Performance-
based Choices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Experiment 2, Additional Probit Regression: Epistemic Cu-
riosity (EC) and Self-Motives (SM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Big Robber Choices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Out-of-sample analysis for the models of Charness and Rabin
(2002), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Alger and Weibull
(2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.1 The three games used in the experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Frequency of the diﬀerent experienced regret levels in lose sit-
uations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3 Random-eﬀects panel probit regressions for choices. . . . . . . 102
3.4 Panel regressions for log-transformed response times. . . . . . 108
3.5 Random-eﬀects panel probit regressions with additional controls.112
3.6 Regression models while bootstrapping the standard errors. . . 113
3.7 Regressions models for cumulative proportional reinforcement. 113
3.8 Panel regression for log-transformed response times including
an additional dummy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.9 Panel regression for ln(response time) with additional controls. 115
v
3.10 Panel regression for log-transformed response times while
bootstrapping the standard errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.1 Overview of prescribed actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.2 Experiment 1, Overview of observations in conﬂict and align-
ment situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3 Experiment 1, Random eﬀects panel regressions for
ln(ResponseTimes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.4 Experiment 2, Overview of observations in conﬂict and align-
ment situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.5 Experiment 2, Random eﬀects panel regressions for
ln(ResponseTimes). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
vi
List of Figures
1.1 Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits. . . . . 16
1.2 Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and
Expected Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits. . . . . 24
1.4 Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and
Expected Performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 Overview of the Experimental Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 Absolute Frequency of Robbing Choices. . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3 Robbing Choices by Treatment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4 Decision Times for the Big Robber Question. . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 Robbers’ Decisions in the Intermediate Games. . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Behavior of Robbers in the Dictator Game. . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 Behavior of Robbers-50% in the Dictator Game. . . . . . . . . 69
2.8 Behavior of Robbers-50% in the Ultimatum Game. . . . . . . 70
2.9 Average donations in percentage and expected donations in
Euros. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 Average individual choice frequencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2 Average individual response times. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3 Average individual choice frequencies and response times by
games. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.1 Classiﬁcation of actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Experiment 1, Overview of observations and their classiﬁca-
tion according to diﬀerent behavioral rules. . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3 Experiment 1, Average response times of correct responses and
errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
vii
4.4 Experiment 2, Overview of observations and their classiﬁca-
tion according to diﬀerent behavioral rules. . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.5 Experiment 2, Relative frequency of errors and correct re-
sponses for NoLoad and Load treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.6 Experiment 2, Average response times of correct responses and
errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.7 Experiment 2, Average response times for the NoLoad and
Load treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.8 Average response times of reinforcement and imitating-others
decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.9 Average response times of of stay and shift correct decisions
and errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.10 Average response times of correct decisions and errors exclud-
ing inertia decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.1 Experiment 1, Average response times and payoﬀ. . . . . . . . 172
5.2 Experiment 2, Average response times and payoﬀ. . . . . . . . 174
5.3 Experiment 3, Average response times of voting decisions. . . . 178
5.4 Experiment 3, Relative frequency of sincere votes and number
of votes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.5 Experiment 4, Average response times of the second draw. . . 183
5.6 Experiment 4, Average error rates of the second draw. . . . . . 184
viii
Introduction and Summary
This dissertation consists of ﬁve self-contained research papers that cover
experimental studies on diﬀerent economic topics. My research interests are
mainly focused on two interrelated areas within economics. One area is con-
cerned with inequality aversion and social preferences. The other area is more
process-orientated and concerns behavioral rules and heuristics. Especially,
the use of response times as process data is among my research interests.
Chapters 1 and 2 cover topics from the former area, whereas the remaining
three chapters contribute to the latter area. Chapter 1 concerns the role
of performance curiosity which can trump inequality aversion. Chapter 2
presents a novel experiment analyzing prosocial behavior in a high-stakes set-
ting. Chapter 3 shows that the reinforcement process can work as cognitive
shortcut to apparent myopic best reply behavior. Chapter 4 demonstrates
that behavior in Cournot oligopolies is codetermined by multiple behavioral
rules. Chapter 5 establishes a consistent reduction in response times for com-
plex decisions under cognitive load. In the remainder of this section I present
a brief introduction for each chapter and summarize the main ﬁndings.
Chapter 1 is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University
of Zurich) and Jaume García-Segarra (University of Cologne) and has been
published under the title “Performance Curiosity” in the Journal of Economic
Psychology. We show that performance curiosity – the desire to know one’s
own (relative) performance – can trump inequality aversion. In two experi-
ments (combined N = 450), participants chose between an equal allocation
and a performance-based one after generating surplus in a real-eﬀort task.
In the experimental treatment, choosing an equal allocation came at the cost
of not knowing the own performance, which led to a substantial increase of
performance-based choices in comparison with the control treatment. The
eﬀect seems especially pronounced for women, but the gender eﬀect is due to
a diﬀerence in expectations regarding performance. Interestingly, the manip-
ulation equalized the proportion of equal allocation choices between males
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and females compensating for their diﬀerence in expectations. Work on this
paper was shared among the authors as follows: Carlos Alós-Ferrer 33%,
Jaume García-Segarra 33%, Alexander Ritschel 33%.
Chapter 2, entitled “The Big Robber Game,” is the result of joint work
with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of Zurich) and Jaume García-Segarra
(University of Cologne). We present a novel design measuring a correlate of
social preferences in a high-stakes setting. In the Big Robber Game, a “rob-
ber” can obtain large personal gains by appropriating the gains of a large
group of “victims” as seen in recent corporate scandals. We observed that
more than half of all robbers take as much as possible. At the same time, par-
ticipants displayed standard, prosocial behavior in the Dictator, Ultimatum,
and Trust games. That is, prosocial behavior in the small is compatible with
highly selﬁsh actions in the large, and the essence of corporate scandals can
be reproduced in the laboratory even with a standard student sample. We
show that this apparent contradiction is actually consistent with received
social-preference models. In agreement with this view, in the experiment
more selﬁsh robbers also behaved more selﬁshly in other games and in a do-
nation question. We conclude that social preferences are compatible with
rampant selﬁshness in high-impact decisions aﬀecting a large group. Work
on this paper was shared among the authors as follows: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
33%, Jaume García-Segarra 33%, Alexander Ritschel 33%.
Chapter 3 is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of
Zurich) and has been published under the title “The Reinforcement Heuristic
in Normal Form Games” in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization. We analyze simple reinforcement-based behavioral rules in 3 × 3
games through choice data and response times. We argue that there is a large
overlap between reinforcement-based heuristics (win-stay, lose-shift) and the
more “rational” behavioral rule of myopic best reply. However, evidence from
response times shows that choices in agreement with the common prescrip-
tion of those rules are comparatively fast, and choices of the form “lose-shift”
occur more frequently for larger diﬀerences with bygone payoﬀs. Both ob-
servations speak in favor of reinforcement processes as a cognitive shortcut
for apparent myopic best reply, and advise caution when interpreting behav-
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ioral results in favor of optimizing behavior. Work on this paper was shared
among the authors as follows: Carlos Alós-Ferrer 50%, Alexander Ritschel
50%.
Chapter 4, entitled “Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies,”
is the result of joint work with Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of Zurich).
We show that in a Cournot oligopoly, multiple behavioral rules codetermine
behavior. While imitation of successful behavior is an intuitive behavioral
rule, myopic best reply is a deliberative rule. Previous literature has deduced
the relevance of imitation from convergence, but we analyze individual de-
cisions and derive testable predictions from a formal drift-diﬀusion model.
The model predicts a non-trivial asymmetry which was readily found in two
laboratory experiments. Our results suggest that a dual view of behavior
incorporating rational behavior and evolutionary ideas on bounded rational-
ity might provide a useful synthesis and improve our understanding of how
economic decisions are made. Work on this paper was shared among authors
as follows: Carlos Alós-Ferrer 50%, Alexander Ritschel 50%.
Chapter 5, entitled “Cognitive Load in Economic Decisions: How To Tell
Whether It Works,” is the result of joint work with Anja Achtziger (Zeppelin
University, Friedrichshafen) and Carlos Alós-Ferrer (University of Zurich).
Cognitive load manipulations are routinely used in psychology to causally
manipulate the reliance on deliberative or intuitive decision modes or pro-
cesses, hence uncovering performance tradeoﬀs (e.g., between speed and ac-
curacy) and default behavioral tendencies and motivations. The success of
cognitive load manipulations in economic tasks, which are typically far more
complex and time-consuming, is comparatively moderate, with many stud-
ies ﬁnding null eﬀects. Those, however, might be due to either a failure of
cognitive load to inﬂuence behavior or performance, or to a failure to induce
relevant levels of cognitive load. A fundamental diﬃculty is that there exist
no simple manipulation check to disentangle both possibilities. We argue
that response times provide exactly such a manipulation check, but that,
contrary to intuition and to received results for tasks from psychology, a suc-
cessful cognitive load manipulation in typical economic tasks will decrease
response times as decision makers reallocate resources to faster, less deliber-
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ative processes. We test this hypothesis in four separate experiments using
diﬀerent, purely economic tasks (belief updating, voting, and competition
in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly) and diﬀerent cognitive load manipulations.
Our evidence shows that response times are a simple test to check whether
cognitive load was successfully induced in economic experiments, and should
be systematically reported in such studies to allow for a proper interpretation
of the results. Work on this paper was shared among the authors as follows:





When diﬀerent people exert diﬀerent levels of eﬀort, an egalitarian distri-
bution of jointly-generated proceeds is not necessarily “fair.” In this sense,
egalitarianism might not always be socially desirable. If agents anticipate
the results of their eﬀort, social conventions dictating egalitarian allocations
can greatly diminish incentives to exert eﬀort to achieve a high performance.
This simple observation points to a conﬂict arising from diﬀerent human
motivations. On the one hand, most human beings strive to perform well. In-
deed, psychological research has identiﬁed achievement motivation as a basic
(intrinsic) motive (e.g., McClelland et al., 1989; Brunstein and Heckhausen,
2008). This goes hand-in-glove with the view that individual eﬀort should
be rewarded. On the other hand, research in behavioral economics has iden-
tiﬁed inequality aversion, which implies a preference in favor of egalitarian
outcomes even if they result in a reduction of the own payoﬀs, as an impor-
tant factor in decisions concerning (re)distribution (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). When confronted
with the decision to allocate the proceeds from individual eﬀort, these two
motivations result in opposite tendencies, which are at the heart of discus-
sions on many socioeconomic issues, ranging from performance pay within
ﬁrms to redistribution of income through tax systems.
In this work, we contribute to the investigation into the motivations un-
derlying preferences among distributional allocations. We aim to show that
preferences for egalitarian redistribution, as opposed to rewarding individual
performance, hang in a fragile balance and can be signiﬁcantly reduced with
subtle interventions. In particular, we focus on a manipulation derived from
performance curiosity, deﬁned as the desire to know the own performance
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(especially in relative terms). The rationale is that the motivation to achieve
and perform well is linked to self-reputation and self-image concerns, which
are themselves closely linked to the notion of identity (Mazar et al., 2008;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). Obviously, information on the own performance
has a crucial impact on the self-image. We hence postulate that human be-
ings might be willing to give up the beneﬁts of their own eﬀort to appease
their inequality aversion, but this willingness only lasts as long as they at
least receive the information on how well they have performed. Speciﬁcally,
if social conventions, on top of imposing an egalitarian redistribution, go to
the extreme of eliminating (relative) performance feedback, we postulate that
preferences for egalitarian distributions will be greatly reduced.
In this work, we report on two experiments with an innovative design
which pits inequality aversion against curiosity regarding the own perfor-
mance in a real-eﬀort task. The task is used to generate surplus, and is
followed by a distributional allocation decision within a group. The design
creates a tradeoﬀ between an egalitarian allocation and receiving information
on performance in the real-eﬀort task. We show that this subtle manipulation
can shift preferences away from egalitarian allocations.
In our ﬁrst experiment (N = 180) participants generated income by work-
ing on a real-eﬀort task and subsequently decided on the allocation of the
joint proceedings within a small group. In the control treatment, participants
chose between an egalitarian allocation and a performance-based one, lead-
ing to the standard observation of inequality aversion. In the experimental
(“No Info”) treatment, the only change was that opting for the egalitarian
distribution came at the cost of not knowing the actual performance and
ranking in the real-eﬀort task. The design highlights relative performance,
because the information, if revealed, includes the performance and rank of
all group members, enabling social comparisons. This change had a large
eﬀect, with participants choosing the performance-based distribution rather
than the egalitarian one. In the second experiment (N = 270) we replicated
the results of the ﬁrst experiment and also added a third treatment and
additional questionnaires to test for further explanations of the basic eﬀect.
6
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Our tasks were explicitly incentivized. Hence, given the own expected
performance, participants could easily compute which of the two allocations
would maximize their (expected) monetary rewards. The allocations were
designed in such a way that only those expecting to be strictly above average
would be better oﬀ under the performance-based allocation, with all others
being better oﬀ under the egalitarian allocation. Hence, we elicited expected
performance in the real-eﬀort task and controlled for it by testing the basic
hypotheses also within diﬀerent groups (in terms of expectations) and by
including the corresponding variable as a control in our regressions. As was to
be expected, a higher expectation led to a higher percentage of performance-
based choices, but the basic eﬀect remains clearly signiﬁcant.
In view of evidence on gender diﬀerences and competition (e.g., Gneezy
et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), we were also interested in gen-
der eﬀects. For this reason, we were led to a design with perfectly balanced
participation across gender and a sample size large enough to examine gen-
der diﬀerences. Speciﬁc hypotheses regarding those can also be derived from
research on inequality aversion. Some studies in this ﬁeld have found gender
diﬀerences, as reﬂected, e.g., in the proportion of egalitarian allocations in
Dictator and Ultimatum games (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2006). However, the
evidence is mixed. Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that there is no diﬀer-
ence in social preferences, and that the observed eﬀects arise due to gender
diﬀerences in the sensitivity to cues in experimental contexts. The latter hy-
pothesis is motivated by research in psychology establishing that women are
more sensitive to social cues and feedback than men (Gilligan, 1982; Roberts
and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989). Since our manipulation involves the provision
of feedback, it is natural to expect that the basic eﬀect should be especially
pronounced for women, compared to men. Indeed, the treatment eﬀect in
our experiments was clearly stronger among women, with behavior in the
control treatment exhibiting clear gender diﬀerences which vanished in the
No Info treatment. Controlling for expected performance allows to uncover
the roots of this gender eﬀect: women had a lower expected performance
than men, leading to a lower percentage of performance-based choices in the
7
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control treatment (due to extrinsic, monetary rewards) which was overcome
in the experimental treatment.
We conclude that performance curiosity, i.e. wanting to know one’s
own (relative) performance, can counteract inequality aversion as a mo-
tivation and tilt decisions away from egalitarian distributions and toward
performance-based ones. Additionally, creating a tradeoﬀ between informa-
tion and egalitarian allocations substantially reduces gender diﬀerences in
behavior, with women becoming more willing to accept performance-based
allocations. This is a potentially important insight for incentive design and
the reduction of gender diﬀerences.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses some related
literature strands and helps place our experiments in a broader context. Sec-
tion 1.3 describes the design of Experiment 1 and presents the analysis of
the data. Section 1.4 does the same for Experiment 2. Section 1.5 discusses
the results. Appendix A analyzes some closely related constructs which were
measured through questionnaires in our experiments and discards them as
possible alternative explanations. Appendix B contains the experimental
instructions.
1.2 Related Literature
Our results are in agreement with the literature showing that preferences for
egalitarian allocations, or, more generally, reducing inequality, seem not to
be stable. For instance, dictator-game giving is reduced if the perception of
anonymity and social distance is increased (Hoﬀman et al., 1994; Charness
and Gneezy, 2008; Franzen and Pointner, 2012). Also, subtle content-free
psychological manipulations cause radical shifts of behavior (Achtziger et al.,
2015b, 2016, 2018). Further, part of the motivation for reducing inequality
might be related to the desire to show others that one is not selﬁsh (Bardsley,
2008; Cappelen et al., 2013). Further, unequal payoﬀs are often deemed
acceptable, provided some justiﬁcation is given, e.g. merit, entitlement, or
needs (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoﬀman et al., 1994; Konow, 2003; Fershtman
et al., 2012). This already points out that the balance between rewarding
8
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performance and distributing resources equitably can be shifted if the link
to performance is emphasized (e.g., through merit or entitlement).
The studies reported here are also related to the extensive social-
psychological literature on social comparisons, which goes back to Festinger
(1954). This literature stresses the human desire to evaluate oneself. The
very ﬁrst hypothesis is that people have a basic need to evaluate themselves
and their performance. The second hypothesis is that social comparisons
are used to fulﬁll this desire since objective evaluations are often unavailable
or diﬃcult to obtain (see also Moore and Klein, 2008). For instance, Trope
(1980) asked experimental participants to rate computer games requiring
eye-hand coordination, but which diﬀered in how accurately skill was linked
to outcomes. Participants preferred games with accurate feedback, bearing
the potential negative consequences for their self-esteem, over games which
were not diagnostic for the participant’s skill.
Recent studies in economics have also clearly shown that information on
the own (relative) performance has a strong impact on motivation. Several
studies have shown that the provision of feedback has a positive eﬀect on per-
formance in the laboratory and in the ﬁeld (Hannan et al., 2008; Azmat and
Iriberri, 2010; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2011; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012).
Azmat and Iriberri (2016) have recently shown that information on relative
performance increases eﬀort and aﬀects satisfaction when payoﬀ depends on
performance (piece-rate wage), but has no eﬀect in either when pay is inde-
pendent of performance (ﬂat rate). Schoenberg and Haruvy (2012) gave par-
ticipants in an experimental asset market information on either the highest-
or lowest-earning trader in the market, period by period. Market prices were
signiﬁcantly higher when the information of the highest-performing trader
was presented, and the satisfaction of the traders was higher if they had a
good relative position relative to the presented information.
In agreement with developments in research on social comparisons as
quoted above, research in economics has also argued that people may care
about relative performance, as captured by rankings, even when rankings
have no ﬁnancial consequences, because of its impact on self-image (Bén-
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abou and Tirole, 2006, 2011; Köszegi, 2006).1 For instance, Berger et al.
(2013) show that ratings on performance are more eﬀective for increasing
productivity if there is a high level of diﬀerentiation in the feedback.2 How-
ever, this strand of the literature has typically concentrated on the link be-
tween information on performance and performance itself, while our aim is
to establish the link between information on performance and preferences on
distributional allocations.
Of course, the concept of curiosity (in a general sense) has received a great
deal of attention in psychology. An inﬂuential curiosity-related construct is
lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989), which describes the factors involved
in the general knowledge formation process. It describes four epistemic mo-
tivations related to the need for speciﬁc or nonspeciﬁc closure, and the need
to avoid them. Those determine the length of hypothesis generation and
testing sequence to evaluate evidence and form a belief. Although similari-
ties between social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) and lay epistemic
theory seem apparent, the latter does not suggest a general drive towards
social comparison and weighs informational sources by their relevance, not
by their similarity towards oneself.
Another important construct is epistemic curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994;
Litman et al., 2005), deﬁned as “the desire for knowledge that motivates
individuals to learn new ideas, eliminate information-gaps, and solve intel-
lectual problems” (Litman, 2008, p. 1586). Epistemic curiosity is subdivided
in two broad categories. The ﬁrst is interest-type curiosity, which involves
the anticipated pleasure of new discoveries. The second is deprivation-type
1Work in evolutionary game theory has shown that relative-payoff concerns, which go
hand-in-glove with imitating behavior, can tilt long-run predictions away from Nash equi-
libria (Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005) and towards more competitive
ones in experimental markets. This prediction has been confirmed in several Cournot-
oligopoly experiments, e.g. Huck et al. (1999) and Offerman et al. (2002). In alignment
with those, Fatas et al. (2015) found that the availability of a relative-performance measure
led to more competitive outcomes.
2Payment schemes based on relative performance can sometimes decrease productivity.
In a field experiment, Bandiera et al. (2005) found that productivity under piece rates was
substantially higher than under relative incentives, because workers took into account the
negative externality their effort imposed on others. However, an altruistic motivation was
ruled out because this effect was only present when monitoring was possible.
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curiosity, which is the need to reduce uncertainty and eliminate undesirable
knowledge gaps. To check for the possible relation between these concepts
and performance curiosity, we included the epistemic curiosity questionnaire
by Litman and Mussel (2013) in Experiment 2 (see Appendix A).
Our explanation for the relevance of performance curiosity hinges on the
value of feedback for the own self-image. Psychological research (Sedikides
and Strube, 1995, 1997) has identiﬁed four cardinal self-motives as relevant
to the development, maintenance, and modiﬁcation of self-views . These
are self-enhancement (the desire to see oneself positively), self-verification
(the desire to conﬁrm a preexisting view of oneself), self-assessment (the
desire to know the truth about oneself), and self-improvement (the desire to
improve oneself). To check the possible relation between these concepts and
performance curiosity, we included the questionnaire by Gregg et al. (2011)
in Experiment 2.
A study by Van de Ven et al. (2005) investigated how curiosity regard-
ing an uncertain outcome contributes to the endowment effect, which causes
a disparity between selling and buying prices. In an experiment involving
lotteries, sellers were more curious about the outcome than buyers and the
curiosity positively correlated with the minimum selling price. A second
experiment involved tokens initially held by sellers whose actual value (ex-
change rate) was uncertain. Post-trade information about that value diﬀered
across conditions. Minimum selling prices were signiﬁcantly higher for sellers
who would not learn about the exchange rate of a token they sold, compared
to sellers who would learn about the exchange rate independently of whether
they sold it or not. This showed a willingness to pay for the satisfaction of
curiosity, which added to the endowment eﬀect.
Last, our experiments are related to the literature on gender eﬀects in
competition. In our case, the decision on how to redistribute the joint earn-
ings of the group came after performing the task. Therefore, we do not
deal with performance diﬀerences or with preferences for competition, but
rather with preferential choices in distributions. Still, our work is obviously
related to those strands of the literature at a conceptual level. There are well-
established gender diﬀerences in the attitudes toward competition. Gneezy
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et al. (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) showed that women tend
to shy away from competition in real-eﬀort tasks, and Gneezy et al. (2009)
showed that matrilineal and patriarchal societies diﬀer with regard to com-
petitive behavior.3 A recent ﬁeld experiment by Azmat et al. (2016) has
shown that women perform worse than men when stakes are high, while the
opposite is true when the stakes are low.
1.3 Experiment 1
1.3.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).4 Participants were
recruited from the University of Cologne’s pool, excluding psychology stu-
dents, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was a between-subject
design with 180 participants, 45 females and 45 males in each of the two
treatments. Average payoﬀ was EUR 13.25 (USD 17.80) for a session that
lasted around 60 minutes. Subjects were assigned to groups of ﬁve players,
but they did not know the identities of the other group members.5 Further,
both the task and the subsequent allocation decision were made individu-
ally and there was no interaction of any kind except in the determination of
payoﬀs at the end of the experiment. Initially, subjects worked individually
in a real-eﬀort task requiring to add up sets of ﬁve two-digit numbers (e.g.
30+87+19+16+38=) for a predetermined time. Each correct answer gen-
erated 10 points, with an exchange rate of 5 Euro cents per point, but no
feedback on the correctness of the responses was provided until the end of the
3Our design bears procedural similarities to Task 4 in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)
in the sense that participants perform the task without knowing the incentive rule and
choose the compensation scheme later. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) offered a choice
between piece-rates or competitive tournaments, while our design involves neither, but
rather different distributions of the joint income generated by the group.
4The data and the codebooks for both experiments can be downloaded from
http://osf.io/5hkj6.
5In particular, they had no information on the gender composition of their group. This
is particularly important, because gender composition might affect decision making and
performance within a group (Gneezy et al., 2003; Apesteguía et al., 2012).
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experiment. Subjects were not allowed to use calculators or other electronic
devices, but they were allowed to use scratch paper. This real-eﬀort task
was proposed in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and has been often used in
experiments (e.g., Azmat and Iriberri, 2016).6
The real-eﬀort task lasted for eight minutes, which is relatively long. This
duration was selected to put enough weight on the eﬀort side rather than on
the skills of the subjects. Also, a shorter task duration would have increased
the probability of ties inside each group. After performing the task, the
experiment moved to the decision-making part without any feedback being
provided.
Participants were asked to make a decision on how they would prefer to
distribute the joint amount of points generated by the group. They were
informed that one of the group members would be selected at random and
his or her decision would be implemented as stated.7 Two distributions were
available. The ﬁrst was an equal split, where all group members earned the
same amount of points. The second was a performance-based split, leading
to a diﬀerent amount of points depending on the relative rank within the
group (see Table 1.1). Speciﬁcally, the performance-based split made the
three worst-placed participants earn less than under the equal split, in order
to create a clear tradeoﬀ between monetary rewards and feedback provision
for the median participant.8
6Women often think that their performance in math will be worse than that of men,
which sometimes leads to actually worse performance due to “stereotype threat” (Spencer
et al., 1999; Gneezy et al., 2003). However, a meta-analysis of 100 studies on gender
differences in math performance showed that there is no gender difference in arithmetic
or algebraic performance (Hyde et al., 1990).
7Subjects were informed that they were part of a group at the beginning of the ex-
periment, and they were aware that after finishing the real-effort task, they would decide
among two distribution rules for sharing the joint surplus, with one decision implemented
at random. However, they were not informed about the specifics of the possible distribu-
tion rules until the decision had to be made.
8The performance-based distribution allocates 15%, 10%, and 5% of the joint proceeds
to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th group member, respectively. Hence choosing the performance-
based distribution entails a clear monetary cost for participants who expect to be average
or worse. The participants ranked first and second are rewarded with 40% and 30% of the
joint proceeds, that is, by a factor of 2 and 1.5, respectively, compared to the equal-split
distribution. This makes clear that the distribution indeed rewards performance.
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Table 1.1: Treatment Overview: Distribution and Information Revelation.
Control Treatment No Info Treatment
Equal Performance- Equal Performance-









(%) (%) (%) (%)
1 20 1 40 - 20 1 40
2 20 2 30 - 20 2 30
3 20 3 15 - 20 3 15
4 20 4 10 - 20 4 10
5 20 5 5 - 20 5 5
The key manipulation between treatments was the amount of information
that was revealed with each possible distribution. In the Control Treatment
participants chose one of the two distributions, but later the ranking and the
number of correctly solved calculations was revealed independently of which
distribution was ﬁnally implemented. However, in the No Info Treatment
participants were told that the ranking and the number of correctly solved
calculations would only be revealed if the performance-based split was ac-
tually the one chosen and implemented. The alternatives are detailed in
Table 1.1.
In the absence of self-image concerns, the diﬀerence across treatments
should not aﬀect behavior. In the presence of performance curiosity, however,
we should observe a higher proportion of performance-based choices in the
No Info treatment than in the control treatment.
To control for various other possible explanations for diﬀerences in be-
havior across treatments we also elicited self-efficacy before and after the
real-eﬀort task. That is, participants were asked how many additions they
thought they could solve correctly in eight minutes. Further, they were asked
to report their expected relative performance in a 7 seven-point scale ranging
from “Far below average” to “Far above average.” To control for individual
diﬀerences in the regression analysis in attitudes and motivation, we also
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elicited risk aversion attitudes using the lottery questionnaire of Holt and
Laury (2002) and the reduced Achievement Motive Scale of Lang and Fries
(2006), using the German version of Dahme et al. (1993) (the analysis of
those is relegated to Appendix A). At the end of the experiment participants
received feedback (if any) on a screen where their rank and the number of
correctly solved additions were highlighted.
1.3.2 Distribution choices
The percentage of performance-based choices in both distributions is illus-
trated in Figure 1.1(a). In the control treatment, there is no tradeoﬀ since
the same information is revealed independently of which distribution is im-
plemented. Hence, this treatment is a pure test of inequality aversion. In
agreement with standard results in the social preferences literature, only 35
of the 90 participants (38.89%) in this treatment chose the performance-
based distribution. In contrast, this proportion rose to 70.00% in the No
Info treatment (63 out of 90). The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant according
to a test of proportions (z = −4.191, p < 0.0001).9 Thus, subjects chose the
performance-based distribution in the No Info treatment more often than in
the control treatment. Since the only diﬀerence between treatments is the
information that is revealed when the equal split is implemented, the diﬀer-
ence in results is due to the tradeoﬀ regarding information on performance.
We hence conclude that performance curiosity overcomes inequality aversion
in our data.
Since we expected a gender eﬀect, we analyzed the behavior of the women
and men separately. Figure 1.1(b) shows the proportions of participants
choosing the performance-based split across treatments by gender. The over-
all eﬀect observed in Figure 1.1(a) seems to be driven by female behavior.
While only 10 women out of 45 (22.22%) chose the performance-based split
in the control treatment, the proportion rose to 68.89% (31 out of 45) in the
No Info treatment (test of proportions, z = −4.445, p < 0.0001). The diﬀer-
ence goes in the same direction for men, with 55.56% of performance-based
9A Fisher’s exact test delivers the same conclusion.
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Figure 1.1: Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits.
Notes. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split across treat-
ments. (b) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and gender. Bars represent 1 Standard Error of the Mean. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05,
⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, test of proportions.
choices in the control treatment vs. 71.11% in the No Info treatment, but the
diﬀerence misses signiﬁcance (z = −1.531, p = 0.1257). As a result, while
females chose the equal split more often than males in control treatment (test
of proportions, z = 3.2434, p = 0.0012), the diﬀerence disappeared in the
No Info treatment (z = 0.2300, p = 0.8181). We delay the analysis of the
interaction between treatment and gender to the regression analysis below
(Table 1.2, Model 2; Section 1.3.4).
That is, while men choose the performance-based distribution more often,
as soon as a tradeoﬀ involving performance curiosity is introduced, women
behave exactly as men.
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1.3.3 Expected Performance
There is one obvious, rational reason for some participants to choose the
performance-based split. If the participant believes that he or she is likely
to be strictly above the group’s average, the individual payoﬀ under the
performance-based split is higher than under the egalitarian allocation. Re-
ciprocally, if the participant believes to be at or below average, the individual
payoﬀ is higher under the egalitarian allocation (recall Table 1.1). Hence, we
need to control for expected performance.
The median number of correctly solved additions was 15 (ranging from
5 to 43), and the median error rate was 0.19 (ranging from 0.03 to 0.69).10
Crucially, participants were asked their expected relative performance (after
completing the real-eﬀort task) in a seven-point scale. The expected relative
performance did not diﬀer across treatments according to a Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon (MWW) test (control treatment, mean 4.089; No Info treatment,
4.300; z = −1.055, p = 0.2913). We classiﬁed participants into three groups
according to their beliefs, i.e. below, exactly, and above average.11
Figure 1.2(a) disentangles the proportions of performance-based choices
within the three expectation groups. The performance-based split was cho-
sen less often in the control treatment than in the No Info treatment across
all three groups. For participants who expected to be above average, the
performance-based split was chosen 24 out of 36 times (66.67%) in the con-
trol treatment, compared to 39 out of 43 (90.70%) in the No Info treatment
(test of proportions, z = −2.647, p = 0.0081). For participants who expected
to perform exactly on average, the performance-based split was chosen 6 out
of 23 times (26.09%) in the control treatment, compared to 14 out of 21
(66.67%) in the No Info treatment (z = −2.700, p = 0.0069). For partic-
10After completing the real-effort task but before making the distribution choice, par-
ticipants were asked about their expected performance, that is, how many additions they
thought they had solved correctly. The average expectation was 15.2 additions in the
control treatment and 17.3 in the No Info treatment. The difference was not significant
according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = −1.457, p = 0.1452).
11For simplicity, the question on expected relative performance did not refer to a group.
Since allocation to groups was random, the participants’ expectations translate into ex-
pected ranking within the group.
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Figure 1.2: Experiment 1, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and Expected
Performance.
Notes. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and expected ranking. (b) Expected versus actual performance by gender. ⋆ p < 0.1,
⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, test of proportions.
ipants who expected to be below average, the performance-based split was
also chosen less often in the control treatment (16.13%; 5 of 31) than in the
No Info treatment (38.46%; 10 of 26), but the diﬀerence narrowly missed
signiﬁcance (z = −1.907, p = 0.0565). Additionally, comparing the propor-
tions of choices across groups, one sees that, as was to be expected, a higher
expected performance resulted in a higher proportion of performance-based
choices (see regression analysis below).12
We did not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in beliefs across treatments. However,
women believed that they had performed worse (average 3.800 in the 7-point
scale), compared to men’s expectations (average 4.589 in the 7-point scale).
12A separate probit regression showed no significant interaction between treatment and
expected performance.
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The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 3.924, p = 0.0001).
Figure 1.2(b) plots the expected performance (average report in the 7-point
Likert scale) for males and females, conditional on the actual population
septiles in the experiment, as computed from the number of correctly solved
additions. This ﬁgure makes apparent that females tend to underestimate
their performance compared to males, as previously pointed out, e.g., by
Gneezy et al. (2003).13
1.3.4 Regression Analysis
Recapitulating, in the previous subsections we have seen that performance
curiosity shifts choices toward the performance-based split and away from the
egalitarian allocation, and that this eﬀect is far stronger for women. How-
ever, we have also seen that choices are inﬂuenced by the expected ranking,
and that there are diﬀerences in beliefs across genders. In view of these re-
sults, our next step is to conduct regression analyses controlling for expected
ranking. This will also allow us to investigate the determinants of the gender
eﬀect.
We hence turn to probit regressions on the choice of the performance-
based split accounting for treatment, gender, and expected ranking. We
report on three diﬀerent model speciﬁcations in Table 1.2.
Model 1 investigates the basic treatment eﬀect without further controls.
The treatment dummy is highly signiﬁcant and positive, reproducing in the
regression the basic message of the test of proportions in Section 1.3.2, as
illustrated in Figure 1.1(a). Model 2 adds gender and its interaction with
the treatment dummy. The reference group is hence made of males in the
control treatment. The treatment dummy becomes non-signiﬁcant, reﬂect-
ing that the treatment eﬀect misses signiﬁcance for males as found in Section
1.3.2 (recall Figure 1.1(b)). In contrast, the interaction of the treatment
dummy and the female dummy is signiﬁcant, showing that women react to
13Although the task has been determined to be gender-neutral (see Niederle and Vester-
lund, 2007), in our sample women actually performed worse than men, with an average
18.4 correct additions for males and 15.0 for females (MWW test, z = 3.349, p = 0.0008).
Causality, of course, might go in the other direction because of stereotype threat (recall
Footnote 6).
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Table 1.2: Experiment 1, Probit Regressions on Performance-based Choices.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3








Constant −0.282∗∗ 0.140 −0.224
(0.1340) (0.1875) (0.2126)
LogLikelihood −115.120 −109.701 −90.676
Wald Test 17.458∗∗∗ 26.590∗∗∗ 50.785∗∗∗
Linear combination tests:
No Info + No Info X Female 1.257∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗
(0.2854) (0.3102)
Female + No Info X Female −0.064 0.045
(0.278) (0.303)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the manipulation more strongly than men. A post-hoc linear combination
test (No Info + No Info × Female, bottom of Table 1.2) reveals that the
treatment eﬀect for women is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001). The female
dummy is negative and highly signiﬁcant, showing that women choose the
egalitarian allocation more often than men in the control treatment. How-
ever, this gender diﬀerence does not exist in the No Info treatment, as shown
by the corresponding linear combination test (Female + No Info × Female,
bottom of Table 1.2; p = 0.8181).
Model 3 is the key regression, which introduces the expected ranking of
participants and sheds light into the determinants of the gender diﬀerences.
First, the independent variable “Expected Performance in Septiles”, centered
at 0, is highly signiﬁcant and positive, conﬁrming that the higher the expecta-
tions the more likely it is that the participant chooses the performance-based
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split, as higher expectations make the latter split more attractive. Once
we control for this natural eﬀect, the treatment dummy becomes highly sig-
niﬁcant and positive, indicating that performance curiosity is a signiﬁcant
driver of behavior for males. The linear combination test conﬁrms that the
treatment eﬀect is also highly signiﬁcant for females. That is, after control-
ling for the expectations we see that both male and female participants are
more likely to choose the performance-based split when inequality aversion
conﬂicts with performance curiosity.
In contrast, in Model 3 the female dummy and its interaction with the
treatment dummy are not signiﬁcant anymore. A linear combination test
also shows that there is no gender diﬀerence in the No Info treatment (p =
0.8822). That is, the entire gender eﬀect observed in previous regressions and
tests originates exclusively in diﬀerences in expectations. In other words,
since females have lower expectations, the performance-based split is less
attractive, and hence chosen less often by females than by males. Once we
control for expectations, we see that the eﬀects of performance curiosity are
present for both genders.
1.4 Experiment 2
The purpose of our second experiment was threefold. First, the experiment
was conceived as a replication in order to establish the reliability of the ef-
fects. Accordingly, the ﬁrst two treatments of Experiment 2 were identical
to those of Experiment 1. Second, we added a third treatment to the design,
the Only Winner Treatment, in order to test whether revealing only partial
information, namely whether one is the winner or not, is enough to produce
the same eﬀect we found in Experiment 1. Human beings have intrinsic pref-
erences for winning, perceived as a reward in itself. That is, they choose
to exert eﬀort to win (Fershtman et al., 2012) regardless of the payoﬀ dis-
tribution resulting from their eventual victory. Hence, one could speculate
that the eﬀects we uncovered in Experiment 1 are actually derived from this
motivation only, that is, that the desire to know whether one is the winner
is the actual driver behind the eﬀect. In the new treatment, the information
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regarding whether one is the winner or not is revealed independently of the
distribution choice. Hence, if the desire to know whether one is the winner
were enough to satisfy the need for information about performance, in the
new treatment the eﬀect should disappear.
Third, we added additional controls (personality scales) to the design in
order to test for the robustness of the eﬀects with respect to individual diﬀer-
ences. The new controls were of two kinds, related, ﬁrst, to general curiosity,
and, second, to self-motives. Speciﬁcally, we focused on epistemic curios-
ity (Loewenstein, 1994; Litman et al., 2005), using the epistemic curiosity
questionnaire by Litman and Mussel (2013), and self-motives (Sedikides and
Strube, 1995, 1997), using the questionnaire by Gregg et al. (2011). Both
constructs are described in Section 1.2 and their analysis is relegated to Ap-
pendix 1.A.
1.4.1 Design and Procedures
The experiment was a between-subject design with three treatments, again
conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research, and pro-
grammed in z-Tree. We recruited 270 participants through ORSEE from
the University of Cologne’s pool, excluding psychology students. The sam-
ple was perfectly balanced by gender, leaving 45 females and 45 males for
each of the three treatments. The average payoﬀ was EUR 10.56 (USD 14.21)
for a session that lasted around 55 minutes.
The experiment diﬀered from Experiment 1 in two respects. First, since
after Experiment 1 we concluded that neither risk attitudes nor achievement
motivation were determinant for the treatment eﬀect, we replaced those ques-
tionnaires by the ones measuring epistemic curiosity and self-motives as ex-
plained above. Since questionnaires were placed at the end of the experiment,
the change could not aﬀect behavior and the experiments remain fully com-
parable. Second, we added a third treatment, but the other two treatments
were identical to the control and No Info treatments of Experiment 1 (recall
Table 1.1), hence the new experiment contains a pure replication.
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Table 1.3: Only Winner Treatment in Experiment 2.
Only Winner Treatment
Equal Split Performance-Based
Rank Share (%) Rank Share (%)
1 20 1 40
- 20 2 30
- 20 3 15
- 20 4 10
- 20 5 5
The third treatment is the Only Winner Treatment. In this treatment, the
egalitarian and performance-based allocations are identical to those of other
treatments, but the associated information is diﬀerent. If the performance-
based split is chosen and implemented, as in the other two treatments all
information regarding how many additions have been correctly solved by
each member of the group and the resulting ranking is revealed. The diﬀer-
ence is that, if the equal split is the one chosen and implemented, then the
only information revealed is how many additions were correctly solved by the
winner, plus a signal indicating whether the participant is the winner or not.
See Table 1.3 for a summary of the treatment.
The rest of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 regarding the
real-eﬀort task, the procedure for implementing the chosen allocation, the
order of tasks and decisions, self-eﬃcacy elicitation, and the ﬁnal possibility
to privately receive feedback.
1.4.2 Distribution Choices
Figure 1.3 shows the proportions of participants choosing the performance-
based split across the three treatments, for the whole sample (a) and split
by gender (b). We successfully replicated the main result of Experiment
1. There were signiﬁcantly more performance-based choices in the No Info
treatment (75.56% of 90) than in the control treatment (43.33% of 90) (test
of proportions, z = −4.402, padj < 0.0001, adjusted for multiple compar-
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Only Winner Treatment 1 SEM
Adjusted p−values using Holm−Bonferroni Method
 
Figure 1.3: Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits.
Notes. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split across treat-
ments. (b) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and gender. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, test of proportions.
isons following the Holm-Bonferroni method). Further, the proportion of
performance-based choices in the Only Winner treatment (60.00% of 90) was
signiﬁcantly smaller than in the No Info treatment (z = 2.233, padj = 0.0256),
and larger than in the control treatment (z = −2.237, padj = 0.0505), al-
though the latter diﬀerence narrowly misses signiﬁcance. That is, the new
treatment lies clearly “in the middle” between the two previous ones.
Females chose the performance-based split less often than males in the
control treatment (females, 33.33%; males, 53.33%; z = 1.915, p = 0.0556),
although the diﬀerence narrowly misses signiﬁcance, whereas there were no
gender diﬀerences in the No Info treatment (females, 71.11%; males, 80.00%;
z = 0.981, p = 0.3265) or in the Only Winner treatment (females, 53.33%;
males, 66.67%; z = 1.291, p = 0.1967). That is, the apparently higher degree
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of inequality aversion of women in the control treatment disappears in both
of the treatments with an informational tradeoﬀ.
As in Experiment 1, when looking at females only, we also observe signif-
icantly more performance-based choices in the No Info treatment (71.11%)
than in the control treatment (33.33%) (test of proportions, z = −3.588,
padj = 0.0010). Further, the eﬀect is also signiﬁcant for males (No Info treat-
ment, 80.00%; control treatment, 53.33%; z = −2.683, padj = 0.0219). That
is, although the eﬀect for males missed signiﬁcance in Experiment 1, it is
signiﬁcant in the replication, and we conclude that both men and women
chose the performance-based split signiﬁcantly more often when information
was not revealed in the equal split. Looking at females only, the propor-
tion of performance-based choices in the Only Winner treatment (53.33%)
again lies between the control and the No Info treatments, although the ef-
fects miss signiﬁcance (No Info vs. Only Winner, z = 1.739, padj = 0.0820;
control vs. Only Winner, z = −1.915, padj = 0.1111). The proportion of
performance-based choices for males in the Only Winner treatment (66.7%)
was also between those of the other treatments, but the eﬀects are not sig-
niﬁcant (No Info vs. Only Winner, z = 1.430, padj = 0.3053; control vs. Only
Winner, z = −1.291, padj = 0.1967).14
If partial information, namely whether one was or not the winner, was
enough to satisfy performance curiosity, the eﬀect seen in Experiment 1
should disappear in the Only Winner treatment, because the information re-
garding the winner was available in both allocations. Quite to the contrary,
we observe that the eﬀect is already present in the Only Winner treatment.
Hence, we discard that revealing partial information about the winner is
enough to satisfy performance curiosity. The general picture that arises so
far is that Experiment 2 successfully replicated the results of Experiment 1,
but additionally the new treatment, where the information tradeoﬀ also ex-
ists but is less severe than in the No Info treatment (because less information
is hidden under the equal split) is simply midway between the control treat-
ment and the No Info one. That is, the stronger the informational tradeoﬀ,
14The interaction between gender and treatments was not significant in an additional
probit regression.
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the stronger the inﬂuence of performance curiosity, leading the participants
to choose the fully informative performance-based split.
1.4.3 Expected Performance
The median number of correctly solved additions in Experiment 2 was 15
(ranging from 3 to 36), and the median error rate was 0.15 (ranging from 0
to 0.73).15 As in Experiment 1, we control for the individual beliefs regard-
ing the expected ranking, elicited after the completion of the real-eﬀort task
but before the distribution choice. Figure 1.4(a) illustrates the expected own
ranking of the participants. In contrast to Experiment 1, there were some
minor but signiﬁcant diﬀerences in expectations across treatments. Speciﬁ-
cally, the average expected septile for participants in the No Info treatment
(4.378) was signiﬁcantly higher than that of the participants in the Only Win-
ner treatment (3.889; z = 2.487, padj = 0.0387), and also higher than that
of the participants in the control treatment (3.978; MWW test, z = 2.100,
padj = 0.0714) although the diﬀerence missed signiﬁcance. There were no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in expectations between the control and Only Winner
treatments (z = 0.430, padj = 0.6674).
As in Experiment 1, the proportion of performance-based choices was
signiﬁcantly higher in the No Info treatment than in the control treatment,
both for participants who expected to perform above average (control, 73.53%
of N = 34; No Info, 97.67% of N = 43; test of proportions, z = −3.130,
p = 0.0017) and for those who expected to perform on average (control,
23.81% of N = 21; No Info, 72.00% of N = 25; z = −3.256, p = 0.0011).
The diﬀerence for participants who expected to perform below the average
was not signiﬁcant (control, 25.71% of N = 35; No Info, 36.36% of N = 22;
z = −0.856, p = 0.3922). However, we do not observe “last-place aversion”
15As in Experiment 1, participants were asked how many additions they thought they
had solved correctly (after completing the real-effort task but before making the distri-
bution choice). The average expectation was 16.2 additions in the control treatment,
17.3 additions in the No Info treatment, and 15.0 additions in the Only Winner treat-
ment. The differences were generally not significant according Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
tests, adjusted for multiple testing (control vs. No Info, z = −1.177, padj = 0.2393; con-
trol vs. Only Winner, z = 1.344, padj = 0.3577; No Info vs. Only Winner, z = 2.217,
padj = 0.0799).
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Figure 1.4: Experiment 2, Proportion of Performance-Based Splits and Expected
Performance.
Notes. (a) Proportion of participants choosing the performance-based split by treatment
and belief. (b) Expected versus actual performance by gender. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05,
⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, test of proportions.
(Kuziemko et al., 2014) in the sense that for those subjects the equal split
distribution is not chosen signiﬁcantly more often in the No Info treatment,
where they could hide their expected poor placement.
As commented above, the proportion of performance-based choices in the
Only Winner treatment lies between the proportion of performance-based
split in the control and No Info treatments. Of course, this points to weaker
eﬀect sizes when comparing with either of the other two treatments. As a
consequence, when splitting the data into the three expected performance
ranges, the diﬀerences are in general not signiﬁcant.
Figure 1.4(b) plots the expected performance (average report in the 7-
point Likert scale) for males and females, conditional on the actual population
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septiles in the experiment, as computed from the number of correctly solved
additions (compare with Figure 1.2(b)). As in Experiment 1, we observe
that females tend to underestimate performance compared to males. This is
conﬁrmed by a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test on the whole sample (males,
N = 135, average expected septile 4.304; females, N = 135, average 3.859;
z = 2.843, p = 0.0045).16
1.4.4 Regression Analysis
We now turn to a regression analysis to conﬁrm the results of our non-
parametric tests while controlling for expected ranking and for the various
other individual variables measured in the experiment. In view of the results
above, instead of treatment dummies we introduce two dummies representing
what kind of information is revealed. The ﬁrst dummy, Hidden Info, captures
all cases when some information is hidden in the equal split, that is, both the
No Info and the Only Winner treatment. The second dummy, Only First,
further diﬀerentiates the cases where only information regarding the winner
is revealed when the equal split is implemented, that is, identiﬁes the Only
Winner treatment. This way we can better analyze the diﬀerential eﬀects
of the informational treatments and emphasize the comparisons between the
Only Winner and the No Info treatments (captured directly by the Only First
dummy) and between the No Info and the control treatments (captured by
the Hidden Info dummy).
Model 1 (see Table 1.4) captures the basic treatment eﬀects without ad-
ditional controls and reproduces the insights from the non-parametric tests
as illustrated in Figure 1.3(a). The Hidden Information dummy is positive
and highly signiﬁcant, showing that choosing the performance-based split
was more likely in the No Info treatment than in the control treatment. The
Only First dummy is signiﬁcant and negative, showing that performance-
based choices were less likely in the Only Winner treatment than in the No
Info treatment. A linear combination test (bottom of Table 1.4) shows that
16As in Experiment 1, women actually performed worse than men, with an average 17.2
correct additions for males and 15.1 for females (MWW test, z = 2.294, p = 0.0218).
Recall Footnote 13.
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Table 1.4: Experiment 2, Probit Regressions on Performance-based Choices.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Hidden Info 0.860∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(0.1961) (0.1978) (0.2208)






Constant −0.168 0.0220 −0.0634
(0.1328) (0.1547) (0.1694)
LogLikelihood −172.205 −169.224 −136.021
Wald Test 19.261∗∗∗ 24.540∗∗∗ 68.681∗∗∗
Linear Combination Test 0.421∗∗ 0.430∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
Hidden Info + Only First (0.1884) (0.1899) (0.2077)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
performance-based choices were more likely in the Only Winner treatment
than in the control treatment.
In Model 2, we further control for gender. Females are less likely to
choose the performance-based split than men, as reﬂected by the signiﬁcantly
negative female dummy. Adding interactions between gender and treatments
does not change the results qualitatively. Otherwise, the results of Model 1
are not aﬀected by controlling for gender.
Model 3 incorporates the expected performance (in septiles and centered
at 0), which, as in Experiment 1, is shown to have a positive and highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of choosing the performance-based split.
That is, subjects are naturally more likely to choose the performance-based
split when they expect to be highly ranked. As expected, the female dummy
becomes insigniﬁcant controlling for expectations, conﬁrming that the appar-
ent gender eﬀect is fully driven by the fact that females have lower expecta-
tions than males. The key treatment eﬀect remains signiﬁcant, showing that
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even when controlling for expectations the performance-based choice is more
likely in the No Info treatment than in the control treatment (as in Experi-
ment 1). However, the diﬀerence between the No Info and the Only Winner
treatments becomes insigniﬁcant (p = 0.1686) when we control for expecta-
tions. Accordingly, the diﬀerence between the control and the Only Winner
treatments becomes more pronounced and highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.0061),
suggesting that, after controlling for expectations, both the Only Winner and
the No Info treatments actually have similar eﬀects. Recall that if partial
information were already enough to satisfy performance curiosity, we would
expect no eﬀect at all in the Only Winner treatment, as this information
is available independently of the distribution choice. Hence, it seems that
the driver of behavior is the actual curiosity to know the own performance,
independently of whether one is the winner or not.
1.5 Discussion
We have shown that performance curiosity, a form of intrinsic motivation
related to self-image, can overcome preferences for egalitarian allocations of
jointly generated proceeds. In our experiments, a subtle manipulation in
the structure of information regarding how well each participant performed
in a real-eﬀort task was enough to produce large shifts away from equal-
split choices and toward performance-based schemes. This eﬀect subsists
even when one controls for expected relative performance, which of course
correlates with the choice of the performance-based allocation, as the latter
maximizes expected income if one expects to perform better than average.
As we expected, the eﬀect of performance curiosity appears to be much
stronger for females than for males, with the consequence that the manipula-
tion greatly helps reduce gender diﬀerences in egalitarian choices. The gender
diﬀerence in our results is fully explained by diﬀerences in performance be-
liefs. Apparent gender diﬀerences regarding the proportion of equal-split
choices (and hence, inequality aversion) are caused by diﬀerences in beliefs
regarding the own performance, namely the fact that, compared to women,
men are typically more overconﬁdent. The diﬀerence in beliefs creates an
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apparent gender eﬀect in the control treatment, with females choosing the
egalitarian allocation more often than males. This diﬀerence (and the eﬀect
of beliefs) disappears in the presence of performance curiosity. Our analysis
hence identiﬁes a factor which helps overcome gender diﬀerences arising from
relative underconﬁdence.
Appendix A analyzes and discards a number of alternative explanations
for our results, on the basis of supplementary data (questionnaires) collected
in the two experiments. Some other alternative interpretations of our re-
sults and possible extensions are as follows. First, it is well-known that
diﬀerent factors as entitlement, merits, etc, can be used as justiﬁcations in
order to depart from “fair” allocations and switch to more favorable ones
(in terms of income). It could be argued that the presence of additional
information attached to the performance-based split could have been used
as precisely such a justiﬁcation even if the participants did not care about
the information itself. However, this explanation is unlikely because our
data shows a larger proportion of performance-based distribution choices in
the No Info treatment than in the control treatment even for subjects who
expected to perform exactly on or below average. For those participants,
by design the income-maximizing decision would have been the equal split.
Hence, the additional information has no value as an excuse to pursue an
income-maximizing allocation.
Second, a possible alternative interpretation would be that the eﬀect is
simply due to the fact that, in the No info treatment, the performance-based
distribution comes with an additional informational attribute than the equal
split distribution. This explanation would imply that general curiosity is
far stronger than assumed, in the sense that the particular content of the
additional information is not relevant. By its very nature, a performance-
based split will always reveal some information on performance, hence it is
not possible to shut down that informational attribute and replace it with an
alternative, less informative one. However, the explanation could be tested
with an additional design where the equal split is endowed with some non-
informative attribute (with respect to performance; e.g., the weather forecast
of a remote country) but the performance-based split is still endowed with
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performance information. Hence, the number of informational attributes
would be kept constant, and any diﬀerence would be due to the actual nature
of the information. This design goes beyond the scope of the present work.
A related point is that in the No Info treatment it was made salient that
information on performance was being left out, which might have increased
the focus on performance. This is unavoidable, since the point of our design
is to make the tradeoﬀ between information and an equal-split allocation
apparent. However, the real-eﬀort task was run before the actual choices
were presented. There was no information whatsoever about the fact that
performance information might or might not be revealed depending on later
choices (in the No Info treatment, the initial instructions mentioned that
choices might diﬀer in attached information, but the nature of such informa-
tion was not explained until after the real-eﬀort task). That is, the fact that
there was a tradeoﬀ with respect to information on performance was only
apparent right before the actual choice of distribution, and hence any pos-
sible salience eﬀects would have been kept to a minimum. Also, we remark
that, as shown in the regression analysis, the eﬀect subsists when controlling
for expected performance.
Some extensions of the present research would be natural. We mention
here just two of them. First, Loewenstein (1994) argued that curiosity may
be an impulsive hedonic drive that easily wanes after being satisﬁed. If this
is the case, prosocial decision makers might regret having chosen feedback
over equality, leading to diﬀerent decisions in the future. Since our objective
was to show that performance curiosity can trump inequality aversion, we
adopted a purely one-shot design, and hence we cannot test this additional
possibility. It would be possible to expand the design incorporating repeated
decisions in order to test for this hypothesis, but if performance was revealed
between decisions, it would be necessary to appropriately control for it.
A second natural avenue for further research would be to elicit the actual
willingness to pay for information on performance. In view of well-known be-
havioral phenomena pointing at discrepancies between valuations and actual
choices and the noisy character of evaluations (e.g., Delquié, 1993; Alós-
Ferrer et al., 2016a), we aimed to establish that the postulated eﬀect had
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consequences on actual behavior (choice data), but once this eﬀect has been
established, evaluating the willingness to pay for information is a natural sec-
ond step. Although we leave this task for future research, we can oﬀer some
preliminary evidence because, as mentioned above, participants who believed
to be exactly on average or below would have maximized expected payoﬀs by
choosing the equal-split allocation, but did not choose that allocation more
often. Hence they actually revealed the willingness to incur monetary costs
in order to obtain the information.
We view our research as a contribution to the general investigation into
the causes of and motivations behind preferences among diﬀerent distribu-
tional allocations, especially in frameworks where the resources that are dis-
tributed can be traced back to individual contributions. This is potentially
important for reward schemes in ﬁrms and organizations, and for a deeper
understanding of attitudes with respect to fairness and redistribution at the
societal level. Our results, however, can be read in two diﬀerent ways. If
egalitarian allocations are viewed as fair and hence as a worthy policy ob-
jective, the results point out that support for egalitarian principles might be
diminished in society if information on individual performance is restricted,
for instance in order to protect privacy or to avoid making interpersonal
comparisons prominent. While people might be willing to accept egalitarian
redistributions independently of whether they proﬁt from them themselves
or not, they still have a strong preference for receiving information on their
relative individual contribution. On the other hand, if rewarding perfor-
mance through incentives is viewed as fair and desirable, linking information
to rewards might result in increased social support of the corresponding dis-
tribution schemes.
Appendix 1.A: Robustness Analysis
Appendix 1.A.1: Experiment 1
In this subsection, we report on a few additional controls which help discard
possible alternative interpretations. First, it is natural to speculate that some
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participants might choose the egalitarian distribution in the No Info treat-
ment in order to protect their self-image, especially if they fear being below
average, because in this way they avoid being exposed to negative feedback.
However, this would create a tendency leading to less performance-based
splits, which we do not observe, even among participants who expected to
be below average. In any case, we anticipated this alternative explanation
and we introduced a ﬁnal question for participants in the No Info treat-
ment, after all other decisions have been made but before the distribution
was implemented. In this question, we asked them whether they wanted to
be privately informed about their own performance (both absolute and rel-
ative, that is, number of correctly solved additions and ranking within the
group), independently of which distribution was ﬁnally implemented. Recall
that even if a participant chose the performance-based split, it was not guar-
anteed that the information would be revealed, since the random mechanism
could select a diﬀerent participant, which might have chosen the egalitarian
allocation instead. Hence the additional question made sense to participants.
All participants but one (that is, 89 out of 90) chose to see their own perfor-
mance, indicating that the possible desire to protect their self-image against
feedback was not a factor.
Second, we measured risk attitudes by means of the lottery questionnaire
of Holt and Laury (2002). There were no diﬀerences in risk attitudes by
gender (males: mean relative risk aversion parameter 0.497; females: mean
0.558; MWW test, z = −0.405, p = 0.6851), treatment (control treatment:
mean 0.526; No Info treatment: mean 0.530; z = −0.203, p = 0.8388), or
choice (egalitarian choice, N = 82, mean 0.530; performance-based choice,
N = 98, mean 0.526; z = −0.062, p = 0.9508).17
Third, we also used the reduced Achievement Motive Scale of Lang and
Fries (2006) to elicit achievement motives. That scale is divided in questions
eliciting two components, aptly named “hope of success” and “fear of fail-
ure.” Each subscale is made out of 5 items on a 4-point Likert scale, and
17Pooling together a large number of experimental studies, Filippin and Crosetto (2016)
find significant but very small gender differences in risk attitudes, as measured by the
lottery-questionnaire method.
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the (added) scores of the subscale range from 4 to 20. We found the gen-
der diﬀerences typically described in the literature, namely that men score
signiﬁcantly higher on the hope of success scale (males: mean 17.122; fe-
males: mean 15.944; MWW test, z = 3.518, p = 0.0004) and women score
signiﬁcantly higher on the fear of failure scale (males: mean 10.344; females:
mean 12.400; z = −4.346, p < 0.0001). There were no diﬀerences across
treatments, neither for hope of success (control treatment, mean 16.300; No
Info treatment, mean 16.767; z = −1.379, p = 0.1680) nor for fear of failure
(control treatment, mean 11.400; No Info treatment, mean 11.344; z = 0.200,
p = 0.8417).
There was no diﬀerence by choices in the scores of the fear of failure
scale (egalitarian choice: N = 82, mean 11.780; performance-based choice,
N = 98, mean 11.031; z = 1.470, p = 0.1415). However, participants who
chose the performance-based split scored higher on the hope of success scale
(egalitarian choice: N = 82, mean 15.841; performance-based choice, N =
98, mean 17.112; z = −3.689, p = 0.0002). This diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant
if we look separately at the control treatment (egalitarian choice: N = 55,
mean 15.872; performance-based choice, N = 35, mean 16.971; z = −2.914,
p = 0.0283) and the No Info treatment (egalitarian choice, N = 27, mean
15.778; performance-based choice, N = 63, mean 17.190, z = −2.776, p =
0.0055). This makes sense as hope of success should be associated with higher
expectations, hence a higher likelihood of choosing the performance-based
split. In other words, we do not gain any new insights from the achievement
motivation scales.
To further examine the eﬀects of achievement motivation and risk atti-
tudes, and also to study the robustness of the basic eﬀects, we added them
as controls in a further regression model (see Table 1.5). This model also
includes interactions with the No Info treatment, which should reﬂect any
possible explanation of the basic eﬀect based on the individual diﬀerences
captured by the new measures. This has the problem that the interpretation
of the treatment dummy becomes more complex. To test for the treatment
eﬀect of the manipulation, we calculated the average marginal eﬀects of the
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treatment dummy on the performance-based split choice.18 As shown in
the bottom line of Table 1.5, the average marginal eﬀects of the treatment
dummy are highly signiﬁcant and quantify a 25% increase in the probability
of choosing the performance-based split after including the manipulation in
the structure of the information.
The regression model, however, did not detect any signiﬁcant eﬀects of
risk attitudes, hope of success, or fear of failure. Hence, we conclude that
these additional variables do not hid any alternative explanation and our
basic eﬀects, as captured in Model 3 (Table 1.2), are robust.
Appendix 1.A.2: Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, subjects in the No Info and Only Winner treatments
were asked whether they wanted to be informed about the own absolute and
relative performance after making the distribution choice. Only two subjects
(of 180) declined to receive feedback. Hence, we conclude again that self-
image protection does not appear to be a factor in our experiments.
In Experiment 2, we further investigated the possible relation of per-
formance curiosity to existing constructs capturing curiosity. We focused
on epistemic curiosity (Loewenstein, 1994; Litman et al., 2005; recall Sec-
tion 1.2) and included the epistemic curiosity questionnaire by Litman and
Mussel (2013). Further, since our explanation for the relevance of perfor-
mance curiosity hinges on the value of feedback for the own self-image, we ex-
plored whether this link was captured by diﬀerences in standard self-motives
(Sedikides and Strube, 1995, 1997; recall Section 1.2) and included the ques-
tionnaire by Gregg et al. (2011).
Model 4 (see Table 1.6) includes the two measures for epistemic curiosity
(EC) and the four measures of self-motives (SM) elicited through question-
naires, and the interaction of each of the six measures with the two infor-
mation dummies. None of the new measures is signiﬁcant, and among the
twelve interactions only one reaches signiﬁcance, namely the interaction be-
18The average marginal effect calculates the average difference in the predicted proba-
bility of choosing the performance-based split if all observations would have been in the No
Info treatment, compared to if all observations would have been in the control treatment.
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Risk Attitude 0.019 −0.054
(0.3769) (0.5074)
Hope of Success 0.047 0.002
(0.0666) (0.0865)






Average Marginal Eﬀects 0.247∗∗∗
No Info Treatment (0.0517)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
tween self-improvement and the Hidden Information dummy. There is hence,
no convincing basis to speculate that the performance curiosity concept might
be captured or closely related to existing measures of curiosity or self-motives.
As in Model 3 (Table 1.4), there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
Only Winner and the No Info treatments. Hence, Model 4 shows the robust-
ness of Model 3. To examine the robustness of the main results to the intro-
duction of the new 18 coeﬃcients, we again calculated the average marginal
eﬀects to test for the treatment eﬀect. Those are shown at the bottom of
Table 1.6. The eﬀect of the No Info treatment is positive and highly signif-
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EC-Interest −0.012 0.034 −0.020
(0.0683) (0.0970) (0.1038)
EC-Deprived −0.010 −0.008 0.051
(0.0460) (0.0856) (0.0941)
SM-Enhance −0.012 0.027 0.005
(0.1388) (0.2061) (0.2038)
SM-Assessment −0.074 −0.016 −0.110
(0.1962) (0.2896) (0.2708)
SM-Veriﬁcation −0.029 0.171 −0.255
(0.1397) (0.2301) (0.2394)







Hidden Info Only First
0.235∗∗∗ −0.075
(0.0561) (0.0618)
Notes. Standard errors in brackets,∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
icant, showing that the probability of choosing the performance-based split
is increased by approximately 24% by the basic manipulation. This almost
exactly replicates the conclusion from Experiment 1 (recall Table 1.5)
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The Big Robber Game
2.1 Introduction
The recent decades have witnessed an astonishing loss of conﬁdence by the
general public on ﬁnancial institutions, large ﬁrms, and economic decision
makers. The image of riotous protesters at WTOministerial conferences, G20
summits, and other high-level meetings has become commonplace. Public an-
imosity toward ﬁnancial institutions, the banking sector, and “Wall Street”
reached a 40-year high in 2011 (Owens, 2012). Beyond the circles of academic
economists and politicians, conﬁdence in the market has been replaced by the
views put forward by former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who coined
the term “predatory capitalism” (Raubtierkapitalismus; Schmidt, 2003), re-
ferring for instance to a large number of scandals where corporate executive
oﬃcers were viewed as unduly appropriating funds or actively damaging so-
ciety. As stated by Krugman (2008), “[Americans have] lost conﬁdence in the
integrity of our economic institutions.” This has sparked a widespread, cyn-
ical view of economic actors as hopelessly-selﬁsh agents capable of inﬂicting
any damage on others for personal gain.1
On the other hand, it is clear that self-interest is not the only motivation
guiding economic human decisions, and this has long been recognized in
economics. As Adam Smith put it, “how selﬁsh soever man may be supposed
to be, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him
in the fate of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derive nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith, 1759). The
limits of self-interest have been systematically exposed in experiments using
1The idea that corporate scandals might have even macroeconomic consequences is
reflected, for instance, in the model of Myerson (2012), where the possibility of moral-
hazard rents extracted by bankers and financial agents can create macroeconomic credit
cycles with repeated recessions.
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stylized games as the Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982), the Dictator
Game (Forsythe et al., 1994), and the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995), as
well as in many distributive-allocation experiments (Engelmann and Strobel,
2004). This evidence has motivated models incorporating various forms of
“social preferences,” encompassing fairness concerns, prosociality, and even
motivations with an intentional component as reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Alger and Weibull, 2013).
The “social-preference revolution” seems to be based on the enticingly
simple message that economic agents are not so selﬁsh as usually assumed in
economic theory. For example, in a widely-echoed article, Mazar et al. (2008)
argue that most people will help others, refrain from actively damaging them,
and, if given opportunity, cheat only a little. This message, however, is at
odds with the popular (and populist) criticisms of the “economic system,”
which showcase the allegedly inordinate levels of selﬁshness displayed by cor-
porate executives and decision makers in the ﬁnancial sector. In other words,
while social-preference models attempt to defuse the assumption that eco-
nomic agents are selﬁsh, the popular perception of economic decision makers
is that, at least at certain levels, selﬁshness is rampant.
In view of these opposed trends, it is maybe advisable to make a distinc-
tion between social preferences and the experimental observation of prosocial
or altruistic behavior. To drive this point home, consider the following ex-
ample. A decision maker i = 1 can choose among certain allocations for
n participants, including herself, x = (x1, . . . , xn), with the property that∑
n
i=1 xi = C for a certain amount C > 0. Her utility function is given by








This is an example of social preferences as in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Suppose this decision maker participates in a Dictator Game where she can
freely allocate 10 monetary units between herself and a second participant,
that is, n = 2, C = 10, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 10. A straightforward computation
shows that u is maximized at x1 = 7, hence the decision maker will freely
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donate 3 out of 10 monetary units to the other player, in line with prosocial
behavior as typically observed for the Dictator Game in the lab. That is,
this decision maker can be seen as prosocial. Suppose that this very same
decision maker is now part of a group of 17 people, each of them endowed with
10 monetary units, and she is given the power to appropriate any amount
τ from each of the other participants (uniformly). That is, n = 17, C =
170, and the decision maker can freely choose among allocations of the form(
10 + 16τ, 10− τ, 16. . ., 10− τ), and hence her problem consists of maximizing







over 0 ≤ τ ≤ 10. A direct computation shows that v(·) is strictly increasing
in its domain, and hence our prosocial decision maker will decide τ = 10,
appropriating all income from a group of 16 other participants.
In our view, it is uncontested that, ﬁrst, humans care about how their
actions aﬀect others and, second, selﬁshness is one of the most fundamental
and powerful human motivations. The diﬀerence between prosocial behavior
as observed in the lab and rampant egoism as apparently observed in the ﬁeld
is that the situations triggering the respective responses are fundamentally
diﬀerent. As the example above illustrates, this is readily captured by extant
models of social preferences. In this work, we aim to demonstrate empiri-
cally that prosocial behavior in the small is fully compatible with morally-
outrageous behavior in high-stakes, high-impact decisions where a decision
maker can obtain a large personal gain at the expense of signiﬁcantly dam-
aging a large number of other people. Obtaining such empirical evidence
entails three kinds of diﬃculties, and it is our aim to address them within an
experimental paradigm designed to inform the discussion.
First, many of the experimental paradigms on which social-preference
models have been based are constrained to bilateral interactions. This is
natural, since those games were a ﬁrst step in research, and keeping the
experimental setting as simple as possible facilitates the analysis. Think,
however, of the typical situation that critics of ﬁnancial institutions have
in mind, where a single decision maker has the possibility to harm a large
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number of people. Clearly, such a situation diﬀers from the experimental
paradigms in several dimensions, and hence the latter are not well-suited to
predict behavior in the former. For example, in view of corporate scandals, it
could be argued that ﬁnancial institutions select people who are not represen-
tative of the general population, and hence prosocial behavior in the large is
compatible with selﬁsh behavior at certain levels. Currently-employed exper-
imental paradigms, however, are not appropriate to test for such a selection
phenomenon, since one would need an experimental setting where regular
laboratory subjects can actually damage a group of other experimental par-
ticipants (in exchange for signiﬁcant monetary gain). This is exactly what
our design provides.
The second, related diﬃculty is that games of the bargaining type (Ul-
timatum, Dictator, and Trust games) are highly stylized and might hence
measure a very speciﬁc dimension of behavior. Again, this is natural, since
they were originally designed to provide demonstrations of the existence of
social preferences and motives. But they might be insuﬃcient to explore
the full impact of prosocial behavior on economic decisions. In other words,
those games might be triggering prosocial behavior in a limited set of situa-
tions, which might be compatible with high levels of selﬁshness being sparked
in diﬀerent circumstances (see also Levitt and List, 2007). Our experiment
contributes to the literature supporting this view.
The third diﬃculty is that, to determine whether prosocial behavior is
of suﬃcient magnitude as to be seen as a major driving force for economic
behavior, one needs to address the size of the stakes. This question is hard
to examine in standard laboratory experiments, simply because the stakes
are too low. There are, however, indications that prosocial behavior can
still be found in spite of high stakes. Indeed, experiments in low-income
countries have found prosocial behavior with large stakes (Roth et al., 1991;
Slonim and Roth, 1998; Andersen et al., 2011).2 However, an analogous,
smoking-gun demonstration for high-income, developed countries is missing,
because generating high stakes in such environments would quickly exhaust
2Andersen et al. (2011) focused on responder behavior in Ultimatum games and showed
that rejection rates decreased with high stakes, but were still positive.
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even the most generous research budget. Our design makes a methodological
contribution by providing a cost-neutral way (in terms of research budget
expenditure) to study high-stake settings.
In this contribution, we present a new experimental paradigm, the “Big
Robber Game,” which adds to the debate on prosociality vs. selﬁshness along
the three dimensions sketched above. First, it focuses on a situation where
a single decision maker can take a signiﬁcant amount of money from a large
group of other participants, and is hence closer to phenomena sparking public-
opinion concerns in recent years. Second, it provides a qualitatively diﬀerent
paradigm which, together with standard games as the Ultimatum, Dictator,
and Trust games, allows for a more complete exploration of the nature and
consequences of social preferences. Third, it allows us to test for prosocial
behavior by educated subjects in developed countries, with reasonably high
stakes (around 100 Dollars/Euros), in a natural, straightforward frame where
being selﬁsh inﬂict serious damage on a group of others.
The basic, pragmatic design idea behind the Big Robber Game is as
follows. Consider an average researcher in economics based in the U.S. or
Europe, with access to a budget for behavioral experiments. A single ses-
sion with, say, 30 participants, costs around e/$ 400 (or more). From the
point of view of the average participant, the cost of that individual session
is a signiﬁcant amount of money. Suppose that the experimenter selects a
participant randomly from half of the participants in the session and gives
him or her the possibility of taking as much as 50% of the earnings of the
other half of the players in the session. Then, a player in this game will face
a single decision potentially giving him or her the possibility to walk away
with e/$ 100. That decision might seriously damage a relatively large num-
ber of people and be considered selﬁsh, even antisocial. The experimental
session, however, does not cost more. Our experimenter will spend exactly
the same part of his or her research budget as a “regular” experiment would
have required.
In our design, we allocated participants to two possible roles, which were
framed neutrally (type I and II) but which we will refer to here as “robbers”
and “victims.” Robbers were asked the Big Robber question, that is, which
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fraction of the earnings of the victims they wished to take away. Crucially,
only one robber was selected at the end (and his or her decision actually
implemented), but all robbers had to answer the question in advance (as in
the strategy method; Selten, 1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011). All victims
were informed in advance of the possibility that a fraction of their earnings
could be taken away by a robber. There was only one Big Robber decision,
with ﬁxed roles, that is, robbers could not be robbed themselves, and there
was no possible retaliation. To generate the relevant income, players of both
roles provided their decisions for the active and passive roles in a series of
intermediate games: Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. This allows
us to compare behavior in the Big Robber question to behavior in these
standard games, and hence link the diﬀerent measures of prosociality that
they provide. Feedback was not provided until the end of the experiment,
and participants did not know the identity or any characteristic of the players
they would be matched with in the intermediate games (not even if they were
robbers or victims). Therefore, behavior could not be aﬀected by possible
group rivalry (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2010, 2012).
Beyond the primary research question, we were also interested to see
whether merely asking the Big Robber question might have an eﬀect on
subsequent behavior, since a number of psychological theories (see Section
2.4 below) might predict behavioral eﬀects. Hence, we further divided the
set of robbers in two, creating two diﬀerent treatments. “Ex ante robbers”
were asked the Big Robber question at the beginning of the experiment,
before they provided their decisions for the intermediate games. “Ex post
robbers” were asked the Big Robber question after they had made their
decisions for the intermediate games (note that, since only victims could be
robbed, the Big Robber question did not aﬀect the robbers’ earnings from
the intermediate games).
After all decisions had been made, but before they were implemented and
payoﬀs were determined, we asked participants whether they would donate a
percentage of their earnings (net of the show-up fee) to a local charity. They
were free to specify any fraction. The idea of this “donation question” was
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to provide an independent measure of possible guilt, by giving robbers the
chance to give a prosocial use to their appropriated earnings.
The theoretical predictions of the selﬁsh homo oeconomicus for the Big
Robber Game are straightforward: take as much as possible. Received social-
preference models predict varying levels of selﬁsh behavior, which we examine
in Section 2.6. Those models incorporate parameters of prosociality which
can diﬀer across subjects. The intermediate games provide exactly such
measures of prosociality. We use the Dictator Game to calibrate the models
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002), and Alger and Weibull (2013). As in our example above, the
predictions for these models suggest that the agent should in many cases take
as much as possible, i.e. 50%; actually, standard social-preference models
predict higher levels of selﬁsh behavior than we actually observe.
The results of the experiment show that the paradigm provides new in-
sights into social preferences and prosocial behavior which go beyond the
ones that can be gathered with “standard” games as the Dictator, Ultima-
tum, and Trust games. First, at the stakes level of the Big Robber Game,
there is a considerable degree of “selﬁshness” as predicted, with as much as
56% of robbers deciding to take as much as allowed of the victims’ earnings.
However, the behavior of the very same robbers in the Dictator, Ultimatum,
and Trust games is within standard ranges. This shows that the Big Robber
Game provides indeed a novel view for the debate on prosociality vs. self-
ishness, and that diﬀerent situations even within the same experiment can
trigger qualitatively diﬀerent behavior with respect to the perceived proso-
ciality associated with the decisions.
Second, we do ﬁnd that robbers who decide to take as much as possible
behave more selﬁshly than robbers who do not take the maximum in the Dic-
tator, Ultimatum, and Trust games, and also in the donation question. That
is, the Big Robber Game is not orthogonal to other paradigms; on the con-
trary, behavior in our paradigm does correlate with individual prosociality,
and hence is consistent with underlying social preferences as modeled in the
literature. Third, we do ﬁnd some (weak) treatment eﬀects between ex ante
and ex post robbers which are compatible with known psychological theories.
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However, these eﬀects interact with gender, showing basic diﬀerences in the
eﬀect that revealing oneself to be selﬁsh has on subsequent behavior. Gender
diﬀerences were not unexpected, and hence we took care to have a perfectly
balanced sample, with exactly half of all robbers within each treatment being
female.
Our study is of course related to several branches of the extensive lit-
erature on social preferences. Some experimental paradigms in this litera-
ture allow players to take money from other players. In the Power-to-Take
game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Reuben and van
Winden, 2010), a player can attempt to take the earnings of another player,
but the second player can react by destroying his own income and hence
the part appropriated by the ﬁrst player. Players in the “take role” choose
considerable take rates in this paradigm. Bosman et al. (2006) consider a
version with group decisions and show that behavior is very similar to the
individual version. In the Moonlighting Game (Abbink et al., 2000), the ﬁrst
mover can either transfer money to a second mover or steal from him, but
the second mover is able to punish. Results showed consistent punishment
of stealing behavior although punishment was costly. Bardsley (2008) con-
sidered a Dictator Game with the added option to take income away from
the recipient (see also List, 2007), and showed that Dictator giving is greatly
reduced when the option to take exists. Andreoni (1995) found more selﬁsh
behavior when taking from a public account than when giving to a public
good.3 Khadjavi and Lange (2015) replicated the experiment making both
the taking and giving options simultaneously available and found that allow-
ing for taking reduces giving. These results are qualitatively in agreement
with ours and show that situations where taking is possible generally trigger
less prosocial behavior than those framed in terms of bargaining or sharing.
3There is also a relation to the Common-Pool Resource (CPR) dilemma (Gardner
et al., 1990), where multiple players extract resources from a common pool. Among other
conditions, Gardner et al. (1990) define CPR dilemmas by Multiple Appropriators, i.e.
more than one individual withdraws resources from the common pool, and a common-pool
resource. However, the Big Robber Game does not satisfy these two conditions. First,
there exists only one Big Robber in the game and second, he or she is not withdrawing
from a common pool but only from the individual earnings of each victim who cannot take
from others.
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The literature has also examined a number of paradigms where antiso-
cial behavior emerges in the laboratory, for instance where participants can
destroy the earnings of others or of a group of innocents, due to envy or
a concern for relative payoﬀs (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2004; Ab-
bink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 2011; Karakostas and Zizzo,
2016). Among those, we single out the experiment of Zizzo (2004), where
participants could appropriate other participants’ income or transfer it to
others. Decisions were made within small (four-player) groups where every-
body could be robbed by the other three participants. This creates a situation
closer to a social dilemma where a participants’ act of stealing could be ar-
gued to be self-defense, since other participants will most likely steal from
him or her.
Our paradigm goes beyond previous insights by providing a (relatively)
high-stakes situation where an individual can take up to half of the earnings of
a large group of other participants, while systematically comparing decisions
to simultaneous Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. In contrast with
the paradigms mentioned above, our focus is on decisions aﬀecting a large
group (not bilateral interactions), with high stakes involved, and where the
decision to take the earnings of others is non-strategic, that is, can be made
with impunity.
Conceptually, our study is aligned with Levitt and List (2007), who ar-
gue that behavior is crucially linked to not only the underlying preferences
but also the speciﬁc characteristics and properties of the situation at hand.
The Big Robber Game provides a speciﬁc, relevant setting where qualitative
behavior becomes predominantly selﬁsh, even though the same participants
simultaneously display standard levels of prosocial behavior in Dictator, Ul-
timatum, and Trust games played during the very same experimental session.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the experi-
mental design in detail. Section 2.3 discusses the results of the Big Robber
Game in itself, that is, the decision to take away (or not) the earnings of
other players. It also examines the diﬀerences in behavior (in the interme-
diate games) across robbers who behave more or less selﬁshly. Section 2.4
discusses treatment eﬀects, that is, diﬀerences in behavior due to whether
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the Big Robber question had already been answered or not when players
faced the intermediate games. Section 2.5 examines the answers to the ﬁ-
nal donation question. Section 2.6 examines the predictions of well-known
models of social preferences for the Big Robber Game, performing a simple
out-of-sample estimation analysis. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Design and Procedures
The objective of the design was to allow for the measurement of a corre-
late of social preferences where signiﬁcant personal gain can be obtained at
the cost of economically harming a large group of fellow participants. The
novel design of the experiment allowed us to accomplish this objective while
maintaining an aﬀordable total experiment cost, even though relatively high
stakes were involved and the experiment was run in a developed, high-income
country (Germany).
The experiment consisted of three parts: the Big Robber question, a se-
quence of games (Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games), which we will refer
to as the intermediate games, and a ﬁnal block of questionnaires, including
a belief elicitation question and the opportunity to donate a fraction of the
individual earnings to a charity organization. For the duration of the ex-
periment participants were assigned two roles: half of the participants were
robbers (neutrally labeled “Type I” during the experiment) and the other half
were victims (“Type II”). These roles were only relevant for the Big Robber
question. All victims knew from the beginning that there is the Big Robber
question in which money could be taken away from them by the choice of
the robbers. The robbers were allocated in two between-subject treatments,
which diﬀered in the timing of the Big Robber question. In the ex ante
treatment, the Big Robber question was asked before participants played the
sequence of games and they knew as much as the victims. In the ex post
treatment, the order was the reverse one and ex post robbers were not aware
of the possibility of robbing until after they provided all their decisions for
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the sequence of games. Note that, since robbers could not be robbed them-
selves this additional piece of information did not aﬀect their payoﬀs in the
sequence of games. This design serves two purposes. First, by comparing
across treatments, it becomes feasible to test for possible eﬀects of the Big
Robber question on subsequent behavior. Second, it allows us to disentan-
gle robbing behavior from possible confounds due to the order of tasks and
whether the involved income has already been generated or not.
We now discuss the three parts in detail. Figure 2.1 presents an overview
of the design. At the very beginning, participants were informed that the
experiment consisted of multiple parts but no details were provided.
The Big Robber question revealed to the participants that there were two
types of players in the experiment. There were 32 participants per session.
In each session, 16 participants were randomly assigned to the robber role
and the remaining 16 to the victim role. The instructions referred to these
roles as “Type I” and “Type II,” but we will continue calling them robbers
and victims for concreteness. The robbers were informed that, at the end
of the experiment, one of them would be randomly selected and would have
the chance to take 50%, 33%, 10%, or nothing from the joint earnings of all
victims. It was clear that only victims would be robbed, that is, a robber
would never be robbed. Every robber was then asked to provide his or her
decision, should he or she be selected (as in the strategy method). In this
way, we collected answers to the Big Robber question from all robbers. This
question was asked either before or after the sequence of games depending
on the treatment. Speciﬁcally, in the ex post treatment the robbers were
initially not provided with any information about the existence of the Big
Robber question.
In contrast, ex ante robbers and victims in both treatments knew about
the Big Robber question from the beginning of the experiment. In partic-
ular, victims were informed of the fact that participants of the other type
would be asked the Big Robber question, and that one of them would be
randomly selected and his or her decision implemented while the ex ante
robbers answered the Big Robber question.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the Experimental Design.
To emphasize the stakes, the Big Robber question also included numerical
estimates of the amount of money that would be transferred to the randomly
selected robber depending on each possible answer. Those numerical esti-
mates were computed using estimates of behavior in the sequence of games
taken from the literature (details are provided below), which delivered an es-
timated transfer of e100 for a robber deciding to take 50% (respectively e66,
e20, and e0 for 33%, 10%, and 0%). We also provided the theoretical max-
imum transfers derived from the joint proﬁt-maximizing choices. The exact
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Table 2.1: Big Robber Choices.
Choice Proportion in points Amount in Euros
 50% of all points about e100 (expected, maximum e112)
 33% of all points about e66 (expected, maximum e74.60)
 10% of all points about e20 (expected, maximum e22.40)
 0% of all points e0
format of the Big Robber choices and the provided information is displayed
in Table 2.1.
The sequence of intermediate games was played after the Big Robber
question in the ex ante treatment and before it in the ex post treatment.
The order of those games was ﬁxed and identical for all participants. Each
participant played ﬁrst the Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994) as a dicta-
tor, an Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982) as proposer, and a Trust Game
(Berg et al., 1995) as trustor. Next, he or she “played” the Dictator Game
as receiver, that is, the participant was simply informed that at the end of
the game he or she would be matched to some other participant and play
the passive receiver role in a Dictator Game. Then, the participant played
the Ultimatum Game as responder and, ﬁnally, the Trust Game as trustee.
Decisions for the last two roles were collected using the strategy method,
that is, participants provided contingent answers for each possible proposal
of the sender (proposer or trustor, respectively). The order of the games
was chosen to minimize the changes between sender and receiver mindsets,
hence avoiding an artiﬁcial activation of the concept of reciprocity through
mere alternation. The framing was in terms of “decisions” and the roles
were described neutrally (participants A and B for sender and receiver roles,
respectively). Payoﬀs were realized at the very end of the experiment by ran-
domly matching participants in the corresponding roles in such a way that
every participant was matched to a diﬀerent participant for each of the six
games. In particular, no feedback was provided for any of the decisions until
the experiment ended. There was no distinction between robbers and victims
for the purposes of matching to implement the six intermediate games.
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Each game was played with an endowment of 10 points. That is, in each
of the games, the sender (dictator, proposer, or trustor) decided how to split
10 points among him- or herself and the other player (with only integer allo-
cations allowed). In the Dictator Game(s), this decision was implemented. In
the Ultimatum Game(s), the responder decided whether to accept or reject
each possible split (proposal). At the end of the experiment, after matching
players and implementing decisions, an acceptance led to the realization of
the proposal, and a rejection led to zero payoﬀs (in that particular game) for
both proposer and responder. In the Trust Game, the trustor proposal was
implemented, but the part allocated to the trustee was then doubled and the
trustee could decide which part of the proceeds (if at all, and constrained to
be an integer number of points) to send back to the trustor. The factor of two
in the Trust Game(s) was chosen to reduce artiﬁcial incentives to cooperate
and capture the social preferences in a clean way (Glaeser et al., 2000).
The purpose of the sequence of games was twofold. On the one hand,
as most of the literature we use them as (standard) indicators of the social
preferences of the participants. On the other hand, the games were a device
to generate income for the victims which could then be partially taken away
by the robbers.
As commented above, we estimated the income generated by the sequence
of games in order to provide numerical estimates of the additional revenue
associated to each alternative choice in the Big Robber question. Since each
game was played with an initial endowment of 10 points and the amount
sent by the trustor in the Trust Game was doubled, the maximum number
of points that could be earned for each two players was 80, resulting in a
maximum of 32× 40 = 1280 points for the whole session, of which half (640)
corresponds to the victims. With an exchange rate of 35 Eurocents per point,
this means that by robbing 50% the selected robber would receive a maximum
transfer of e112, and proportionally for the other alternatives, as reported in
Table 2.1. To estimate the expected transfers, we relied on the literature. We
computed the expected earnings relying on the meta-analyses of Oosterbeek
et al. (2004) for the Ultimatum Game and Johnson and Mislin (2011) for
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the Trust Game.4 In this way, we obtained proxies for the expected behavior
in the sequence of games and were able to compute a numerical estimate of
e195.17 for the joint earnings of the victims, leading to estimates (rounding
up) of approximately e100, e66, and e20 for the decision to rob 50%, 33%,
and 10%, respectively (as reﬂected in Table 2.1). The actual average joint
earnings of victims in our sessions was e179.34, showing that our estimate
was reasonably accurate.
The third and last part of the experiment consisted in a block of individ-
ual questions. First, participants were asked about their beliefs regarding the
Big Robber question. Speciﬁcally, they were requested to indicate how many
out of 100 people they believed would take 50%, 33%, 10%, or 0%. This be-
lief elicitation question was not incentivized. Second, the participants were
given the opportunity to donate a fraction of their total earnings (excluding
the show-up fee) to a local charity organization. This was done to examine
possible guilt feelings on the part of the robbers. We will discuss this ques-
tion in Section 2.5 below. Last, the experiment included a questionnaire on
demographic data (including gender, age, and ﬁeld of studies).
After all three parts of the experiment were completed, payoﬀs were com-
puted. First, the matching algorithm paired the decisions of participants in
the six games and computed the generated income. Then, the “Big Rob-
ber” was randomly chosen among the 16 robbers and his or her decision was
implemented. Then, the donation decision was individually applied to each
participant’s earnings. Finally, all payoﬀ-relevant information was presented
4The joint earnings in a 10-point Dictator Game are obviously constant and equal to
10. According to Oosterbeek et al. (2004), the rejection rate in implementations of the
Ultimatum Game played in Germany is about 9.5%, hence the expected joint earnings
in a 10-point Ultimatum Game are 9.05 points(10 points with a 90.5% acceptance rate).
Johnson and Mislin (2011) contains a Trust Game experiment carried out in Germany
with a factor of two, and where the trustor sent on average 58% of the initial endowment
(Walkowitz et al., 2009). Hence the expected joint gains (which are independent of the
decision of the trustee) for an initial endowment of 10 points are 4.2 + 2 × 5.8 = 15.8.
This leads to a total of 2× (10 + 9.05 + 15.8) = 69.7 for each set of six two-player games,
or (1/2)× 16 × 69.7 = 557.6 for all 16 victims in a session. With an exchange rate of 35
Eurocents per point, this translates into e195.17, hence stealing 50% would result in an
average transfer of e97.59, which we rounded up to e100.
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to the participants. Payment was made anonymously (individually) in a
separate room.
2.2.2 Power Analysis
Before running the experiment, we conducted a power analysis to determine
the sample size. We focused on possible eﬀects in the Dictator Game, and
speciﬁcally the hypothesis that facing the robbing decision before the Dicta-
tor Game might aﬀect the dictator’s decision. As a prior, we used the joint
distribution of the meta-analysis of behavior in the Dictator Game by En-
gel (2011). Starting from this distribution we used three diﬀerent treatment
eﬀect sizes and simulated how many observations would be needed to ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the prior distribution and the distribution
inﬂuenced by the robbing decision. We simulated distributions with devia-
tions of 15, 25, and 30 percentage points from the prior at the focal points
represented by transfers of 0 and 5 points (out of 10). Between these values
we smoothed the distribution.
Of course, the distribution might be diﬀerent across groups of participants
making diﬀerent robbing decisions. For example, participants taking 50% are
likely to be more selﬁsh than those taking 0%. We expected that robbing
decisions would concentrate in two groups, with the remaining categories
capturing only a small share.5 In addition, we expected gender eﬀects, and
hence invited enough participants of each gender to ensure an equal amount
of male and female robbers. Accounting for these factors, we computed that,
with 40 observations for each gender and group of decisions in each treatment,
a medium-sized treatment eﬀect (≈ 25%) would still have a power of 80%
when restricting to a speciﬁc gender. Assuming evenly-split decisions, this
means 160 observations per treatment, with 80 men and 80 women each, for
a total group size of 320 robbers (and hence 320 victims).
5An alternative would have been to conduct a pretest to determine base rates for the
robbing decision. However, given the nature of this experiment, we decided not to conduct
any pretest in order to prevent the possibility that future participants at our lab might
have heard about the design.
54
Chapter 2 The Big Robber Game
2.2.3 Data
We conducted the experiment at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search (CLER). The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and participants were recruited from the student population of the
University of Cologne using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), excluding psychology
students. There were 640 participants (334 females). We collected data in
20 sessions scheduled in four consecutive days, 10 according to the ex ante
treatment, and 10 according to the ex post treatment.
Subjects belonging to the group of “robbers” were perfectly balanced by
gender for each treatment and each session, resulting in a total of 80 male
and 80 female ex ante robbers, and 80 male and 80 female ex post robbers.
There were 72 male and 88 female victims in the ex ante sessions and 74
male and 86 female victims in the ex post sessions.
The average payoﬀ from the six intermediate games was e11.15 (around
$12 at the time of the experiment), ranging from e4.20 to e19.60. Addi-
tionally, participants received a show-up fee of e2.50. Experimental sessions
lasted around 50 minutes.
2.3 The Big Robber Question
2.3.1 Robbers’ Choices: To Rob or Not to Rob
The left-hand side of Figure 2.2 depicts all robbing decisions. A majority
of robbers opted for personal gain at the expense of the 16 victims in their
session. Out of 320 robbers, 180 (56.25% of the robbers) decided to steal
the maximum, i.e. 50% of the victims’ earnings, while 86 further robbers
(26.88%) decided to take 33%, only 47 robbers (14.69%) took just 10% (the
minimum above zero), and a purely anecdotal 2.19% (just 7 robbers) declined
to take anything.
The right-hand side of Figure 2.2 depicts the robbing decisions conditional
on gender. There is almost no diﬀerence in the robber choices between males
and females. Out of 160 male robbers, 94 (58.75%) took 50%, 41 (25.62%)
took 33%, 21 (13.12%) took just 10%, and only 4 (2.50%) declined to take
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Figure 2.2: Absolute Frequency of Robbing Choices.
Notes. The left-hand side shows the robbing decisions pooled for males and females. The
right-hand side shows the robbing decisions split by gender.
money from the victims. Out of 160 female robbers, 86 (53.75%) took 50%, 45
(28.12%) took 33%, 26 (16.25%) took just 10%, and only 3 (1.88%) declined
to rob. The distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to a χ2 test
(χ2(3) = 1.216, p = 0.7491).6
After the Big Robber was selected, there was actual stealing in all 20
sessions. The average robbing earnings (i.e. transfer due to the robbing
decision) was e66.83, ranging from e17.85 to e97.65. Counting the earnings
from the games, the 20 selected Big Robbers earned an average of e78.23,
ranging from e26.25 to e110.25 (not including the show-up fee and the
donation decisions). Hence, the experiment truthfully involved high stakes,
since it was actually possible to walk away with over e100.7
6Of the 320 robbers in our experiment, 147 reported having economics-related majors.
There were no significant differences between the distributions of robbing choices for them
and for the 173 robbers who reported non-economics-related majors.
7The remaining 300 robbers who were not selected to be Big Robbers earned on average
e11.08 (not including the show-up fee and the donation decisions; median e10.85, SD =
2.30, ranging from e4.20 to e18.20). Since all victims were robbed, their earnings were
correspondingly lower (mean e7.19, median e7.00, SD = 2.20, ranging from e3.15 to
e14.35).
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Figure 2.3: Robbing Choices by Treatment.
Notes. The left-hand side shows relative frequency of robbers-50% by treatment. The
right-hand side shows the complete histograms of robbing decisions split by treatment.
Bars represent 1 Standard Error of the Mean. ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, test of proportions.
Since the vast majority of robbers took either 50% or 33%, for the subse-
quent analysis we divided the robbers in two groups. The “more selﬁsh” ones
are those who decided to rob 50%, hereafter denoted as robbers-50%. The
“less selﬁsh ones” are those who took less than 50%, that is, all those who
decided to rob 33%, 10%, or nothing at all. We refer to this category as the
robbers-no-50%.
The left-hand-side of Figure 2.3 depicts the relative frequency of robbers-
50% in the ex ante and ex post treatments (recall that there are 160 obser-
vations in each treatment). In the ex ante treatment 62.50% of the robbers
(100) took 50%, but in the ex post treatment only 50.00% of the robbers
(80) took 50%. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant according to a test of propor-
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tions (z = 2.254, p = 0.0242).8 The right-hand side of the ﬁgure depicts
the robbing decisions conditional on treatment. The distributions are signif-
icantly diﬀerent according to a χ2 test (χ2(3) = 9.157, p = 0.0273). We can
conclude that if the Big Robber question is asked after the games have been
played, there is a small shift away from robbing the maximum. However,
as we expected the treatment diﬀerence is not large and it does not detract
from the observation that stealing the maximum is the dominant mode of
behavior.
Nevertheless, there are natural avenues of explanation for the treatment
diﬀerence. A psychologically-motivated explanation might point out that ex
post robbers could have developed some empathy towards the victims after
playing the 6 games. A more economically-based explanation might point
at income eﬀects and attitudes toward risk. First, in comparison to ex ante
robbers, ex post robbers were explicitly aware of at least part of the earnings
from the games (e.g., they knew that the dictator and the trustor decisions
would be implemented as given) and could have an expectation on the to-
tal earnings from the games. An increased awareness of those earnings is
in practice an income eﬀect which could decrease the motivation to steal.
Second, since ex ante robbers had not experienced the six games when mak-
ing the robbing decision, they could have a less-focused expectation on the
earnings accruing from them, i.e. face a more risky prospect regarding those
than the ex post robbers. Under risk aversion, this could lead to a larger
appropriation decision, in practice compensating for the higher variance of
earnings. A related explanation might be that ex ante robbers who took
the maximum might be trying to insure themselves against the possibility of
having low earnings in the intermediate games, while ex post robbers already
had a personal estimate of possible earnings. However, in this case one could
argue that robbers who took the maximum in the ex ante treatment should
have made more selﬁsh decisions in the Dictator Game than their ex post
8The difference misses significance if looking only at males: 63.75% (51) of male robbers
took 50% in the ex ante treatment, versus 53.75% (43) in the ex post treatment (test
of proportions, z = 1.285, p = 0.1989). Looking at females, the difference is weakly
significant: 61.25% (49) took 50% in the ex ante treatment, versus 46.25% (37) in the ex
post treatment (test of proportions, z = 1.903, p = 0.0571).
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counterparts, since in this game they have actual control of their earnings,
and this hypothesis is not conﬁrmed by the data (see Section 2.4 below).
2.3.2 Decision Times
It is a long-standing, well-established observation that decisions where the
decision-maker is “closer to indiﬀerence” (informally speaking) are harder and
result in longer decision times (Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951;
Moyer and Landauer, 1967). A recent application to economic data has been
provided by Krajbich et al. (2015). The basic observation resonates with the
intuition that when alternatives are similarly desirable, the decision maker
will be more likely to struggle with the decision and require more time to
select a choice.
We relied on this logic to investigate the possible moral struggle faced
by robbers. To this end, we recorded the decision times for the Big Robber
question. Initially, robbers received an explanation on the robbing decision,
detailing the possibility to take part of the victims’ earnings and explaining
that a decision on how much to take would have to be made. As they clicked a
continuation button, the table with the four possible alternatives was revealed
(recall Table 2.1). On this table, robbers had to select a choice and then
click a conﬁrmation button. Decision times measure the time elapsed from
the appearance of the table with the four alternatives to the clicking of the
conﬁrmation button. Hence they include the time needed for reading and
understanding the table and making a decision.
Robbers who took the maximum decided signiﬁcantly faster than other
robbers. The mean decision time of robbers-50% (N = 180) was 35.24 s,
against 42.31 s for robbers-no-50% (N = 140). Decision times are clearly
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test
(z = −2.613, p = 0.0090).9 Average decision times are depicted in the left-
hand side of Figure 2.4.
The immediate interpretation is that the more selﬁsh robbers faced a
less severe moral struggle than the ones who decided not to rob the maxi-
9The result remains true if we compare robbers-50% only to those who took 33%
(N = 86, mean decision time 43.90 s; MWW test, z = −2.568, p = 0.0102).
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Figure 2.4: Decision Times for the Big Robber Question.
Notes. The left-hand side shows the average decision time of robbers-no-50% versus
robbers-50%. The right-hand side shows the average decision time of the robbing de-
cision by robbing choice. The bars represent here and subsequently one standard error of
the mean. ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, MWW test.
mum. The right-hand side of Figure 2.4 depicts the decision times across the
diﬀerent robbing decisions. We observe an inverted U-shape which agrees
with this interpretation. More extreme decisions (robbing the maximum or
robbing only a little) should reﬂect a more clear preference, hence shorter
decision times, while intermediate decisions might be the result of compro-
mising and balancing tradeoﬀs (the decision maker is “closer to indiﬀerence”),
resulting in longer decision times. However, the extreme data point corre-
sponding to purely altruistic behavior (declining to rob) is of course purely
anecdotal since there were almost no such observations.
The diﬀerence in decision times is also clearly signiﬁcant when looking at
the ex post treatment alone (robbers-50%, N = 80, average 35.64 s; robbers-
no-50%, N = 80, average 45.53 s; MWW test, z = −2.503, p = 0.0123).
However, although the direction persists, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant for
the ex ante treatment (robbers-50%, N = 100, average 34.92 s; robbers-no-
50%, N = 60, average 38.02 s; MWW test, z = −0.652, p = 0.5144).
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Decision times can also be used to study whether the processes under-
lying a certain decision are more or less intuitive or deliberative in nature,
following dual-process theories (see, e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014, for a
recent overview) which indicate that intuitive processes are faster.10 Follow-
ing this logic, Cappelen et al. (2016) observed that fair decisions in a Dictator
Game took on average 38.4 s, whereas selﬁsh decisions took 48.5 s. Relying
on this statement, i.e. that fair decisions are faster, they argue that fair de-
cisions might be more intuitive. If we followed the argument of Cappelen
et al. (2016), we would have to conclude that the decision to rob as much
as possible is more intuitive than the decision to refrain from such behavior.
However, decisions with decision times as long as the ones studied here or in
Cappelen et al. (2016) clearly always include a large amount of deliberation,
and are hence not well-suited for the study of underlying processes, at least
in a straightforward way. Inferences of process characteristics in these cases
risk a reverse-inference fallacy, i.e. “intuitive” may mean “fast,” but this
would not imply that “faster” means “more intuitive” (Myrseth and Woll-
brant, 2016). Hence, we favor the simpler interpretation that faster decisions
for the robbers who took the maximum indicate a reduced moral struggle
in comparison with the robbers who partially overrode their impulse to take
the maximum.
2.3.3 Beliefs
We elicited the participants’ beliefs by asking how many out of 100 partic-
ipants they thought would choose to take 0%, 10%, 33%, and 50% of the
victims’ earnings. From the resulting distributions, we computed the aver-
age percentage that each individual thought would be taken away from the
victims. This average is increasing with the type of robber. The few robbers-
0% (N=7) believed that on average only 16.73% of the victims’ earnings
would be taken away. The averages increased to 26.41% for the robbers-10%
(N=47), 33.21% for the robbers-33% (N=86), and 41.33% for the robbers-
10See Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014), Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016a), and Alós-Ferrer and
Ritschel (2018b) for examples of response-times studies of individual decisions in economic
settings.
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50% (N=180). There is a clear positive correlation between the robbing
choice and the beliefs (ρ = 0.5928, p < 0.0001). The result persists for each
gender (males, ρ = 0.6233, p < 0.0001; females, ρ = 0.5658, p < 0.0001) and
treatment (ex ante, ρ = 0.5198, p < 0.0001; ex post, ρ = 0.6804, p < 0.0001).
This ﬁnding suggests that participants had beliefs consistent with their actual
behavior, that is, participants believed that, on average, other participants’
behavior would be close to their own.
2.3.4 The Selﬁshness of Big Robbers
It is important to establish that the Big Robber Game measures social prefer-
ences and not a completely diﬀerent construct. To this end, the intermediate
games corresponded to the standard ones usually employed to study social
preferences, i.e., the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games.
Dictator Game. The cleanest measurement of social preferences as stud-
ied in the literature is provided by the Dictator Game, since there are no
strategic concerns for the dictator decision. For this reason, we placed this
decision at the very beginning of the block containing the intermediate games,
ensuring that there would be no income eﬀects or other carryover consider-
ations at this point. Robbers who took the maximum were signiﬁcantly less
generous as dictators in the Dictator Game. Robbers-no-50% (N=140) sent
on average 3.157 points while robbers-50% (N=180) only sent 1.267 points
(see the left-hand extreme of Figure 2.5). The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant
according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = 8.210, p < 0.0001). The
result persists when splitting the data by gender or treatment. Figure 2.6
displays the full distribution of dictators’ decisions, separately for robbers-
no-50% and robbers-50%. The two distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(χ2(8) = 79.853, p < 0.0001). We conclude that robbers who took the
maximum are more selﬁsh, as measured by the Dictator Game, than other
robbers.
Ultimatum Game. Participants played the Ultimatum Game twice, once
as proposer and once as responder. Of course, oﬀers in the Ultimatum Game
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Dictator Proposer Trustor MTA Trustee
Robbers−No−50% Robbers−50%
Figure 2.5: Robbers’ Decisions in the Intermediate Games.
Notes. Comparison of decisions of robbers-50% and robbers-no-50% in the Dictator Game,
the Ultimatum Game, and the Trust Game. ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, MWW test.
were larger than in the Dictator Game, due to the strategic aspect of the
proposer’s decision (avoiding rejection). However, again robbers who took
the maximum were revealed to be more selﬁsh than other robbers, this time
by their behavior as proposers in the Ultimatum Game. Robbers-50% (N =
180) oﬀered 3.922 points on average while robbers-no-50% (N = 140) oﬀered
4.550 points (second decision illustrated in Figure 2.5). The diﬀerence is
highly signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 4.141, p < 0.0001). The eﬀect persists
when splitting the data by gender or treatment.
We elicited responder behavior in the Ultimatum Game using the strat-
egy method, yielding 11 decisions per participant (whether to accept or re-
ject proposals of 0,1,. . . ,10 points out of 10). To analyze responder behavior,
we computed the smallest accepted oﬀer (or Minimum Threshold of Accep-
tance, MTA), excluding participants who switched between rejection and
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Figure 2.6: Behavior of Robbers in the Dictator Game.
Notes. Relative frequency of points sent by the robbers-no-50% and robbers-50% in the
Dictator Game.
acceptance multiple times.11 Robbers-50% (N = 178) had an average MTA
of 2.730 points while robbers-no-50% (N = 135) had a signiﬁcantly higher
MTA of 3.163 points (MWW test, z = 2.437, p = 0.0148; fourth decision
illustrated in Figure 2.5). As ought to be expected, robbers who took the
maximum are willing to accept lower oﬀers since a higher level of selﬁsh-
ness goes hand-in-hand with giving priority to purely monetary concerns.
The behavior of responders in the Ultimatum Game again indicates that for
robbers who took the maximum, social preferences are less marked than for
other robbers.
Trust Game. Participants played the Trust Game twice, once as trustor
and once as trustee. The decision made as trustor was already the third
down the line in the block of intermediate games. However, there were again
clear diﬀerences, with robbers who took the maximum trusting less than
other robbers. Robbers-no-50% (N = 140) sent on average 4.314 points
to the trustee while robbers-50% (N = 180) sent on average only 2.767
11Out of 640 participants only 19 participants (2.97%) switched more than once.
64
Chapter 2 The Big Robber Game
points. This diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 5.636, p <
0.0001; third decision illustrated in Figure 2.5). The eﬀect persists when
conditioning on either treatment or gender. Once again, this is evidence that
social preferences are less marked for robbers who took the maximum, in the
sense that they trust less, presumably because they expect others to be more
selﬁsh.
We elicited trustee behavior in the Trust Game using again the strategy
method, yielding 10 decisions per participant (how much to send back if
the trustor sent 1,. . . ,10 points out of 10). To analyze trustee behavior, we
computed the fraction that was sent back aggregated over all 10 decisions. We
again ﬁnd clear diﬀerences. Robbers-no-50% (N=140) returned on average
25.99% of the received points, against only 11.77% for robbers-50%. This
diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 8.995, p < 0.0001; right-most
decision illustrated in Figure 2.5). The eﬀect also persists when conditioning
on gender or treatment. Strictly speaking, the decision of the trustee is free of
strategic components and is formally equivalent to a Dictator Game. Hence,
again we see that robbers who took the maximum behave more selﬁshly than
other robbers.
Average behavior of robbers. At the same time, behavior in the Dic-
tator, Ultimatum, and Trust games was well within the standard ranges re-
ported in the literature. The average oﬀer by robbers in the Dictator Game
was 20.94%, which is quite close to the grand average of 24.7% reported by
Engel (2011) for students. The average oﬀer by robbers in the Ultimatum
Game was 41.97%, which was rather close to the grand average of 40.54% (71
studies) reported by Oosterbeek et al. (2004). The average MTA of robbers
in the Ultimatum Game was 29.17%, which is within the ranges reported in
other Ultimatum Game experiments using the strategy method. For exam-
ple, Cappelletti et al. (2011) report mean MTAs of 23.00% and 31.42% for an
endowment of e15 and e7, respectively. Declerck et al. (2009) found MTAs
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of 23.10% and 30.00% when subjects played an Ultimatum Game after and
before being matched with another subject, respectively.12
For the Trust Game, it is harder to compare our data to the literature
because published experiments have a higher design variance than those em-
ploying Dictator or Ultimatum games. In our experiment, robbers sent on
average 34.44% of the available resources as trustors and returned 17.99%
as trustees. These levels seem to be within the standard ranges in the liter-
ature as reported, e.g., in the meta-analysis of Johnson and Mislin (2011),
although on the lower range of trust and (especially) trustworthiness.13 The
closest design we could ﬁnd in a published study is Bellemare and Kröger
(2007), which employed the strategy method in a laboratory Trust Game
played with students in central Europe where transfers were doubled. In
that study, trustors sent on average 30.58% of their resources, and trustees
send back around 24% of what was available.14 Our results are also close to
those of Eckel and Petrie (2011).
The Big Robber Game and Social Preferences. In summary, results
are strikingly consistent across all games. Robbers who took the maximum
gave less in the Dictator Game, sent less money back in the Trust Game as
trustees, made lower oﬀers in the Ultimatum Game, trusted less as trustors
in the Trust Game, and accepted lower oﬀers as responders in the Ultimatum
Game. In view of this evidence, it can be concluded that the Big Robber
Game, as intended, measures a correlate of social preferences as they have
been discussed in the literature until now, and not a diﬀerent construct.
12Armantier (2006) finds slightly higher mean MTAs, ranging from 31.80% to 38.00%.
McLeish and Oxoby (2011) find slightly lower MTAs of 26.10% in the baseline condition
of their experiment.
13In view of the literature, the fact that our results for the Trust Game are in the lower
range might be unsurprising. We used a multiplying factor of two, while many studies
use a factor of three. Johnson and Mislin (2011) suggest that a lower factor reduces
trustors’ transfers and trustees’ returns. Casari and Cason (2009) argue that the strategy
method, which we used, reduces transfers of trustees (although Brandts and Charness,
2011 find no difference). Burks et al. (2003) argue that playing both roles in the Trust
Game reduces both overall trust and overall reciprocity; in our setting, players first made
a trustor decision and were asked for a trustee decision later on.
14We thank Sabine Kröger for providing the aggregate statistics. In that study, however,
trustees had an additional endowment.
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We remark that the fact that behavior is qualitatively consistent between
the Big Robber Game and all other games is of independent interest, since
such associations should not be taken for granted at the individual level.
Blanco et al. (2011) estimated two parameters of inequality aversion in a
within-subject design where participants played several games, including Dic-
tator and Ultimatum games, and found remarkably low correlations within
subjects. Galizzi and Navarro-Martínez (2018) found low correlations be-
tween behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games in the lab and social
behavior in the ﬁeld. This is in line, e.g., with Stoop et al. (2012), who found
clear divergences in cooperation levels between lab and ﬁeld settings. How-
ever, other authors have found positive associations across domains. Dariel
and Nikiforakis (2014) found a qualitative correlation for prosocial behav-
ior across games, with participants behaving cooperatively in a public-good
game reciprocating higher wages with higher eﬀort levels in a gift-exchange
game. Fisman et al. (2007) ﬁnd a strong positive association between prefer-
ences for giving and social preferences referred to distributions among others
(which do not aﬀect the own payoﬀs).
2.4 Does the Big Robber Question Affect Behavior?
In this section, we focus on treatment eﬀects. The Big Robber decision is
clearly not one that can be taken lightly. It is conceivable that behavior in
the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games was aﬀected by having answered
this question beforehand. This is precisely the reasoning which brought us
to include the ex ante and ex post treatments.
There are indeed a number of natural hypotheses grounded on psycho-
logical research. According to the “what-the-hell eﬀect,” an initial loss of
self-control can lead to a modal change in which all pretenses are abandoned,
for example in the dieting domain (Polivy and Herman, 1985). It has been
argued (Achtziger et al., 2015b, 2016, 2018) that prosocial behavior requires
self-control in order to override selﬁsh impulses. A natural implication then
would be that, if a participant has revealed being selﬁsh in the ex ante Big
Robber decision, then he will behave less prosocially afterwards than controls
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(ex post robbers). However, the opposite hypothesis could also be justiﬁed.
According to the “transgression-compliance eﬀect,” people who believe that
they have harmed someone show an increased willingness to perform unre-
lated good deeds later on (Carlsmith and Gross, 1969), as if the latter could
compensate the former (see Gneezy et al., 2014, for a recent illustration).
This eﬀect might reveal a mechanism to reduce experienced guilt. In our
context, it would imply that if a participant has revealed to be selﬁsh in the
ex ante Big Robber decision, he or she should behave more prosocially than
controls afterwards.
A further possible hypothesis concerns robbers who refrained from taking
the maximum. According to the “moral credentialing” eﬀect, humans often
act as if an initial good behavior (even an exogenously induced one) provides a
license to misbehave later on (Monin and Miller, 2001). For example, people
purchasing “green” products are later on less likely to share in a Dictator
Game, and more likely to cheat on a task to increase their gains (Mazar and
Zhong, 2010; Zhong et al., 2010). According to moral credentialing, robbers
who did not behave completely selﬁshly in the ex ante Big Robber decision
should behave more selﬁshly afterwards than controls.
2.4.1 The more selﬁsh robbers
We start with the behavior of robbers who took the maximum possible, i.e.
robbers-50%, for which the opposed hypotheses derived from the what-the-
hell eﬀect and the transgression-compliance eﬀect apply. In the Dictator
Game, ex ante robbers-50% (N=100) gave on average 1.310 points, while ex
post robbers-50% (N=80) gave on average 1.213 points. The diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 0.695, p = 0.4873). However, look-
ing at genders separately allows us to see a diﬀerent picture. Figure 2.7 shows
the relative frequency of points sent by the robbers-50% in the Dictator Game
split by gender. In the ex ante treatment, female robbers-50% (N=49) sent
on average 1.612 points while in the ex post treatment female robbers-50%
(N=37) sent 0.811 points. This diﬀerence, which agrees with the possibly
guilt-induced transgression-compliance eﬀect, is highly signiﬁcant according
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Figure 2.7: Behavior of Robbers-50% in the Dictator Game.
Notes. Relative frequency of points sent by the robbers-50% in the Dictator Game split
by treatment and gender (left-hand side: males; right-hand side: females).
to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = 2.442, p = 0.0146). In contrast, look-
ing at male robbers only, there is no evidence of the transgression-compliance
eﬀect. Ex ante male robbers-50% (N=51) sent on average 1.020 points in the
Dictator Game, compared to 1.558 points sent by ex post male robbers-50%
(N=43). The diﬀerence goes in the opposite direction, that is, the one pre-
dicted by the what-the-hell eﬀect, but does not reach signiﬁcance (MWW
test, z = −1.348, p = 0.1775).15
Moving to the behavior of robbers-50% in the Ultimatum Game, oﬀers in
the ex ante treatment (N = 100, mean 3.760) were signiﬁcantly lower than
the oﬀers of the robbers-50% in the ex post treatment (N = 80, mean 4.125
points; MWW test, z = −1.808, p = 0.0705). This is in agreement with the
what-the-hell eﬀect. However, this ﬁnding is driven by male behavior. Figure
2.8 shows the relative frequency of points proposed by the robbers-50% in the
Ultimatum Game split by gender. Male robbers-50% in the ex ante treatment
(N = 51) oﬀered 3.765 points on average, which was signiﬁcantly lower than
the average 4.209 points oﬀered by the male robbers-50% (N = 43) in the
ex post treatment (MWW test, z = −2.155, p = 0.0312). In contrast, there
15Out of N = 640 participants, only 3 gave 10 points in the Dictator Game, all of them
male: one victim and two robbers. One of the robbers took 50%. Excluding this atypical
individual from the test, the average points sent by ex ante male robbers-50% (N=50)
drop to 0.840 points and the difference between treatments becomes more clear, but still
misses significance (MWW, z = −1.561, p = 0.1185).
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Figure 2.8: Behavior of Robbers-50% in the Ultimatum Game.
Notes. Relative frequency of points proposed by the robbers-50% in the Ultimatum Game
split by treatment and gender (left-hand side: males; right-hand side: females).
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for females (ex ante, N = 49, average 3.755;
ex post, N = 37, average 4.027; MWW test, z = −0.319, p = 0.7495).
The decision in the Dictator Game and the proposer decision in the Ul-
timatum Game were the two ﬁrst decisions in the sequence of games. For
those, as commented above we ﬁnd small eﬀects which depend on gender.
The responder decision in the Ultimatum game and the two decisions (as
trustor and as trustee) in the Trust Game are the last three decisions in
the sequence of games, and behavior might have been aﬀected by the most
recent decisions (in the Dictator and Ultimatum games) more than by the
previous Big Robber question. Hence, we did not expect strong treatment
diﬀerences for these decisions. Indeed, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences, even
when looking at genders separately, in Minimum Thresholds of Acceptance
in the Ultimatum Game or in behavior in the Trust Game between ex ante
and ex post robbers-50%.
We conclude that the psychological eﬀects caused by the Big Robber
decision on more selﬁsh robbers might be present but are, ﬁrst, generally
weak, and, second, dependent on gender. While women seem to be aﬀected
by guilt-related considerations as the transgression-compliance eﬀect, men
seem to be show the opposite tendency as predicted by the what-the-hell
eﬀect.
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2.4.2 The less selﬁsh robbers
The behavior of robbers who declined to take the maximum possible, i.e.
robbers-no-50%, might be aﬀected by the moral-credentialing eﬀect, that is,
since they did not behave (maximally) selﬁshly in the Big Robber decision,
they might have behaved more selﬁshly in the subsequent games. However,
we ﬁnd no evidence for such an eﬀect in the Dictator Game. Ex ante robbers-
no-50% (N = 60) gave an average of 3.200 points, which is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the average of 3.125 given by ex post robbers-no-50% (N = 80)
(MWW test, z = −0.172, p = 0.8633). The diﬀerences remain insigniﬁcant
when splitting the sample by gender.
In the Ultimatum Game, there are also no diﬀerences for the full sample.
Ex ante robbers-no-50% (N = 60) proposed an average of 4.500 points, which
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average of 4.588 proposed by ex post
robbers-no-50% (N = 80) (MWW test, z = −0.148, p = 0.8820). However,
splitting the sample by gender reveals (marginally) signiﬁcant and opposed
eﬀects. Ex ante female robbers-no-50% (N = 31) oﬀered an average of 4.323
points while ex post female robbers-no-50% (N = 43) oﬀered an average of
4.767 points (MWW test, z = −1.701, p = 0.0889). This diﬀerence is in
the direction predicted by the moral-credentialing eﬀect. In contrast, the
treatment diﬀerence for male robbers-no-50% went in the opposite direction,
with signiﬁcantly higher oﬀers in the ex ante treatment (N = 29, mean
4.690) compared to the ex post treatment (N = 37, mean 4.378; MWW test,
z = 1.657, p = 0.0974).
As in the case of robbers-50% (and most likely for identical reasons),
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant treatment diﬀerences for robbers-no-50% as
responders in the Ultimatum Game or in either role in the Trust Game.
We conclude that, as in the case of more selﬁsh robbers, the psychological
eﬀects caused by the Big Robber decision on less selﬁsh robbers are generally
weak and depend on gender. While women seem to be aﬀected by the moral-
credentialing eﬀect in the Ultimatum Game, men show the opposite tendency.
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2.4.3 The victims
All victims in the experiment (N = 320) learned about the possibility that
part of their earnings could be taken away before making their decisions in
the sequence of games. It is natural to ask whether this information aﬀected
their behavior. For instance, one could speculate that, knowing that part of
their earnings might be lost, they might have become more self-centered. One
could also speculate with possible negative reciprocity against the robbers,
although this is an unlikely motivation because victims did not know whether
the partners they would be matched with to play the Dictator, Ultimatum,
and Trust games would be victims or robbers (random matching).
The cleanest comparison to ﬁnd possible eﬀects in victims’ behaviors is
with ex post robbers (N = 160). These robbers were informed about the
Big Robber decision after they played the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust
games, hence their behavior in those games could not be aﬀected by the
latter question, and they are in practice a control group. Comparing the
behavior of victims to the behavior of ex post robbers, however, reveals
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. In the Dictator Game, victims sent an average
of 2.216 points, compared to 2.169 sent by ex post robbers (MWW test,
z = 0.217, p = 0.8282). In the Ultimatum Game, victims proposed an
average of 4.359 points, compared to 4.356 proposed by ex post robbers
(MWW test, z = −0.049, p = 0.9609). As responders, the victims’ average
MTA (N = 308) was 2.912, compared to an average MTA of 2.891 for ex
post robbers (N = 156; MWW test, z = −0.042, p = 0.9662). In the Trust
Game, victims sent an average of 4.013 points, compared to 3.575 sent by
ex post robbers (MWW test, z = 1.420, p = 0.1556). As trustees, victims
sent back an average of 20.21%, compared to 18.75% sent back by ex post
robbers (MWW test, z = 0.797, p = 0.4252). Splitting the tests by gender
revealed only one signiﬁcant eﬀect, namely that male victims (N = 146)
sent an average of 4.480 points while male robbers (N = 80) sent an average
of 3.625 points, with the diﬀerence being signiﬁcant according to a Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = 1.793, p = 0.0730). However, none of the other
nine within-gender comparisons for the ﬁve decisions was signiﬁcant.
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We conclude that victims’ behavior was unaﬀected by the knowledge that
a part of their earnings might be taken away by robbers.
2.5 Donations
Since the Big Robber decision is a high-stakes one, it is natural to ask
whether, in some or even most of the cases, the decision to take the maximum
might have led to feelings of guilt and regret. There is evidence from social
psychology pointing out that guilt can motivate prosocial behavior perceived
as reparative, as a way to appease guilty feelings (Malinowski and Smith,
1985; Giner-Sorolla, 2001; Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007). In particular, Lind-
sey (2005) showed that guilt is associated with increased charity donations.
This is also consistent with Andreoni (1989), who argued that people derive
direct utility from the act of giving to a charity, with Gneezy et al. (2014),
who showed that people were then more likely to donate to charity after
making an immoral choice, and with Andreoni et al. (2017), who showed
that people give more if exposed to stimuli which activate empathy (“Please
give!”) but at the same time try to avoid exposure to such stimuli.16
We hence decided to include a ﬁnal question giving participants the oppor-
tunity to donate part of their earnings to a charity, a local animal shelter.17
In the ﬁnal questionnaire, we also asked for the valuation of the charity or-
ganization on a scale from 1 = very bad to 10 = very good. The average
evaluation was 6.46 (N = 640, SD= 2.66), indicating a generally positive
view.
The form of the question was as follows. “You can donate a fraction of
your total earnings (excluding the show-up fee) to a charity organization
(name of animal shelter). How much do you want to donate?” The question
was posed after all decisions had been made, but before the actual Big Robber
16DellaVigna et al. (2012) pointed out that social pressure might be an additional motive
for giving which needs to be dissociated from altruism. In our setting social pressure plays
no role since all decisions are made anonymously. However the need to appease feelings
of guilt might be seen as individual pressure coming from self-perception after facing the
Big Robber decision.
17The charity was the “Cologne Animal Protection Club of 1868.”
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of the session was selected and the game decisions were implemented. On
average, subjects donated a fraction of 5.31% of their earnings, for a total
joint donation of e299.6. Taken as a whole, that is, not diﬀerentiating among
those who took the maximum and those who did not, the donations of robbers
did not diﬀer from those of the victims. Victims (N = 320) donated on
average 6.10% while robbers (pooled, N = 320) donated on average 4.52%.
The diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = −0.122, p = 0.9029).
We hypothesized that, if feelings of guilt or regret were associated with
the decision to take the maximum, robbers who took 50% would donate more
than others. On the contrary, if the decision to take the maximum simply
reﬂects a stronger tendency to rely on pure self-interest, we should observe
lower donations. We found that robbers who took the maximum donated
signiﬁcantly less than others. Robbers-50% (N = 180) donated an average
of only 2.62%, compared to 6.96% donated by robbers-no-50% (N = 140).
The diﬀerence is both substantial and highly signiﬁcant according to a Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test (z = −5.934, p < 0.0001) The eﬀect remains for each
treatment. Ex ante robbers-50% (N = 100) donated only 3.12%, while ex
ante robbers-no-50% (N = 60) donated 6.20% (MWW test, z = −3.339,
p = 0.0008). Ex post robbers-50% (N = 80) donated a mere 2.00%, while
ex post robbers-no-50% (N = 80) donated 7.54% (MWW test, z = −4.982,
p < 0.0001). The left-hand side of Figure 2.9 depicts the average donations
of robbers-no-50% and robbers-50% for both treatments. The eﬀect also
persists when looking at each gender separately.18
A possible criticism of this test is that robbers who took 50% expected
higher earnings than those who did not, hence they might have tried to adjust
down the donation, expressed as a percentage, while still donating a larger
absolute amount. This is not the case. We computed the expected donation
under the extremely generous assumption that each individual robber might
18Pooling all robbers together, there was no significant difference in donations across
treatments. There is a small gender difference in donations, with male robbers donating
less (3.91%) than female robbers (5.13%). The difference is marginally significant (MWW
test, z = −1.651, p = 0.0988). This gender difference is also found among the victims, with
male victims (N = 146) donating an average of 3.29%, compared to an average of 8.46%
by female victims (N = 174). The difference is highly significant (MWW, z = −3.691,
p = 0.0002).
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have assumed that he or she would indeed be the selected one (rather than
using a probability of 1/16). Under this assumption, the expected donation
of robbers-50% would have been e2.89, compared to an expected donation of
robbers-no-50% of e3.80. The diﬀerence is again highly signiﬁcant (MWW
test, z = −4.114, p < 0.0001). That is, no matter how generous the criterion,
robbers who took the maximum also donated less in absolute terms.19 The
right-hand side of Figure 2.9 shows the average donations in percentages
(left axis) and the expected donations in absolute terms (right axis) for the
diﬀerent robber groups and the victims.
In conclusion, there is no evidence of guilt or regret as captured by the
donation decision. One could of course speculate that the donation decision
is only moral at an abstract level in the sense that it does not aﬀect the
victims. Also, one could invoke a diﬀerent version of the what-the-hell eﬀect
to explain the results. The simplest explanation, however, is that robbers
who took the maximum are just more selﬁsh in all dimensions than those
who did not.
It is reasonable to ask whether the diﬀerences in donations where caused
by diﬀerences in evaluations, or whether they were rationalized ex post by
providing lower evaluations of the charity. In both cases, we would ex-
pect robbers-50% to provide worse evaluations. This is, however, not true.
Robbers-50% (N = 180) rated the charity on average with 6.69, while
robbers-no-50% (N=60) rated it lower, at 6.28. The diﬀerence goes in the op-
posite direction but is not signiﬁcant (MWW test, z = 1.506, p = 0.1320).20
19However, robbers as a whole donated more in absolute terms than victims, which is
not surprising since they simply earned substantially more on average. Average expected
donations of the victims were e0.63, compared to e3.29 for the robbers. This difference
is highly significant (MWW test, z = −4.762, p < 0.0001).
20Interestingly, ex ante robbers-50% (N = 100) rated the charity on average with 6.91,
while robbers-no-50% (N = 60) rated it at 6.13, which is significantly lower (MWW test,
z = 1.835, p = 0.0666). Hence, ex ante robbers who took the maximum donated less in
spite of the fact that they valued the charity better. In the ex post treatment the valuations
of the robbers-50% (N = 80, mean 6.43) were not significantly different from the valuations
of the robbers-no-50% (N = 80, mean 6.39; MWW, z = −0.100, p = 0.9205).
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Ex Ante Ex Post Victims 0% 10% 33% 50% 
Robbers−No−50% Donation in %
Robbers−50% Expected Donations in Euro
Figure 2.9: Average donations in percentage and expected donations in Euros.
Notes. The left-hand side shows the donations of robbers-no-50% and robbers-50% in both
treatments. The right-hand side shows the donations in percentage (left axis) and the
expected donations in Euros (right axis) for each robbing group and victims. ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01,
MWW test.
2.6 Models of Social Preferences
In this section, we examine whether the behavior we observe is compatible
with received models of social preferences, focusing on the models of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) (hereafter FS), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) (hereafter BO),
Charness and Rabin (2002) (hereafter CR), and Alger and Weibull (2013)
(hereafter AW). The strategy of analysis is a simple out-of-sample exercise
as follows. Within the sequence of games, the very ﬁrst decision of each
participant corresponded to that of a dictator in the Dictator Game. From
this decision, we deduce the individual parameters of the utility functions
proposed in each of the models by FS, BO, CR, and AW. On the basis
of these parameters, we derive the predicted behavior in the Big Robber
Game for each participant and model. Finally, we compare predicted with
actual behavior and examine the “ﬁt” of the models, simply by examining the
percentage of decisions in our sample of 320 robbers which are compatible
with the model predictions.
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Let xr ∈ [0, 10] be the amount sent by the dictator to the receiver. The




10− xr − ρ · (10− 2xr) if xr ≤ 510− xr − σ · (10− 2xr) if xr > 5
where ρ and σ are parameters capturing distributional preferences (an addi-
tional parameter in the formulation of CR captures reciprocity considerations
which play no role here).
This model encompasses the one of FS, with β = ρ being the parameter
for advantageous inequality and α = −σ the one for disadvantageous inequal-
ity. The model of FS further constrains σ < 0 < ρ < 1. In our setting, the
only diﬀerence between both models is that with the additional constraints,
FS’ model cannot explain dictator decisions giving strictly more than 5 to
the receiver; as a consequence, strictly speaking 5 out of our 320 observations
would remain unclassiﬁed in the FS case. Otherwise, the analysis for FS and
CR is identical.
In our sample, 123 (38.44%) of the robbers gave 0 in the Dictator Game,
which implies ρ ≤ 1/2 and σ ≤ 1 − ρ; 130 (40.63%) robbers gave between 1
and 4 in the Dictator Game, which implies ρ = 1/2 and σ ≤ 1/2; 62 (19.38%)
robbers gave exactly 5, which implies ρ ≥ 1/2 and σ ≤ 1/2; 3 (0.94%)robbers
gave between 6 and 9, which implies ρ ≥ 1/2 and σ = 1/2; and 2 (0.63%)
robbers gave exactly 10, implying σ ≥ 1/2 and either ρ ≥ 1/2 or ρ < 1/2
together with σ ≥ 1 − ρ. The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2.2 summarize
these observations.
Let E[ΠV ] denote the expected income of all victims in a session from
the intermediate games (from the point of view of the individual robber) and
E[ΠR] the own (robber) expected income from those games. Let nV be the
number of victims, and denote by p the share the robber chooses to rob. A
given robber would expect earnings E[ΠR]+pE[ΠV ], and will expect average
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earnings of the victims to be (1 − p)(1/nV )E[ΠV ]. For the Big Robber, the
CR (or FS) model implies the following utility function.
UCR
R
(p) = (E[ΠR] + pE[ΠV ])− ρ
(




= (1− ρ)E[ΠR] + 1
nV
E[ΠV ] (p · (nV − ρ(nV + 1)) + ρ)) .
Note that the parameter σ plays no role because, in expected terms, the
robber could not be worse oﬀ than the victims.
Denote by V the ex ante expected earnings of all nV victims in a session
as communicated in the experiment. For an ex ante robber, since the decision
to rob or not was made before the intermediate games were explained and
played, all the player could deduce was E[ΠV ] = V and E[ΠR] = V/nV .




V [1 + p · (nV − ρ(nV + 1))] .
For an ex post robber, however, the intermediate games had already been
played when the Big-Robber decision was made, and expectations could have
been adjusted. For instance, those robbers knew that they would be receiving
at least 20− xr − xTr , where xr was their decision in the Dictator Game and
xT
r
the decision as a trustor in the Trust Game, and accordingly could adjust
E[ΠV ] down. However, the optimum of U
CR
R
(p) is independent of the exact
values of expectations, and in particular there should be no diﬀerence between




robbers should take 50%, while for ρ = 16
17
robbers are indiﬀerent among
taking 50%, 33%, 10%, or 0%, and for ρ > 16
17
robbers should take 0%. Hence,
all robbers who gave strictly less than 5 points in the Dictator Game should
take 50%, and we have no prediction for those who gave exactly 5 points or
more than 5 points, in the sense that for ρ > 1/2, their optimum might be
to take 50%, 0%, or correspond to full indiﬀerence among all possibilities.
The second to last column of Table 2.2 summarizes these predictions and the
amount of observations compatible with these predictions.
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Because of the linearity of their formulation, the models of FS and CR
can only explain intermediate values (1 to 4 points) in the Dictator Game
through indiﬀerence. The model of BO incorporates a nonlinear term to
deal with this and related issues, the typical implementation relying on a
quadratic functional form. Applied to the Dictator Game, the corresponding
utility function is as follows.
UBO
D














where again xr is the amount the dictator sends to the receiver, and a and
b are parameters weighting the utility of the own payoﬀ and disutility of the
relative payoﬀ, for which BO assume only a ≥ 0 and b > 0. A player’s type
is fully characterized by the ratio a/b. The fourth column of Table 2.2 shows
the ranges of a/b implied by the observed behavior of robbers in the Dictator
Game.21
For the Big Robber, the BO model implies the following utility function.




E[ΠR] + pE[ΠV ]





Again, for an ex ante robber E[ΠV ] = V and E[ΠR] = V/nV , hence the
expression above simpliﬁes to
UBOR (p) = a
V
nV








Since experimental sessions involved 32 participants, half of which were
victims, we have that nV = 16. The expected income of all victims was e200,
corresponding to 571.43 points (recall that the Dictator Game decisions was
how to split 10 points). With these values, a direct computation shows that
UBO
R
(p) for ex ante robbers is maximized at p = 0.5 or above for any ratio
a/b larger than 0.00064. In view of the values derived from behavior in
21Each possible decision implies a different range, but all decisions in the 1 − 4 range,
and analogously for the 6− 10 range, yield the same predicted behavior in the Big Robber
Game, hence we do not differentiate them in the table.
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the Dictator Game, all ex ante robbers who gave less than 5 points in the
Dictator Game are predicted to take 50%, those who gave 6 points or more
are inconsistent with the model, and for those who opted for an equal split,
the possible values derived for a/b do not allow a precise prediction (hence
their behavior in the Big Robber Game is always aligned with the model).
Ex post robbers form their expectations about their own payoﬀ from the
intermediate games depending on their actions. In our design, the robbers
play against a diﬀerent player in each intermediate game but do not know
if the opponent is a robber or victim. If the robbers played only against
robbers, the expectations about the victims earnings should be unaﬀected,
E[ΠV ] = V . In the opposite extreme, all six interactions of the robber in the
intermediate games might have aﬀected victims. It follows that on average, at
most one victim (playing in six games) was aﬀected by the robber decisions,
implying that E[ΠV ] ∈ [(nV − 1)V/nV , V ]. From equation (2.1) above, we






































We know that E[ΠR] ∈ [20−xr−xTr , 70+xTr ], where the maximum possible
payoﬀ of 80 points results if the robber gave the minimum away except for
the Trust Game where she gave everything to the trustee and receives the
maximum possible in each of the intermediate games. Since V = 571.43
points and nV = 16, no matter what the exact expectation adjustment was,
E[ΠR] < (nV − 1)V/nV ≤ E[ΠV ]. It follows that the derivative of p∗ with
respect to E[ΠV ] is strictly positive, which implies that, in the BO model,
robbers should rob (weakly) more with larger expectations on E[ΠV ].
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expression cannot be larger than its value for the minimum feasible values
of E[ΠR] and E[ΠV ], which are 0 and
15
16
571.43 points, respectively. With
nV = 16, this implies that p
∗ is increasing in E[ΠR] for all a/b above (ap-
proximately) 0.00088. That is, for such values, in the BO model, robbers
should also rob (weakly) more with larger expectations on E[ΠR]. Thus, the
optimum p∗ will be larger than the value of p∗ with the smallest possible








but with nV = 16 and V = 571.43, this expression is always larger than 0.5
for any a/b above (approximately) 0.00082. In view of the values derived
from behavior in the Dictator Game, all ex post robbers who gave less than
5 points in the Dictator Game are predicted to take 50%, those who gave 6
points or more are inconsistent with the model, and only for those who opted
for an equal split, the possible values derived for a/b do not allow a precise
prediction. That is, the model predicts no diﬀerence between ex ante and
ex post robbers. In particular, the implications are in practice identical to
those derived from the CR model.
The model of AW states that an individual is a homo moralis if her
utility function is the convex combination of selﬁshness (maximization of own
payoﬀ) and Kantian morality (the payoﬀ received when everybody acts as
the individual). The weight each subject puts on the moral payoﬀ reveals her
degree of morality, i.e., κ ∈ [0, 1] with κ = 0 being completely selﬁsh (homo
oeconomicus) and κ = 1 being completely moral (or homo kantiensis).
The AW model considers symmetric games, but it is extended to asym-
metric ones as the Dictator Game by recasting it as a role game, that is, the
player considers herself as either the dictator or the receiver with probabil-
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ity 1
2



















where again xr is the amount the dictator sends to the receiver, yr is the
amount received if the agent is the receiver, and v : [0, 1] 7→ R is a diﬀer-
entiable function with v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 representing the well-being from
wealth.
Hence, given a function v we can infer bounds on the degree of morality
κ that subjects reveal depending on what they sent in the Dictator Game.
For our exercise we deﬁne v =
√
x which satisﬁes the required properties
for v stated above.22 The ranges for the implied κ are displayed in the ﬁfth
column in Table 2.2. Note that, as in the case of BO, those who gave 6 points
or more are inconsistent with the AW model.
For the Big Robber, the AW model (with a 1
2
probability of being a robber








E[ΠR] + p ·E[ΠV ]
E[ΠR] + E[ΠV ]
)
+ κ · v
(
(1− p) · E[ΠR]
E[ΠR] + E[ΠV ]
)
+ (1− κ) · v
(
(1− q) · E[ΠR]
E[ΠR] + E[ΠV ]
))
(2.2)
where p is as deﬁned above, q is the share that is taken from the participant
in case she is a victim, and v is deﬁned as in the Dictator Game above. Note
that the the second and third terms refer to hypothetical situations where the
decision maker becomes a victim. However, the decision maker still has the
same expectation E[ΠR] on her earnings from the intermediate games, and
the term E[ΠR]+E[ΠV ] should be interpreted as the sum of this expectation
and the expected earnings by all other players in those games.
22The model of BO is also cast for general functional forms, but the functional form
we use is the one typically employed in the literature. Hence, although using a specific
functional form for the model of AW is arbitrary, it keeps the exercise comparable with
the previous one.
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Once again, for an ex ante robber E[ΠV ] = V and E[ΠR] = V/nV , hence







1 + p · nV
1 + nV
)










A direct computation shows that, for ex ante robbers, UAW
R
(p) is maxi-
mized at p = 0.5 or larger for any level of morality κ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we
conclude that all ex ante robbers with κ ∈ [0, 1] should take 50%.
Regarding ex post robbers, we proceed as in the BO model. The optimal




E[ΠV ]E[ΠR]κ2 + E[ΠV ]2







2κ2 + 2E[ΠV ]E[ΠR])
(E[ΠV ]E[ΠR]κ2 + E[ΠV ]2)
2
which is strictly positive for κ,E[ΠV ], E[ΠR] > 0. That is, in the AW model,
robbers should rob (weakly) more with larger expectations on E[ΠV ]. Note
that completely selﬁsh agents, i.e. those κ = 0, will of course rob as much as
possible.





−E[ΠV ]κ2 (κ2E[ΠR]2 + 2E[ΠV ]E[ΠR] + E[ΠV ]2)
(E[ΠV ]E[ΠR]κ2 + E[ΠV ]2)
2
is strictly negative for κ,E[ΠV ], E[ΠR] > 0, which implies that robbers should
rob (weakly) more with smaller expectations on E[ΠR].
Thus, the optimum p∗ will be larger than the value of p∗ with the small-
est possible expectation E[ΠV ] = (nV − 1)V/nV and the largest possible
E[ΠR] = 80. Straightforward but cumbersome computations show that the
corresponding value of p∗ with nV = 16 and V = 571.43 is always larger than
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Table 2.2: Out-of-sample analysis for the models of Charness and Rabin (2002),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Alger and Weibull (2013).
Nr. Implied Implied Implied Prediction Compatible w/
xr Obs ρ (CR) a/b (BO) κ (AW) BR Game prediction
0 123 ≤ 1
2
[0.045,∞[ [0, 0.162] Take 50% 100 (81.3%)
1-4 130 = 1
2
[0.005, 0.045] [0.162, 0.904] Take 50% 59 (45.4%)
5 62 ≥ 1
2
[0, 0.005] Undeterm. 62 (100%)
[0.904, 1] Take 50% 20 (32.3%)
6-9 3 ≥ 1
2
N/A N/A Undeterm. 3 (100%)
10 2 Undeterm. N/A N/A Undeterm. 2 (100%)
Total 320 CR 226 (70.6%)
FS/BO 221 (69.1%)
AW 179 (55.9%)
0.5 for any value of κ ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that ex post robbers with any
level of morality should also take 50% in the Big Robber Game.23 In sum-
mary, the AW model predicts the same as the other three models for robbers
who gave 4 or less in the Dictator Game, but, while the models of FS, BO,
and CR do not provide unique predictions for the 62 robbers who gave 5 in
the Dictator Game, the AW model predicts that those robbers should take
as much as possible, i.e. 50%. In our sample only 20 participants (32.26%)
out of those 62 behaved as predicted by AW.
The last column of Table 2.2 compares the predictions of the models to
actual behavior in the Big Robber Game. We obtain that 226 out of our
320 observations (70.63%) can be explained by the model of CR. Further, of
the 226 observations, 159 (49.69% of the total, or 70.35% of the explained
observations) are such that the robbers took the maximum, while 67 (20.94%
of the total, or 29.65% of the explained) are such that the prediction of the
model cannot be actually derived (because the participant gave 5 or more
23This apparently surprising result has a straightforward intuition. The utility of an AW
agent is a convex combination of selfishness and the hypothetical payoff obtained when
everybody robs as much as the agent. Selfishness prescribes to rob as much as possible.
The other part of the utility combines the large payoff increase obtained when the agent
is a robber and robs p from 16 other agents with the comparatively small payoff decrease
obtained when the agent is a victim and p is robbed from her. Obviously, the payoff
increase dominates.
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points in the Dictator Game). The 5 observations of robbers who gave strictly
more than 5 points are inconsistent with the models of FS, BO, and AW.
We obtain that 221 out of 320 observations (69.06%) can be explained by
the models of FS and BR. Out of the 221 observations, 159 are such that
the robbers took the maximum, while 62 (19.38% of the total, or 28.05% of
the explained) are such that the prediction of the model cannot be actually
derived (because the participant gave exactly 5 in the Dictator Game). Only
the AW model provides a unique prediction for subjects who gave exactly 5
in the Dictator Game. The AW model explains 179 out of 320 observations
(55.94%), all of them such that the robbers took the maximum.
In summary, the observations are in line with received models of social
preferences as FS, CR, or BO, although a signiﬁcant percentage of obser-
vations are compatible with those models simply because they do not make
unique predictions for participants who gave exactly 5 in the dictator game.
It should be noted that, as indicated in Table 2.2, the standard models of
social preferences we consider predict a larger number of participants taking
50% than we actually observe, and are hence even closer to selﬁsh behavior
than the data. The reason is that the very high potential payoﬀ in the Big
Robber Game, compared to the Dictator Game, makes it diﬃcult to compare
the ranges of the parameters across games. Therefore, each model comes to
the conclusion that the robber should take the maximum of 50% whenever
she gives less than the equal split in the Dictator Game. This coincides with
the majority of our data. The model of AW fares considerably worse, es-
sentially because it predicts that homo moralis will always rob as much as
possible, which includes even those participants who gave 5 in the Dictator
Game.
2.7 Discussion
The Big Robber Game is a paradigm which makes high stakes salient, while
also emphasizing that the return comes at the cost of actively harming a
large group of people. Hence, the paradigm directly captures the idea that a
monetary temptation might make people act against society’s interests, as in
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the many corporate scandals which have sparked public outrage in the recent
decades, where “individuals who hold such ﬁnancial power may be tempted
to abuse it for their own personal proﬁt” (Myerson, 2012, p.848). With
this paradigm we showed that such corporate scandals are easily reproduced
in the lab even with regular university students. An absolute majority of
our (large) sample took the maximum possible amount, accepting that their
decision would damage a large number of other people. Further, the decision
to take the maximum was faster on average than the decision to refrain from
it, revealing a weaker moral struggle in the former case, and those who took
the maximum also donated less to a charity afterwards, revealing no evidence
of guilt. Our results stand in sharp contrast with the hypotheses of Mazar
et al. (2008), who argue that most people will cheat only a little if given
opportunity.
At the same time, we show that the very same participants who are
willing to inﬂict considerable damage on their peers within the Big Robber
Game display standard levels of other-regarding behavior as reﬂected by
Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. That is, we empirically demonstrate
the coexistence of prosociality in the small and morally outrageous selﬁshness
in the large, that is, in high-stakes, high-impact decisions aﬀecting large
groups.
The behavior we observe, however, is fully compatible with received mod-
els of social preferences. First, by calibrating standard models using behavior
in the Dictator Game, we show that a large part of our data is consistent
with the functional forms commonly-used to capture other-regarding pref-
erences. If anything, those models predict higher levels of selﬁsh behavior
in the Big Robber Game than we actually observe. Second, we show that
individual behavior in the Big Robber Game stands in a monotonic relation
with behavior in the standard games mentioned above. Participants who
took the maximum in the Big Robber Game gave less in the Dictator Game,
oﬀered less as proposers and accepted more unfair oﬀers in the Ultimatum
Game, and transferred less as trustors and returned less as trustees in the
Trust Game. That is, behavior in all games, small and big, can be explained
within a single account of other-regarding preferences. This is interesting in
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itself, in view of previous results on the (in)consistency of social preferences
across games (e.g., Blanco et al., 2011).
Our experiment also allowed us to acquire a number of other insights.
First, a number of psychological theories predict an eﬀect of previous deci-
sions in the moral domain on subsequent ones. We do ﬁnd eﬀects as pre-
dicted by those theories, but they are small and not systematic (that is, we
ﬁnd them for some games and not for others), and depend on gender. For
men, we ﬁnd evidence that behaving selﬁshly leads to further selﬁsh behavior
down the road, in accordance with the “what-the-hell” eﬀect. For women,
behaving selﬁshly seems to lead to a possibly guilt-induced attempt to be-
have less selﬁshly later on, in accordance with the “transgression-compliance”
eﬀect. Symmetrically, for women, refraining to behave selﬁshly earlier might
lead to increasingly selﬁsh behavior later, in accordance with the “moral-
credentialing” eﬀect. For men, however, refraining to behave selﬁshly earlier
might lead to less selﬁsh behavior later. Hence, while men seem to behave
consistently, sticking to being more or less selﬁsh, women act as if decisions
added up and one bad canceled one good, and vice versa. We insist, however,
that these eﬀects are small and not systematic in our sample.
It is also noteworthy that we ﬁnd no gender eﬀect whatsoever in the Big
Robber decision. Research from psychology suggests that women are more
sensitive to social cues and feedback than men (Gilligan, 1982; Roberts and
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989). In line with this, several previous studies have iden-
tiﬁed gender diﬀerences in the degree of inequality aversion (for example, the
proportion of egalitarian allocations in the Dictator and Ultimatum games).
However, as shown in the review of Croson and Gneezy (2009), the evidence
is mixed, and not all experiments ﬁnd a clear gender diﬀerence. In a recent
ﬁeld experiment, Azmat et al. (2016) show that when stakes are high (as in
our experiment), women perform worse than men, while the opposite is true
whenever the stakes are low. This diﬀerence, though, refers to performance
in real-eﬀort tasks, while our experiment is about preferential choice.
The most important diﬀerences between the Big Robber Game and other
games used to capture social preferences are, ﬁrst, the fact that a single
decision can inﬂict signiﬁcant damage on a large group of people, and second,
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the size of the stakes. There are, of course, by necessity, a number of other
diﬀerences between the Big Robber Game and other games. In our design,
only one robber is selected out of 16 possible ones, and the individual decision
is taken before the actual robber is selected. Hence there might be, in a
certain sense, a diluted responsibility. However, this interpretation is at odds
with evidence from the strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011), which
shows that behavior is essentially aligned if decisions are made conditional on
reaching a certain decision node and if the response is chosen after learning
that the node has been reached. Another diﬀerence is that, in spite of the
neutral framing, the decision in the Big Robber Game is more immediately
placed into a moral framework than those in previous games, since it is not
in terms of distribution or bargaining but simply in terms of taking away the
earnings of others. The Big Robber Game is, simply put, a new paradigm,
and not a high-stakes version of previous ones.
Since we aimed for a relatively large experiment in order to be able to test
for treatment eﬀects and condition those on gender, we settled on a single
basic design rather than complicating the analysis with added variants from
the onset. A large number of avenues for future research, involving design
variants, are obvious at this point. The upper bound of 50% on what could be
taken away from the victims was dictated by practical considerations, in order
to avoid damaging the reputation of the lab by having half of the participants
walk out of the experiment empty-handed. Future design variants could ﬁnd
ways to relax this constraint. Also, the discretization in only four possibilities
reﬂected the desire to have clear behavioral groups (take nothing, take just
a bit, take a signiﬁcant part but not the maximum, and take the maximum).
The baseline result having been thus established, it might be desirable to
implement a continuous version. These and many other possibilities are
beyond the scope of this work and are left for future research.
In conclusion, the Big Robber Game contributes to the literature in three
ways. From the methodological point of view, it provides the possibility to
experiment with relatively high stakes without increasing existing research
budgets. From the conceptual point of view, it provides a novel empirical
demonstration that behavior which is commonly accepted as prosocial in
88
Chapter 2 The Big Robber Game
“small” situations, as captured by standard laboratory games, coexists with
behavior which is commonly considered morally questionable in “large” situ-
ations (high stakes, high impact). Last, the results echo popular discussions
on moral responsibility among economic decision makers by showing that a
large part of our sample (containing just regular university students) is will-
ing to inﬂict signiﬁcant damage on a relatively large number of people for
personal gain, as long as that gain is of suﬃcient magnitude. Regrettably,





The Reinforcement Heuristic in Normal Form Games
3.1 Introduction
Reinforcement is one of the most basic processes underlying human learning.
Accordingly, it has received widespread attention in psychology, going back
to Thorndike’s (1911) “law of eﬀect,” neuroscience (e.g. Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Schönberg et al., 2007), and computer science (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Within microeconomics and game theory, it has been frequently studied as
a boundedly-rational behavioral rule (see, e.g. Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Erev
and Roth, 1998), as have been other rules, e.g. imitation or myopic best reply
(Weibull, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). The simplest version of rein-
forcement learning can be viewed as a heuristic which takes past experiences
into account for the choice of upcoming actions and prescribes a shift from
actions linked to negative experiences to actions associated with positive re-
wards: that is, “win-stay, lose-shift.” This heuristic induces a bias towards
past-high-reward actions which can conﬂict with rational behavior (outcome
bias; Baron and Hershey, 1988; Dillon and Tinsley, 2008).
Evidence from neuroscience shows that reinforcement-based decisions oc-
cur extremely fast in the human brain (Schultz, 1998; Holroyd and Coles,
2002). Indeed, reinforcement is a textbook example of an automatic process,
as conceived in dual-process theories from psychology (see, e.g., Kahneman,
2003; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014). Those theo-
ries deﬁne automatic (or intuitive) processes as immediate, fast, unconscious,
and eﬃcient in the sense of requiring few cognitive resources. For instance,
these processes capture impulsive reactions and behavior along the lines of
stimulus-response schemes. The dual-process approach postulates that hu-
man decisions are mainly inﬂuenced by automatic processes and so-called
controlled (or deliberative) processes. The latter are seen as slow, consum-
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ing cognitive resources, not instigated immediately, and reﬂected upon con-
sciously. Explicit maximization of expected rewards, if conceptualized as a
process, would exhibit many if not all of those characteristics.
The relevance of reinforcement for economic decision making was illus-
trated by Charness and Levin (2005) in a binary-choice, belief-updating task
where mistakes (deviations from optimization under correct Bayesian updat-
ing) could be traced to a reinforcement heuristic. In essentially the same
paradigm, Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) found evidence of the conﬂict
between reinforcement and rational optimization in the form of response
time asymmetries as predicted by an explicit dual-process model. Recent
psychophysiological work (Achtziger et al., 2015a) found direct evidence of
neural correlates of reinforcement in this paradigm and studied their rela-
tion to economic incentives. Further studies relying on this paradigm have
examined the interaction of reinforcement and decision inertia (Alós-Ferrer
et al., 2016b), the inﬂuence of framing on reinforcement decisions (Alós-
Ferrer et al., 2017), and the regulation of reinforcement processes through
motivational interventions (Hügelschäfer and Achtziger, 2017).
In this work, we take a further step in the study of reinforcement heuris-
tics in economic settings by moving beyond binary-choice tasks and studying
the explicit relation between reinforcement and myopic payoﬀ maximization
in strategic decisions. Hence, we study reinforcement processes in a more
complex setting which results in longer decisions times than, e.g., standard
neuropsychological experiments. We concentrate on two-player, 3× 3 asym-
metric normal form games. In this setting, the microeconomics literature
has devoted a great deal of attention to myopic best reply, a behavioral rule
which maximizes the own payoﬀ assuming the other player will repeat her
action, and which can be assumed to have a more deliberative/controlled
nature than reinforcement.
Previous work has analyzed paradigms where, by design, reinforcement
and more deliberative behavior could either conﬂict or be aligned (e.g.
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014). In other settings, however, there might
be a great degree of overlap between the prescriptions of reinforcement and
those of myopic best reply. In the present work we speciﬁcally explore to
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what extent reinforcement can act as a shortcut for (apparent) optimization
in strategic situations with explicit feedback. Suppose a player’s last action
delivered the best possible payoﬀ. Reinforcement will then prescribe to re-
peat the choice (win-stay). By deﬁnition, however, that choice is the best
reply if the opponent stays put. Likewise, suppose the last action did not
deliver the best possible payoﬀ. Reinforcement will prescribe to choose a
diﬀerent action (lose-shift). But, again by deﬁnition, the current choice can-
not be the myopic optimum, and hence myopic best reply also prescribes to
shift. In principle, the “shift” prescribed by reinforcement is arbitrary, but if
payoﬀs are observable (as, e.g., if the payoﬀ table is known), the observable
maximum becomes salient and the shift will often be in its direction, leading
to an apparent myopic best reply. In view of these observations, we postulate
that reinforcement processes might often act as cognitive shortcuts resulting
in choices indistinguishable from myopic best reply.1
If choices coming from reinforcement and those prescribed by myopic
best reply cannot be distinguished, how can this hypothesis be substanti-
ated? There are two possible avenues. The ﬁrst relies on response times. As
explained above, reinforcement processes are automatic and can be expected
to lead to shorter response times than alternative processes. In contrast,
myopic best reply involves explicit maximization and can be assumed to be
deliberative, hence relatively slow. Hence, if the choices favored by both
processes are actually due to the involvement of reinforcement processes, one
should expect shorter response times (compared to other choices), while if
they are due to explicit maximization, response times should be longer.
The second avenue is bygone payoﬀs. Suppose a player obtains a payoﬀ
which is not the maximum possible one given the opponent’s strategy. If
that maximum payoﬀ is observable, the deviation with respect to it is a car-
dinal measure of experienced disappointment. Deﬁne experienced regret as
the diﬀerence between the maximum possible payoﬀ (that of the best reply)
and the actually obtained payoﬀ. By deﬁnition, regret is zero if and only
1Indeed, the obvious evolutionary reason for the existence of automatic processes is
that in certain situations they are adapted and support (near-)optimal decisions while
saving cognitive costs.
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if the player has chosen a best reply, and strictly positive if not (this will
be directly observable in our experiment). Myopic best reply, considered as
a behavioral rule, prescribes to change strategy whenever a best reply has
not been chosen. In contrast, reinforcement processes are stimulus-response
mappings which take the win-loss information as an input. The loss infor-
mation also carries a measurement of stimulus strength which in turn yields
a variation in the responses. Hence, standard formalizations of reinforce-
ment take the probability of a shift to be increasing in the degree of the loss,
which is just the experienced regret as deﬁned above. That is, reinforce-
ment should be triggered more often for larger experienced regret. Hence, if
observed choices follow from reinforcement processes, one should observe a
dependence on experienced regret.
To study these questions, we conducted an experiment (N = 144) where
participants played 3 × 3 games against other players repeatedly. In order
to isolate the decision processes of interest, in our experiment players had
full knowledge of their own payoﬀ tables, but were not aware of the payoﬀs
of the opponents. In this way, we aimed to eliminate a number of potential
confounds, as e.g. imitation or social preferences. Also, in this simple design
the maximum (bygone) payoﬀ associated with a choice is directly observable,
and regret is simply the diﬀerence between the highest payoﬀ associated with
the opponent’s choice and the actually received payoﬀ. To make this even
simpler, each of the diﬀerent payoﬀ tables used in the experiment contain
only three diﬀerent numerical payoﬀs, hence maximum payoﬀs and regret
levels are easily observable.
The experiment was divided in short parts of 13 rounds each, and after
each part both the opponent and the payoﬀ table were changed. This was an
explicit design decision in order to prevent convergence or long-run eﬀects,
and rather concentrate on the decision processes.
Our work is related to several literature strands. Within the reinforcement
learning literature, we focus on simple stimulus-response behavioral rules of
thumb, capturing the basic idea of a “win-stay, lose-shift” stimulus-response
mapping. Of course, the literature on reinforcement also encompasses more
involved models. For instance, the game-theoretic cumulative proportional
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reinforcement of Laslier et al. (2001) postulates that actions are chosen with
probabilities proportional to their cumulative payoﬀs obtained in the past
with that move. Modern reinforcement learning models in computational
neuroscience (see Daw, 2012, for an introduction) often include additional
factors, e.g. through a perseveration parameter capturing the tendency to
repeat or avoid recently chosen actions (e.g., Gershman et al., 2009; Wimmer
et al., 2012). Our interest, however, is on Markov behavioral rules conceived
as mappings from information at t (e.g., payoﬀs and actions of all players)
to behavior at t+ 1 (probabilities of the feasible actions), as standard in the
literature of learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Within this
literature, such behavioral rules include imitation (e.g., Vega-Redondo, 1997;
Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2008) and myopic best reply (e.g. Kandori and
Rob, 1995; Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2007). This focus is consequential
for the analysis. On the assumption that behavior follows Markov rules,
one can concentrate on the estimation of probabilities of actions given only
the relevant information, e.g. realized and bygone payoﬀs and actions in the
last period. For instance, under such maintained hypotheses, the matching
within an experiment is irrelevant, as behavior is assumed to rely only on
the information presented to the player (we will, however, also control for
matching in our analysis).
Our experiment is also related to the literature on multi-armed bandits
(Gittins, 1979, 1989), in the sense that players repeatedly choose an action
out of three possibilities. However, contrary to this literature we are not
interested in optimal (normative) dynamic strategies, but rather on the ac-
tual (one-shot) decision processes employed by human beings in our setting.
Since players were explicitly told that the opponent was human, our exper-
iment was not framed in terms of intertemporal optimization or uncovering
of optimal actions. Indeed, in our data, we see little evidence for intertem-
poral optimization or learning eﬀects. On the contrary, we argue that, in our
context, even what might be interpreted as one-shot optimization might be
actually supported by simpler decision processes.
A more-closely related literature has examined “decisions from experi-
ence,” where subjects make repeated individual decisions in stochastic frame-
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works but learn the underlying probabilities by making decisions (as opposed
to decisions from description, where the priors are induced; Hertwig et al.,
2004). Although our setting is interpersonal (subjects play against a human
being and not a ﬁxed distribution), insights from this literature are infor-
mative. In particular, Erev and Haruvy (2016, Section 1.1.5) remark that
decision inertia plays an important role (recall also Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b),
which in our setting would lead to higher rates of win-stay choices compared
to lose-shift ones. This is indeed found in our data. Erev and Haruvy (2016)
also list “surprise-triggers-change” as one of the main reasons for not repeat-
ing the last choice; that is, the probability of inertia decreases when recent
outcomes are surprising. In our case, a larger experienced regret plays the
role of surprise. The mirror image of this eﬀect is “negative recency,” which
is sometimes observed in decisions from experience and implies higher shift
rates after surprising positive outcomes (in our case, no regret), even though
those reinforce the last choice.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 3.3 presents the
results, analyzing both choice data and response times. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted 6 sessions with 24 participants each for a total of 144 sub-
jects (91 female) at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER).
Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from the student
population of the University of Cologne excluding students of psychology.
The average age was 22.97 years (median 23, range 18–50). The experiment
was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and sessions lasted on aver-
age 60 minutes. The average payoﬀ was 12.28 EUR (SD= 0.94) including a
show-up fee of 2.50 EUR.
The experiment involved three diﬀerent 3 × 3 normal form games (see
Table 3.1). The games had a cyclical structure and the three strategies were
neutrally labeled: ◦, #, ÷ for player 1, and ∼, •, x for the opponent. Each
table uses only three diﬀerent payoﬀs, and each outcome is clearly attainable
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for each action the opponent possibly plays. Hence, maximum bygone payoﬀs
and regret levels (given the actual opponent’s strategies) are directly and
easily observable.
Each subject played a total of 39 rounds divided into three diﬀerent parts
of 13 rounds each. In each part, a subject faced a ﬁxed game and played
against a ﬁxed partner. The subject saw a 3 × 3 payoﬀ table with only her
own payoﬀs. That is, she was not informed about the payoﬀs of the other
player and hence imitation was not feasible, and social preferences were not a
concern. The subject chose one of the three actions (◦, #, ÷) in each round.
Rematching was done within blocks of four players after 13 rounds and a
new game, i.e. payoﬀ table, was presented. The payoﬀ tables were always
reordered and relabeled in such a way that every player saw herself as player
1. The order of the labels for the own strategies was counterbalanced among
subjects. Subjects were paid for each decision in all rounds. Alternatively,
we could have paid one randomly selected round; Charness et al. (2016) have
shown that relying on one or the other method does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
behavior.2
The games were designed to generate diﬀerent levels of “regret,” deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the maximum possible payoﬀ and payoﬀ earned
in the previous round. The levels ranged from 0 to 6 (see Table 3.1). By
construction, in our games a best reply always reached the maximum payoﬀ
available in the payoﬀ table. This was done on purpose to avoid alternative
deﬁnitions of experienced regret and, hence, potential alternative rules based
on reinforcement heuristics.
After each round, the actual play from the previous round was revealed.
Subjects saw their own choice, the opponent’s choice, and their own payoﬀ.
This information remained on-screen while they made their choice for the
next round (obviously, there was no feedback during the ﬁrst choice of each
part). In addition, the column in the payoﬀ table which represented the
choice of the other player in the previous round was highlighted.
2However, Azrieli et al. (2018, Appendix C) conclude that in a dynamic setting with
feedback (as our design) paying a randomly selected round is not incentive compatible,
because agents have an incentive to experiment.
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Table 3.1: The three games used in the experiment.
Game 1
∼ • x
o 6,2 4,4 2,6
# 2,6 6,2 4,4
÷ 4,4 2,6 6,2
Regret ∈ {0, 2, 4}
Game 2
∼ • x
o 7,1 4,4 1,7
# 1,7 7,1 4,4
÷ 4,4 1,7 7,1
Regret ∈ {0, 3, 6}
Game 3
∼ • x
o 6,1 5,5 1,6
# 1,6 6,1 5,5
÷ 5,5 1,6 6,1
Regret ∈ {0, 1, 5}
After completing the 39 rounds of play, participants answered demo-
graphic questions, the Maximization and Regret scale (Schwartz et al.,
2002), the Faith in Intuition scale (Epstein et al., 1996; Alós-Ferrer and
Hügelschäfer, 2012, 2016), and a 15-item Big-Five questionnaire (Lang et al.,
2011, p. 560).3 The results reported below are robust to the inclusion of
those measures as controls, but the measures themselves provided no addi-
tional insights.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Classiﬁcation of the Decision Situations
We are interested in the choices that participants made while seeing the
previous round’s outcomes, and hence we dropped the ﬁrst round of each
part (where no feedback on a previous decision was possible). For all other
decisions, if the participant had achieved the highest possible payoﬀ in the
previous round, we classiﬁed the following decision as a win situation, else
as a lose situation. The complete data set consists of 144× 36 = 5184 obser-
vations, of which 1,794 observations (34.61%) were win situations and 3,390
(65.39%) were lose situations. Regret, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the
maximum possible payoﬀ and the realized one, was always 0 in win situations
and strictly positive in lose situations. Table 3.2 contains the frequency of
3The German versions of the three scales were taken from Greifeneder and Betsch
(2006), Keller et al. (2000), and Gerlitz and Schupp (2005), respectively.
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Table 3.2: Frequency of the different experienced regret levels in lose situations.
Regret 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number 550 494 552 617 589 588
Frequency (%) 16.22 14.57 16.28 18.20 17.37 17.35
various levels of regret in lose situations, which were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from a uniform distribution (χ2-test, χ2(5) = 8.359, p = 0.1375).
The “win-stay, lose-shift” version of reinforcement we focus on prescribed
staying with the previously chosen option in win situations and shifting away
to another option in lose situations. However, in win situations staying with
the previous action is also the prescription of myopic best reply in our games,
since if a player assumes that the opponent will not change strategy, repeating
the strategy which led to a win is optimal. Further, mere inertia (repeating
the previous action no matter what; see, e.g., Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b) also
leads to the same prescription. That is, in win situations all three behavioral
rules (reinforcement, myopic best reply, and inertia) prescribed to repeat
the previous action. There were two possible deviations from this common
prescription, i.e. the choice which would have yielded the medium payoﬀ and
the one which would have yielded the low payoﬀ (if the opponent stayed put).
In lose situations reinforcement prescribed to shift away from the previous
choice to one of the two remaining alternatives. Shifting to the maximum-
payoﬀ alternative was aligned with myopic best reply (BR shifts), but shifting
to the remaining alternative (which could be a medium- or low-payoﬀ one)
was not (non-BR shifts). Since BR shifts just require following the bygone
payoﬀ, we focus on a reinforcement rule prescribing BR shifts. By deﬁni-
tion, the prescription of inertia was to stay put with the previously-chosen
alternative.
The strategy of analysis is as follows. At the ﬁrst level, we take decisions
as a response to the feedback, i.e. we are interested in (Markov) decision rules
as studied in the literature on learning in games (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine,
1998). For such an analysis, the origin of the input (feedback) is irrelevant,
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Figure 3.1: Average individual choice frequencies.
Notes. Frequencies conditional on Win (left-hand side) and Lose (right-hand side) situa-
tions. Bars represent 1 Standard Error of the Mean Significance levels refer to Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests. ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01.
since one studies the probabilities of responses conditional on the input.
Hence we study subject averages (frequency of choices and response times
conditional on choice and situation) with 144 observations (one per player)
and conduct non-parametric (within) tests. At the second level, we conduct
a robustness analysis and reanalyze the data at the block level (since match-
ing was within blocks of four players), creating 36 independent observations
for non-parametric tests. That is, at this level each individual observation
averages over all decisions of all four players in a block. At the third level,
we analyze the data as a panel through the appropriate regression models,
controlling for a number of additional factors.
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3.3.2 Choice Data
Figure 3.1 depicts the average individual choice frequencies conditional on
win and lose situations. In win situations, the decision to “stay” (following
reinforcement, myopic best reply, and inertia) was signiﬁcantly more frequent
than any other alternative. Stay decisions, with an average individual fre-
quency of 51.57%, where more frequent than shifts to the medium-payoﬀ
(26.35%) or the low-payoﬀ action (22.08%). The diﬀerences are signiﬁ-
cant according to Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests4 (stay vs. shift to medium,
z = 6.130, p < 0.0001; stay vs. shift to low, z = 6.615, p < 0.0001). Shifts
to the medium-payoﬀ action were also more frequent than shifts to the low-
payoﬀ action, and the diﬀerence in distributions is also signiﬁcant (z = 2.599,
p = 0.0094). Tests at the block level (N = 36) yielded the same conclu-
sions (WSR tests, stay (50.73%) vs. shift to medium (26.92%), z = 4.550,
p < 0.0001; stay vs. shift to low (22.36%), z = 4.643, p < 0.0001; shift to
medium vs. shift to low, z = 2.353, p = 0.0186).
In lose situations, shifts to the myopic best reply were also more frequent
than other choices. The average frequency of shifts aligned with myopic
best reply was 42.74%, compared to 26.41% of non-BR shifts (WSR test,
z = 6.295, p < 0.0001) and 30.84% of stay choices following inertia (WSR
test, z = 4.443, p < 0.0001). Non-BR shifts were less frequent than inertia
decisions (WSR test, z = −2.108, p = 0.0350). Testing at the block level
(N = 36) yielded the same conclusions (WSR tests, BR shifts (42.07%)
vs. non-BR shifts (26.40%), z = 4.454, p < 0.0001; BR shifts vs. inertia
(31.53%), z = 3.849, p = 0.0002; non-BR shifts vs. inertia, z = −2.090,
p = 0.0367).
Figure 3.3 (left-hand side) shows that the main results above are robust
when choice frequencies are analyzed for each game separately. That is, the
decision to stay in win situations, respectively to shift to the myopic best
reply in lose situations, was more frequent than other choices in each of the
three games.
4Here and elsewhere, tests are adjusted for multiple comparisons following the Holm-
Bonferroni correction.
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Table 3.3: Random-effects panel probit regressions for choices.
Reinforcement decision Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Win 0.2201∗∗∗ 0.3737∗∗∗ 0.3733∗∗∗
(0.0618) (0.0859) (0.0849)




Part 2 Dummy 0.0301
(0.0569)
Part 3 Dummy −0.0323
(0.0581)
Constant −0.2075∗∗∗ −0.3606∗∗∗ −0.2959∗∗∗
(0.0377) (0.0738) (0.0887)
LogLikelihood −3429.1594 −3424.0503 −3421.2967
Wald Test 33.0209∗∗∗ 43.1477∗∗∗ 48.5771∗∗∗
Notes. Independent variable takes value 1 if reinforcement was followed. Standard errors
(clustered by 36 matching blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.3 presents panel probit regressions with random eﬀects at the
individual level and standard errors clustered at the matching block. The
independent variable is deﬁned as 1 if the decision followed the prescription
of reinforcement / myopic best reply, that is, stay in win situations and
shift to the best-payoﬀ action in lose situations. The regressions allow us to
control for other variables such as the regret level or learning eﬀects. In all
three models, the dummy Win (for win situations) is highly signiﬁcant and
positive, implying that participants were more likely to follow the common
prescription of reinforcement and myopic best reply in win situations. That
is, win-stay decisions are more likely than lose-shift (to the best reply) even
though both follow reinforcement and myopic best reply. This asymmetry is
as it should be expected from inertia, since a “stay” decision complies with
this additional process (Erev and Haruvy, 2016; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b).5
5This is also confirmed by WSR tests comparing win-stay rates (average 51.57%) and
the rate of shifts to the best reply in lose situations (average 42.74%), which are significant
both at the individual (z = 3.275, p = 0.0011) and the block level (z = 3.119, p = 0.0018).
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Model 2 adds the interaction Lose × Regret, which captures the eﬀect of
the regret level in lose situations (recall that regret is identically zero for win
situations). The coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcantly positive in Models 2 and 3,
indicating that being further away from the maximum payoﬀ resulted in a
higher probability of following reinforcement. Model 3 controls for learning
eﬀects, adding a coeﬃcient for normalized round within a part (rescaled
to range from 0 to 1) and individual dummies for each part. None were
signiﬁcant, indicating no evidence of behavioral change over time. That is,
consistent with our Markov-rules approach, at the aggregate level there is no
evidence that the reliance on reinforcement changed over time. Additional
regressions including the personality questionnaires and demographic factors
(Table 3.5, Appendix 3.B) as controls yielded the same qualitative results,
while the controls themselves provided no further insights.
Cameron et al. (2008) remarked that a small number of clusters can lead
to over-rejection of standard asymptotic tests and recommending bootstrap-
ping the standard errors. According to their simulations group sizes of 30
already showed a rejection rate close to the intended 5% level. Hence, as a
further robustness test, we ran a regression bootstrapping the standard er-
rors with 100 repetitions (Table 3.6, Appendix 3.B), which yielded the same
conclusions.
In summary, the regressions indicate that “win-stay” in win situations
were comparatively more likely than shifting to the myopically best option
in lose situations, but that the “lose-shift” choice was more likely with higher
regret. Note that the latter result cannot be explained by a behavioral rule
based on myopic best reply (which should be impervious to regret), but is
consistent with a general reinforcement process for which the strength of a
loss does play a role.
3.3.3 Cumulative Reinforcement
The behavioral rules we concentrate on rely on information from the most
recent period of play only. One can of course ask whether alternative re-
inforcement rules using information from longer histories can describe the
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data better. A prominent example is cumulative proportional reinforcement
(Laslier et al., 2001), which prescribes to choose the action with the highest
cumulative payoﬀ over the whole past. Relying only on the simple rules of re-
inforcement and inertia, which only take the previous round into account, we
can account for 3, 406 (65.70%) out of the 5, 184 observations in our data set.
In contrast, only 2, 214 observations (42.71%) agree with cumulative propor-
tional reinforcement, and the majority of those observations are also aligned
with simple reinforcement and inertia. The combination of inertia and cu-
mulative proportional reinforcement captures 2, 813 observations (54.26%).
Only 487 (9.39%) observations are consistent with cumulative proportional
reinforcement but not with the other two rules, while 1, 080 (20.83%) are
compatible with our simple reinforcement rule but not with the other two
rules.
We also ran regressions analogous to Table 3.3 for cumulative proportional
reinforcement (Table 3.7, Appendix 3.B). That is, the dependent variable was
deﬁned as a dummy taking the value 1 if and only if the decision was con-
sistent with this rule. The regression did not yield any signiﬁcant results for
winning or regret levels, but showed a signiﬁcantly negative time trend, indi-
cating a lower likelihood of following cumulative proportional reinforcement
over time. In conclusion, we view these observations as indicators that it is
reasonable to assume Markov decisions rules in this context.
3.3.4 Response Times
We computed average individual response times conditional on the diﬀerent
situations and choices, dropping the ﬁrst round of each part. Note that not all
participants have response times for each shift or stay, since if for instance a
participant never shifted away in win situations, there will be no observations
in the corresponding categories. Hence, the tests below will in general have
diﬀerent numbers of observations (tests at the block level, however, always
have 36 observations).
Figure 3.2 depicts the averages of response times for shift and stay deci-
sions, conditional on win or lose situations. The fastest decisions are always
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Figure 3.2: Average individual response times.
Notes. Response times conditional on Win (left-hand side) and Lose (right-hand side)
situations. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
those consistent with the common prescription of myopic best reply and re-
inforcement. Speciﬁcally, in win situations, stay decisions were faster than
shifts to the medium-payoﬀ action (average 5.25 s vs. 6.53 s; WSR test,
N = 126, z = −4.342, p < 0.0001) and shifts to the low-payoﬀ action (av-
erage 5.34 s vs. 6.73 s; WSR test, N = 112, z = −4.121, p < 0.0001).
Response times for both kinds of shifts were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in win
situations (shift to medium, 6.34 s; shift to low, 6.53 s; WSR test, N = 109,
z = −0.322, p = 0.7475). Testing at the block level (N = 36) yields iden-
tical conclusions (WSR tests, stay (mean 5.01 s) vs. medium (mean 6.34 s),
z = −3.629, p = 0.0006; stay vs. low (mean 6.48 s), z = −3.912, p = 0.0003;
medium vs. low, z = −0.471, p = 0.6374).
The same also holds for lose situations. That is, shifts aligned with myopic
best reply were faster than non-BR shifts (average 5.91 s vs. 6.50 s; WSR
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test, N = 142, z = −2.988, p = 0.0084) and stay decisions (average 5.95 s vs.
6.44 s; WSR test, N = 142, z = −2.066, p = 0.0777). Response times for the
latter two were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in lose situations (non-BR shifts,
6.55 s; stay decisions, 6.45 s; WSR test, N = 140, z = 0.774, p = 0.4391).
However, tests at the block level (N = 36; adjusted, as always, following
Holm-Bonferroni) were not signiﬁcant in this case (WSR tests, BR shifts
(5.98 s) vs. non-BR shifts (6.48 s), z = −1.870, p = 0.1231; BR shifts vs.
stay (6.06 s), z = −0.314, p = 0.7534; non-BR shifts vs. stay, z = 1.901,
p = 0.1719).
Figure 3.3 (right-hand side) illustrates the response time analysis above
for each game separately. The decision to stay in win situations was faster
than other decisions for all Games. The decision to shift to the myopic best
reply in lose situations was faster than other shifts and stay decisions for
Game 3 and faster than stay decisions for Game 1, but the diﬀerences were
not signiﬁcant for Game 2.
Table 3.4 presents panel regressions for log-transformed response times,
with random eﬀects at the individual level and standard errors clustered at
the matching block.6 The analysis conﬁrms that decisions which agree with
the prescriptions of reinforcement (and best reply) are signiﬁcantly faster
than other decisions. To see this for win-stay, we look at the dummy “Stay”
which indicates whether the decision was to repeat the previous choice or
not, i.e. inertia. Its coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant and negative in all models,
indicating that (since the interaction Lose × Stay is included in the models)
decisions to stay after a win, hence to stay with the best response, were
made signiﬁcantly faster. This is consistent with the interpretation that
many such decisions might be the result of relatively automatic processes.7
6Response times are nonnegative and their distribution is strongly right-skewed, while
the distribution of log-transformed response times typically shows a normally-distributed
shape (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2013). Using Shapiro-Wilk W tests at the individual level,
the hypothesis of normality was only rejected for 19 of the 144 subjects at the 5% level,
and there were only 7 cases with significance between 5% and 10%. In contrast, using
regular response times, the hypothesis of normality is rejected in 113 cases at the 5%
level, and in 11 further cases at the 10% level.
7Some of the non-stay, slower decisions might be the result of more complex decision
rules, as e.g. best-responding to a predicted best response.
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For lose-shift, we look at the dummy “BR-Shift” which captures shifts to the
payoﬀ-maximizing option after a lose situation, as in Figure 3.2 (note that
shifting to a best response implies a lose situation). Its coeﬃcient is also
signiﬁcant and negative in all models, again indicating faster decisions.8
The regressions also allow us to examine additional questions. This ﬁrst
concerns the diﬀerence between win and lose situations. Reinforcement /
best-reply decisions were signiﬁcantly faster in win situations than in lose
situations, as revealed by a linear combination test (1) at the bottom of
Table 3.4.9 The dummy for lose situations is not signiﬁcant, implying that
shifts not following the reinforcement prescription did not diﬀer in response
times across win and lose situations.
The second additional observation concerns inertia compared to shifts.
All models include an interaction term for stay decisions in lose situations
(Lose × Stay), that is, for following inertia. Concerning inertia and non-BR
shifts, the linear combination test (2) in Table 3.4 is only marginally signiﬁ-
cant, and only in model 3. That is, there is only weak evidence that inertia
decisions might be faster than non-BR shifts in lose situations. Concerning
inertia and BR shifts, however, the linear combination test (3) comparing
BR-shift decisions with stay decisions in lose situations was not signiﬁcant,
in contrast with the non-parametric results.
Models 2 and 3 also add the interaction with the regret level (in lose
situations, as in win situations there is no regret), which is not signiﬁcant,
implying that the level of regret experienced did not aﬀect the response time.
This is not at odds with our previous ﬁnding that higher regret levels induce
more reinforcement, because the BR-Shift coeﬃcient already captures the
8The omitted category are (non-BR) shifts after a win. Since the non-parametric anal-
ysis did not find significant differences between shifts to medium and low-payoff actions,
we do not distinguish them further. An additional regression including a dummy for shifts
to the medium-payoff action in win situations (Table 3.8, Appendix 3.B) yields the same
conclusions, with the additional coefficient not being significantly different from 0.
9This difference cannot be explained through pure best-reply behavior, since best reply
only depends on the opponent’s previous choice and not on whether there was a previous
win or loss. Reinforcement yields prescriptions conditional on the situation (win-stay,
lose-shift) and could hence account for such difference. Alternatively, one could argue
that, for unmodeled reasons, some best-reply decisions (e.g. win-stay) are less cognitively
demanding than others.
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Table 3.4: Panel regressions for log-transformed response times.
ln(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Stay −0.2753∗∗∗ −0.2752∗∗∗ −0.2912∗∗∗
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0411)
Lose 0.0086 0.0037 −0.0039
(0.0366) (0.0421) (0.0424)
Lose × Stay 0.2202∗∗∗ 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2233∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0487) (0.0476)
BR-Shift −0.0633∗∗ −0.0634∗∗ −0.0680∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0313)




Part 2 Dummy −0.0790∗
(0.0409)
Part 3 Dummy 0.0224
(0.0503)
Constant 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.8643∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0441) (0.0537)
R2 0.0256 0.0256 0.0555
Wald Test 105.5638∗∗∗ 111.5129∗∗∗ 298.8777∗∗∗
Linear Combination Tests:
(1) Lose+BR-Shift vs. Stay 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.2192∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0391) (0.0414)
(2) Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0551 −0.0547 −0.0678∗
(0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0384)
(3) BR-Shift vs. Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0082 −0.0087 −0.0002
(0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0270)
Notes. Standard errors (clustered by 36 matching blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
faster response times in lose situations. Model 3 controls for learning eﬀects
as in the regression on choice data. As standard in choice experiments, partic-
ipants became faster as their familiarity with the interface and the situation
increased, as indicated by a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient for Normalized
Round. Participants also became faster after the ﬁrst part (although the
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eﬀect is only weakly signiﬁcant), but there was no improvement of response
times in the third part compared to the ﬁrst. Additional regressions includ-
ing questionnaires and demographics (Table 3.9, Appendix 3.B) as controls
yielded the same qualitative results. Further, an additional regression boot-
strapping the standard errors with 100 repetitions (Table 3.10, Appendix
3.B) yielded the same conclusions.
3.4 Discussion
In our experiment, we examined a behavioral rule based on the simplest
reinforcement principle, “win-stay, lose-shift,” as a possible cognitive short-
cut for myopic best reply. After a previous win, the rule prescribes to repeat
the previous choice. After a previous lose situation, the rule prescribes to
shift away from it, and available information allows to focus on the speciﬁc
shift favored by myopic best reply. Reinforcement processes are known to
be automatic and associated with short response times, while myopic best
reply, which involves explicit maximization, should be a more deliberative,
slower process.
In win situations, win-stay was a strong driver of behavior. Such deci-
sions occurred more often and faster than other actions (results conﬁrmed
by non-parametric tests both at the individual and block level and by panel
regressions). Choice data alone could be justiﬁed by either reliance on an
automatic, impulsive reinforcement process or a more cognitive, deliberative
explicit maximization. However, win-stay decisions were the fastest decisions
observed in our experiment, indicating that a more automatic process was
at work compared to slower decisions. This leads to the interpretation that
stay responses, even though they correspond to myopic bet response, most
likely often followed a more automatic process.
In lose situations, shift rates (to the best reply) were sensitive to the
magnitude of experienced regret, in agreement with reinforcement learning
but in contrast to myopic best reply, which would predict the best-reply
rates to be independent from the cardinal diﬀerence between experienced and
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maximum possible payoﬀs.10 Also, shifts to the myopic best reply were more
frequent and faster than other choices, conﬁrming the general interpretation
of a more automatic underlying process, although response-time evidence
was less strong than in the case of win situations.
Regression results on response times suggest that stay decisions (consis-
tent with inertia) might actually be as fast as choices following reinforcement
or best reply, in agreement with evidence on inertia as an additional, auto-
matic process (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b). This also agrees with the observa-
tion that, in lose situations, stay decisions occurred more often than shifts
which did not follow the maximum payoﬀ. However, shifts to the myopic best
reply were more frequent with higher regret, an eﬀect incompatible with a
pure best-reply interpretation, but perfectly aligned with general reinforce-
ment processes in which the strength of the loss does play a role.
Our experiment goes beyond previous paradigms on win-stay, lose-shift
rules (which have typically employed binary-choice settings) and shows evi-
dence on the relevance of simple reinforcement processes in strategic settings.
The evidence can and should be seen as a general caveat, in the sense that evi-
dence in favor of myopic best reply in games might often be confounded with
the workings of reinforcement, the basic building block of human learning
(Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw and Tobler, 2014; Achtziger et al., 2015a). In
this and other cases of overlapping behavioral rules, the analysis of response
times might provide valuable evidence.
10In this setting, reinforcement could be seen as a gradual, payoff-dependent version of
best reply, giving rise to behavior in line with quantal response models (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995).
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Appendix 3.A: Frequency and Response Times by Game







































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Average individual choice frequencies and response times by games.
Notes. Choice frequencies and response times conditional on choice and situation for each
game. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
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Appendix 3.B: Additional Regressions
Table 3.5: Random-effects panel probit regressions with additional controls.
Reinforcement decisions Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Win 0.3733∗∗∗ 0.3729∗∗∗ 0.3737∗∗∗
(0.0849) (0.0850) (0.0835)
Lose × Regret 0.0423∗∗ 0.0422∗∗ 0.0421∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0162)
Normalized Round −0.1171 −0.1173 −0.1175
(0.0736) (0.0738) (0.0739)
Part 2 Dummy 0.0301 0.0302 0.0300
(0.0569) (0.0570) (0.0571)








Faith in Intuition 0.0003
(0.0265)














Constant −0.2959∗∗∗ −0.0487 −0.1677
(0.0887) (0.2135) (0.4408)
Log.Likelihood −3421.2967 −3419.0832 −3414.9345
WaldTest 48.5771∗∗∗ 53.1115∗∗∗ 61.9844∗∗∗
Notes. Additional controls are demographic factors (Model 4) and personality question-
naires (Model 5). The dummy Game Theory Knowledge takes the value 1 if the subject
indicated that she attended a game theory lecture. The coefficients Openness to Experi-
ence, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism represent the score
on each sub-scale of the Big Five questionnaire. Standard errors (clustered by 36 matching
blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.6: Regression models while bootstrapping the standard errors.
Reinforcement decisions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Win 0.2201∗∗∗ 0.3737∗∗∗ 0.3733∗∗∗
(0.0635) (0.0924) (0.0912)




Part 2 Dummy 0.0301
(0.0655)
Part 3 Dummy −0.0323
(0.0555)
Constant −0.2075∗∗∗ −0.3606∗∗∗ −0.2959∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0794) (0.0912)
Log.Likelihood −3429.1594 −3424.0503 −3421.2967
WaldTest 11.9980∗∗∗ 17.0684∗∗∗ 22.2866∗∗∗
Notes. Bootstrapping the standard errors (in parentheses) with 100 repetitions. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 3.7: Regressions models for cumulative proportional reinforcement.
Cumulative proportional
reinforcement Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Win 0.1334∗∗∗ 0.0624 0.0615
(0.0399) (0.0485) (0.0502)




Part 2 Dummy −0.0512
(0.0379)
Part 3 Dummy −0.0748∗
(0.0382)
Constant −0.2324∗∗∗ −0.1614∗∗∗ −0.0115
(0.0216) (0.0506) (0.0609)
Log.Likelihood −3524.1636 −3522.9853 −3516.1829
WaldTest 12.7985∗∗∗ 15.1394∗∗∗ 28.6499∗∗∗
Notes. The independent variable takes the value 1 if cumulative proportional reinforcement
was followed. Standard errors (clustered by 36 matching blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Panel regression for log-transformed response times including an addi-
tional dummy.
ln(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Stay −0.2749∗∗∗ −0.2748∗∗∗ −0.2867∗∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0524) (0.0522)
Lose 0.0089 0.0041 0.0004
(0.0446) (0.0548) (0.0530)
Lose × Stay 0.2198∗∗∗ 0.2201∗∗∗ 0.2189∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0519)
BR-Shift −0.0633∗∗ −0.0634∗∗ −0.0680∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0314)
Win and Shift to Medium 0.0006 0.0007 0.0079
(0.0546) (0.0544) (0.0530)




Part 2 Dummy −0.0790∗
(0.0410)
Part 3 Dummy 0.0225
(0.0502)
Constant 1.6491∗∗∗ 1.6490∗∗∗ 1.8599∗∗∗
(0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0564)
R2 0.0256 0.0256 0.0554
WaldTest 105.6889∗∗∗ 111.7340∗∗∗ 307.1746∗∗∗
Linear Combination Tests:
(1) Lose+BR-Shift vs. Stay 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.2192∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0390) (0.0413)
(2) Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0551 −0.0547 −0.0679∗
(0.0410) (0.0405) (0.0384)
(3) BR-Shift vs. Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0082 −0.0087 −0.0001
(0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0270)
Notes. Additional dummy (“Win and Shift to Medium”) takes the value 1 if in the win sit-
uations a shift to the medium payoff occurred. Standard errors (clustered by 36 matching
blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.9: Panel regression for ln(response time) with additional controls.
ln(response time) Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Stay −0.2912∗∗∗ −0.2910∗∗∗ −0.2909∗∗∗
(0.0411) (0.0410) (0.0409)
Lose −0.0039 −0.0035 −0.0034
(0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0423)
Lose × Stay 0.2233∗∗∗ 0.2230∗∗∗ 0.2230∗∗∗
(0.0476) (0.0475) (0.0476)
BR-Shift −0.0680∗∗ −0.0681∗∗ −0.0681∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0314)
Lose × Regret 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Normalized Round −0.3446∗∗∗ −0.3446∗∗∗ −0.3446∗∗∗
(0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0408)
Part 2 Dummy −0.0790∗ −0.0790∗ −0.0790∗
(0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0409)








Faith in Intuition −0.0119
(0.0186)














Constant 1.8643∗∗∗ 1.5855∗∗∗ 1.4137∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.1429) (0.3513)
R2 0.0555 0.0626 0.0689
WaldTest 298.8777∗∗∗ 304.1417∗∗∗ 479.6298∗∗∗
Linear Combination Tests:
(1) Lose+BR-Shift vs. Stay 0.2192∗∗∗ 0.2194∗∗∗ 0.2195∗∗∗
(0.0414) (0.0415) (0.0414)
(2) Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0678∗ −0.0681∗ −0.0679∗
(0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383)
(3) BR-Shift vs. Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0002 −0.0000 −0.0002
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0269)
Notes. Additional control variables as in Table 3.5. Standard errors (clustered by 36
matching blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Panel regression for log-transformed response times while bootstrap-
ping the standard errors.
ln(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Stay −0.2753∗∗∗ −0.2752∗∗∗ −0.2912∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0367)
Lose 0.0086 0.0037 −0.0039
(0.0355) (0.0407) (0.0400)
Lose × Stay 0.2202∗∗∗ 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2233∗∗∗
(0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0427)
BR-Shift −0.0633∗∗ −0.0634∗∗ −0.0680∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0290)




Part 2 Dummy −0.0790∗∗
(0.0394)
Part 3 Dummy 0.0224
(0.0477)
Constant 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.8643∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0476)
R2 0.0256 0.0256 0.0555
WaldTest 155.6743∗∗∗ 171.6338∗∗∗ 358.9157∗∗∗
Linear Combination Tests:
(1) Lose+BR-Shift vs. Stay 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.2192∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0379) (0.0405)
(2) Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0551 −0.0547 −0.0678∗
(0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0369)
(3) BR-Shift vs. Stay+Lose×Stay −0.0082 −0.0087 −0.0002
(0.0281) (0.0274) (0.0266)
Notes. Bootstrapping the standard errors (in parentheses) with 100 repetitions. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies
4.1 Introduction
How are economic decisions made? Neoclassical economics avoided address-
ing this question by focusing on the concept of preferences, whose existence
as a formal object organizing choices is equivalent to the consistency of those
very same choices (the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference). That is, choices
tautologically reﬂect preferences, because preferring one option to another
just means that the former is chosen over the latter. This is of course a
perfectly legitimate approach which identiﬁes choices and the motives be-
hind them and aggregates both into a single object of interest, but it fails to
address the question of how choices arise.
This question becomes especially relevant once one moves away from the
assumption of full rationality, or the proximate assumption of perfect max-
imization of stable preferences. This is of course not a new point. The
microeconomics literature contains extensive and mature strands analyzing
boundedly rational behavior in order to explain certain violations that can-
not be accommodated by neoclassical models which are often used as the
benchmark of normative behavior. For instance, evolutionary game theory
has analyzed diﬀerent behavioral rules capturing speciﬁc deviations from ra-
tionality, as e.g. imitation, satisﬁcing behavior, or reinforcement learning. To
date, however, these behavioral rules have been treated as “black boxes” and
studied in isolation. These evolutionary branches have concentrated on the
study of behavioral rules while the neoclassical literature has kept studying
fully rational, maximizing agents.
Obviously, economic agents do try to maximize certain objectives. Even
more obviously, they frequently fail to do so and follow diﬀerent impulses
instead. In other words, the truth might be in the middle, and it might be
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worth to take both views into account when studying human behavior. In
particular, it is not clear that an individual either acts fully rational or is
always following a behavioral rule over a period of time. Huck et al. (1999)
ﬁnd none of the theoretical learning processes alone can describe observed
behavior in their Cournot Oligopoly experiment, however, imitation and my-
opic best reply play a role for the decisions. Apesteguía et al. (2010) simulate
data allowing for a mixture of multiple behavioral rules such as imitation,
myopic best reply, ﬁctitious play, and relative payoﬀ maximization. With a
relative large weight on imitation they ﬁnd that the simulation of mixed rules
describes their data best. With the idea in mind that the truth about how
decisions are made might be in the middle between fully rational agents and
heuristic following individuals, we set out in this work to show that multiple
behavioral rules govern behavior in a complex economic setting. We will not
only look at decisions outcomes itself but also at the characteristics of be-
havioral rules and present evidence that multiple decision rules codetermine
behavior.
In this work, we target a speciﬁc behavioral rule, namely imitation of
successful behavior, which is one of the most prominent boundedly-rational
behavioral rules examined in the microeconomics literature. In order to
study imitation, we select a standard economic paradigm, namely a Cournot
oligopoly. The reason for this decision is that there is both theoretical
and empirical literature showing the potential relevance of imitation in this
paradigm. Schaﬀer (1989) showed that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium can be
destabilized if ﬁrms consider relative payoﬀs, but the Walrasian equilibrium
cannot. Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that if ﬁrms follow imitative behavioral
rules and make infrequent mistakes, the system converges to the Walrasian
equilibrium (in the sense of stochastic stability). Alós-Ferrer and Ania (2005)
generalized this result to aggregative games by showing that the outcomes
selected by aggregate-taking behavior (a generalization of price-taking behav-
ior) have strong evolutionary stability properties leading to their stochastic
stability when agents follow imitative rules. These results have been shown to
be empirically relevant in the behavioral laboratory. A number of Cournot-
oligopoly experiments (Huck et al., 1999; Oﬀerman et al., 2002; Apesteguía
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et al., 2007, 2010) have found partial convergence to Walrasian outcomes,
which has then been interpreted as indirect evidence for the presence of im-
itative behavior.
Our approach is more direct in that we do not aim to examine conver-
gence, but rather imitative decisions in themselves. Following the evidence
above, we postulate the existence of (at least) two decision rules. The ﬁrst,
is imitation of observed, successful behavior. The second serves as a proxy
for more rational behavior or at least payoﬀ maximization. In the framework
of a dynamic Cournot oligopoly, it is natural to identify this process with
myopic best reply, that is, payoﬀ maximization taking current information
on other players’ behavior as given. In our context it is reasonable to assume
that imitation is a more a heuristic\behavioral rule, where individuals react
to a more successful action and respond by imitating this action while myopic
best reply, on the contrary, is more rational behavior and reﬂective process
which involves active maximization after considering available information.
To examine the multiple behavioral rules we rely on a formal model,
i.e. the dual-process diﬀusion model (Alós-Ferrer, 2018). We derive testable
predictions from the formal drift-diﬀusion model which incorporates a dual-
process theories. Dual-process theories postulate that the human mind is
mainly inﬂuenced by two kinds of processes, called automatic and controlled
(see Kahneman, 2003; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014; see also Evans, 2008
for a detailed review). Automatic processes are deﬁned as immediate, fast,
unconscious, and eﬃcient in the sense of requiring few cognitive resources.
For instance, these processes capture impulsive reactions and behavior along
the lines of stimulus-response schemes. In contrast, controlled processes are
slow, consume cognitive resources, are not instigated immediately, and are
reﬂected upon consciously. In other words, they are far closer to the economic
idea of rationality. There is, hence, an analogy between how economics has
addressed issues of full vs. bounded rationality and how psychology has mod-
eled the origin of decisions. The key diﬀerence is that dual-process models
assume heterogeneity within the individual, that is, decisions are the result
of the interplay between diﬀerent processes within the individual, while eco-
nomics has, to date, kept the analysis of maximizing behavior and behavioral
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rules in separate strands of the literature. In psychological parlance, imita-
tion as bounded rational behavior can be expected to be more automatic
than processes behind active preference maximization, i.e. myopic best reply.
However, all the processes\behavioral rules we are interested in are skewed
towards higher cognitive functions and the paradigms are typically more com-
plex than the ones encounter compared to cognitive or social psychology, and
the analysis is correspondingly more involved.
The theoretical dual-process diﬀusion model (Alós-Ferrer, 2018) deliv-
ers testable hypotheses for one of the most basic measures of process data,
response times, with respect to two diﬀerent processes, one being more auto-
matic and one being more controlled. Response times are a standard tool in
psychology which are slowly being incorporated into the economist’s toolbox
(Wilcox, 1993; Moﬀatt, 2005; Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan and Wengström,
2009; Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016a; Alós-Ferrer
and Ritschel, 2018b). One of the basic insights of dual-process theories is that
automatic processes are faster than controlled ones, and hence response times
have been used as an important source of evidence for the involvement of dif-
ferent decision processes. This does not mean that one can simply classify
decisions in fast and slow according to some exogenous criterion and conclude
that one kind of decisions is more automatic. This is an example of “reverse
inference” fallacy (Krajbich et al., 2015) and this is not our approach. In
a nutshell, we will derive speciﬁc, non-trivial predictions (on response times
conditional on speciﬁc types of choices) from a dual-process model and will
not simply classify more automatic and more controlled processes by faster
response times alone.
We conduct two laboratory experiments to test for those non-trivial pre-
dictions and analyze diﬀerences in the behavioral rules of imitation and my-
opic best reply in a standard economic setting. Experiment 1 tests the pure
predictions of the formal dual-process model while Experiment 2 adds an-
other dimension, i.e. cognitive load, to our setting. In addition, our design
will also allow us to consider other likely determinants of behavior. The
ﬁrst is positive reinforcement, i.e. the tendency to repeat an action if it was
successful (closely linked to the focus on past performance). The second is
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inertia, which simply means the tendency to repeat the previous action re-
gardless of the previous result. Positive reinforcement is actually a special
case of imitation and inertia, that is, it corresponds to situations where the
player imitates him- or herself. Nevertheless, the main analysis will still focus
on the comparison of imitative decisions and myopic best replies.
We conﬁrm in both experiments the following theoretical predictions.
Whenever imitation and myopic best reply are in conﬂict (make diﬀerent
prescriptions), best replies are slower than imitative decisions. In contrast,
in situations when imitation and myopic best reply are aligned (make the
same prescription), best replies are faster than other responses. We do not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant shift in behavior induced by cognitive load, however, in a
detailed analysis we show that the cognitive load manipulation aﬀects imita-
tion and myopic best reply in diﬀerent ways strengthening the evidence for
two distinct behavioral rules. Our results suggest that multiple behavioral
rules codetermine behavior in a complex, economic setting such as a Cournot
oligopoly with imitation being more automatic and myopic best reply being
more controlled. Further, our analysis shows that positive reinforcement (im-
itating yourself) leads to faster decisions than imitating others, but decision
inertia seems to play a minor role.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 derives
our predictions for response times in a Cournot oligopoly. Sections 4.3 and
4.4 present the design and the results of our two experiments. Sections 4.5
and 4.6 discuss the behavioral rules of reinforcement and inertia, respectively.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Predictions for Multiple Behavioral Rules
We hypothesize that multiple behavioral rules codetermine behavior. When
diﬀerent behavioral rules are present they can either prescribe diﬀerent ac-
tions or the same action. In the ﬁrst case, we speak of conflict between the
rules. For those situations it is easy to identify the diﬀerent behavioral rules.
In the second case, we speak of alignment. Alós-Ferrer (2018) proposed the
dual-process diffusion model (DPDM) which delivers predictions on response
121
Chapter 4 Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies
times conditional on situations of conﬂict or alignment, assuming one of the
involved behavioral rule is more automatic, hence faster in expected terms,
and the other is more controlled, hence slower in expected terms.
The DPDM assumes that both rules are stochastic in nature, i.e., they
carry an amount of noise. For instance, an imitative rule will most of the time
(say, with probability larger than 1/2) select the option which was successful
last period. With the remaining probability, however, it might select some
alternative action. Likewise, a myopic best reply rule will most of the time
indeed select the myopic best reply, but with the remaining probability might
select a diﬀerent action. In the case of binary actions, the processes can be
given a micro-foundation as diﬀusion processes as in the diﬀusion model
of evidence accumulation (Ratcliﬀ, 1978)1 Alós-Ferrer (2018) shows that,
assuming that automatic behavior is swifter than controlled behavior (in the
sense of having a stronger trend as diﬀusion processes, i.e., behaving more
in a stimulus-response manner), it follows that its expected response time is
shorter. Further, it also follows that its noise level is smaller, that is, the
probability that a more automatic behavioral rule deviates from its dominant
response is smaller than the probability that a more controlled behavioral rule
deviates from its own (possibly diﬀerent) dominant response. Intuitively,
controlled behavior “wanders around” more, while more automatic behavior
quickly and eﬃciently selects a response (which might be a mistake).
For our purpose, the DPDM makes two basic predictions (see Achtziger
and Alós-Ferrer, 2014 or Alós-Ferrer, 2018 for further details). For the sake
of concreteness, identify the controlled/reﬂective behavior with more ratio-
nal behavior and call the action prescribed by this rule “correct” and any
other action an “error.” In many cases, these labels actually have a norma-
tive meaning, especially if the automatic behavior reﬂects a heuristic or bias
confronted with another rule which is closer to normative behavior. In our
case, “correct responses” are just myopic best replies. With this terminology,
in case of alignment the more automatic behavioral rule is actually a quick,
1In this model, evidence accumulation (internal to the decision maker) is modeled as a
diffusion process with a trend µ and two barriers. Whether the process chooses an option
or the other corresponds to whether the upper or the lower barrier is hit first. The response
time is the time at which the first barrier is hit.
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eﬃcient shortcut to the correct response. In case of conﬂict, however, it is a
quick path to an error (deﬁned as a deviation from the reﬂective rule).
The ﬁrst prediction of the DPDM is that, in case of conﬂict, correct re-
sponses are on average slower than errors arising from the automatic behav-
ior. The intuition is simple, since in this case the automatic behavioral rule
quickly selects an error, while the controlled rule more slowly leads (mostly)
to the correct response. The second, somewhat more surprising prediction
of the DPDM is that, in case of alignment, the reverse relation is expected.
That is, in case of alignment, correct responses are on average faster than
errors. The intuition is that in case of alignment, the automatic behavior is a
quick and eﬃcient shortcut to the correct responses, that is, it generates very
few errors. The controlled behavior also mostly generates correct responses,
but will lead to comparatively more errors than the automatic behavioral
rule. Hence, conditional on an error being observed, it is more likely that
the response is generated by the slower controlled behavioral rule.
A ﬁrst test of the DPDM in an economic setting was carried out in
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014), which also contained a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of the model. That study considered a binary-action belief-updating
paradigm as in Charness and Levin (2005) where two decision processes
inﬂuence behavior as compared to our more complex economic setting of
Cournot oligopolies. The setting endogenously created situations of conﬂict
and alignment among both behavioral rules, and conﬁrmed the predictions
of the DPDM. The results were conﬁrmed to be robust by using diﬀerent
variants of the basic paradigm and adding controls in a regression analysis.
In our experiments, participants take the role of producers in dynamic
Cournot oligopolies. Following the evolutionary literature on this setting,
we conceive behavioral rules as mappings from last period’s information (the
actions and proﬁts of all players) to the following period’s action (Kandori
et al., 1993; Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). Hence, iden-
tifying conﬂict and alignment is a simple matter. Given the output levels
and proﬁts in a given period, myopic best reply identiﬁes the action which
would maximize proﬁts given output levels of other players, while imitation
simply identiﬁes the action which led to the highest proﬁts last period. If
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the two actions are diﬀerent, the behavioral rules are in conﬂict. If they are
identical, the rules are aligned.
Following the DPDM, we can derive speciﬁc hypotheses on response times
for the interaction of imitation and myopic best reply. We conceive imitation
as an intuitive, heuristic, more automatic behavior and myopic best reply
as our proxy for more “rational,” reﬂexive, controlled behavior. We hence
immediately obtain the following two hypotheses.
H1. When imitation and myopic best reply are in conﬂict (prescribe diﬀerent
responses), correct responses (myopic best replies) will be slower than errors
following from imitation.
H2. When imitation and myopic best reply are aligned, errors (all non-
best replies) will be slower than correct responses (myopic best replies and
imitation).
A further prediction of dual-process theories reﬂected in the DPDM is
that decisions in case of conﬂict should take longer than decisions on case
of alignment. This is a widely observed phenomenon reﬂecting the fact
that conﬂict detection and resolution engages the brain’s central executive
functions and is time-consuming (see Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-
Ferrer, 2018, for further details). Another prediction of the DPDM, in agree-
ment with widespread experimental evidence, is the well-known Stroop eﬀect
(Stroop, 1935). In our setting, this eﬀect states that the relation mentioned
above holds when one conditions on correct responses, that is, correct re-
sponses in case of conﬂict should be slower than correct responses in case of
alignment, even if the additional time needed for conﬂict detection and res-
olution is ignored. These additional predictions, show that deviations from
myopic best reply is not just random variations, but follow from imitation.
For the sake of concreteness, we will always refer to conﬂict situations
(or being in conﬂict) as situations when myopic best reply and imitation
prescribe diﬀerent responses. Similarly, we will always refer to alignment sit-
uations (or being aligned) as situations when myopic best reply and imitation
prescribe the same responses. We will explicitly mention when we deviate
from those deﬁnitions of conﬂict and alignment. Further, decisions which
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follow myopic best reply (in conﬂict and alignment) favor the normative cor-
rect decisions and will be called correct (or correct decision) throughout this
work. Decisions which do not follow myopic best reply and therefore are
not correct will be called errors. Those errors can originate from multiple
sources and we will label them for clarity. In conﬂict, errors can either be
due to following imitation, i.e. “imitation” errors, or due to other kind of
behavior which neither follows imitation nor myopic best reply, i.e. “noise”
errors. In alignment, we do not further discriminate the errors according to
any behavioral rule and we just label them errors.
4.3 Experiment 1
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
In the main part of the experiment, participants interacted in 4-player
Cournot oligopolies (tetrapolies). Each participant participated in three
oligopolies (parts), with 17 periods each, which diﬀered in the payoﬀ ta-
ble and group composition. For each part, we computed a payoﬀ table using
a Cournot oligopoly with zero costs and a linear inverse demand function of
the form P (Q) = a−Q, where P is the price, a the saturated demand, and
Q the total quantity in the market. However, during the experiment a neu-
tral framing was used and neither ﬁrm nor quantities were mentioned. We
reduced the action space to four possible actions (A, B, C, and D). Hence,
the whole payoﬀ table has dimensions 4 × 20, with four rows representing
the possible actions and 20 columns labeled AAA to DDD representing the
possible actions of the opponents. Payoﬀs were expressed in points, with an
exchange rate of 18 Eurocents per 1000 points. The points achieved in all 51
rounds were accumulated and paid at the end of the experiment. The payoﬀ
table, containing the proﬁts rounded to the nearest integer, was permanently
visible in the upper part of the screen during the corresponding part of the
experiment, and hence contained all the information relevant for the (one
shot) game.
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We chose a setup with discretized actions to make the postulated behav-
ioral rules (myopic best reply and imitation) both feasible and comparable.
For instance, a continuous-action setup would have turned myopic best reply
in an abstract maximization problem, while imitation would remain a dis-
crete, intuitive rule. Hence, by choosing a discrete setup we act against our
hypotheses and reduce the conceptual distance between the two postulated
behavioral rules. While many previous experiments with Cournot oligopolies
have focused on triopolies to increase the number of independent observa-
tions for a given number of participants (Oﬀerman et al., 2002; Apesteguía
et al., 2007), we chose to focus on tetrapolies because larger groups make
collusion less likely and ensure higher outcome volatility (see Huck et al.,
2004).
For all rounds, except the ﬁrst within each part, participants were given
feedback on the actions and proﬁts of every group member in the previous
period. The column corresponding to the joint actions of the opponents
was highlighted. Myopic best reply corresponds to maximization within that
column, that is, the mechanical part of determining a myopic best reply
required comparing four numbers only. Hence, the highlighting reduced any
time needed to identify the appropriate column of the other players’ previous
choices.
To make imitation feasible, information about all group members’ choices
and points earned in the previous round was presented in addition to the pay-
oﬀ table. There were two experimental treatments which diﬀered only in how
this additional information was presented. In Treatment FullInfo, the choice
and points of the other group members were presented in separate boxes,
and the box with the highest point amount was highlighted. In Treatment
BestOnly only one (highlighted) box was shown, displaying the choice which
received the highest points in the previous round and the amount of points.
The treatments were implemented between subjects, with half the subjects
in each treatment in each session and as a robustness test in order to make
sure that there were no big diﬀerences in response times due to presentational
eﬀects (as we will see below, there were none). The BestOnly treatment re-
ﬂects the idea of “imitate the best” as described by Vega-Redondo (1997),
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i.e. giving the opportunity to choose the action with the highest proﬁt in the
previous round. The FullInfo treatment represents a robustness check with
respect to myopic best reply. In the FullInfo treatment the mechanical part
of both postulated rules, imitation and myopic best reply, require process-
ing exactly the same number of quantities. Further, this treatment controls
for the possibility that the presentation excessively primed participants to
imitate.
The reason to have three parts with three diﬀerent oligopolies was to avoid
convergence. In contrast to previous experiments with Cournot oligopolies,
we are interested in behavioral correlates of each individual action, rather
than on eventual convergence. If convergence (or collusion) occurred, we
would lose the necessary variance of the data to analyze behavioral rules,
and response times would also become meaningless as most of the time par-
ticipants would just be mechanically repeating a ﬁxed action. To avoid this,
we took three measures. First, the payoﬀ tables of each part were diﬀer-
ent, computed with diﬀerent demand functions and diﬀerent quantities. The
sequence of the payoﬀ tables was varied across the sessions. Second, the
ordering of the quantities from A to D, changed with each part, that is, in
some parts the assignment of quantities to letters was increasing, in some it
was decreasing.2 The second and third parts of the experiment always had a
diﬀerent payoﬀ table and a reversed ordering of the quantities with respect
to the previous part. Third, for each of the three parts the individuals were
rematched, with identities reassigned. In each new part, at least two players
in the group were diﬀerent from the previous group. To increase the number
of independent observations for the most conservative approach, rematching
was done within pre-determined blocks of 8 participants, hence there were a
total of 16 fully independent blocks of participants in the experiment. Re-
matching, working with shorter oligopolies, and the changed payoﬀ tables
increase the variance in the behavioral data and diminish the possibilities of
collusion.
2Payoff table 1: P (Q) = 150 − Q, A = 37.5, B = 33.25, C = 30, D = 18.75 (or
reversed); Payoff table 2: P (Q) = 175 −Q, A = 43.75, B = 38.875, C = 35, D = 21.875
(or reversed); Payoff table 3: P (Q) = 200 − Q, A = 50, B = 44.5, C = 40, D = 25 (or
reversed).
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The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (CLER) and programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We
recruited 128 participants (82 females; median age 22 years) using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). During recruitment, we excluded students majoring in eco-
nomics, psychology, and business as such students might have been taught
concepts as Nash equilibrium which might inﬂuence their behavior. Students
who had already participated in 20 or more experiments were also excluded.
A session comprised 32 participants and lasted around 90 minutes. Average
earnings were 13.59 EUR, including a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR.
4.3.2 Classiﬁcation of Decisions
Table 4.1 displays the prescriptions of myopic best reply, imitation, and iner-
tia in the experiment, for the case of decreasing assignment of quantities to
letters.3 Those prescriptions were identical for all three tables. That is, the
table shows the prescription of each behavioral rule when a speciﬁc combina-
tion of one’s own choice (row) and the choice of the other players (column)
occurred in the previous round. Whenever myopic best reply is in alignment
with imitation (that is, both prescribe the same action), the cell of the my-
opic best reply is shaded in gray. Hence, unshaded entries in the myopic best
reply columns indicate conﬂict with imitation. For reference, we include also
the prescriptions of inertia with shaded entries when they coincide with those
of imitation. Note that an alignment of imitation and inertia means that the
imitative action also follows positive reinforcement (imitating yourself).
With this design and Table 4.1, the identiﬁcation of behavioral rules for
any action is straightforward. For periods 2–17 within each part, we can
classify each actual decision of each participant as compatible with myopic
best reply, imitation, or inertia. The Venn diagram in Figure 4.1 shows the
possible classiﬁcations of the decisions. Actions can be classiﬁed as imita-
tion, myopic best reply, or inertia, as belonging to any of the intersections
(alignments), or as being incompatible with all of them (unclassiﬁed).
3For the analysis of the data, the case of increasing assignment of quantities was simply
recoded.
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Table 4.1: Overview of prescribed actions.
AAA AAB AAC AAD ABB ABC ABD ACC ACD ADD
BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta
A D A A D A A D A A C A A D A A C A A C A A C A A B A A A A A
B D A B D A B D A B C A B D A B C A B C A B C A B B A B A A B
C D A C D A C D A C C A C D A C C A C C A C C A C B A C A A C
D D A D D A D D A D C A D D A D C A D C A D C A D B A D A A D
BBB BBC BBD BCC BCD BDD CCC CCD CDD DDD
BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta BR Imit Inrta
A C A A C A A B A A C A A B A A A A A C A A A A A A A A A A A
B C B B C B B B B B C B B B B B A B B C B B A B B A B B A B B
C C B C C B C B B C C B C B B C A B C C C C A C C A C C A C C
D C B D C B D B B D C B D B B D A B D C C D A C D A C D A D D
Notes. Overview of prescribed actions for each behavioral rule depending on last period’s
outcome. Cell entries describe the action prescribed by myopic best reply (BR), imitation
(Imit), and inertia (Inrta) when the player previously chose the action given in the row
and the opponents chose the actions given in the column. Shaded entries indicate that
myopic best reply or inertia are aligned with imitation.
4.3.3 Results
The whole data set of choices and response times consists of 128×48 = 6144
observations. The ﬁrst decision within each block is always excluded since
for that period there is no feedback concerning previous actions and the
behavioral rules considered make no prescriptions.
In order to test our hypotheses, we will initially conduct non-parametric
tests. For instance, we can test whether decisions compatible with one be-
havioral rule are faster than those compatible with another decision rule,
conditional, e.g., on conﬂict among the rules. To do so, we look at all sit-
uations where the two rules conﬂict and build two sets of decisions, those
where the prescription of the ﬁrst rule was followed, and those where the
prescription of the second rule was followed. Then we apply the appropriate
test (in this case, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test).
At this point, we would like to argue that the appropriate unit of ob-
servation is the individual participant (but more conservative readers should
just wait). The reason is that we are following the logic of evolutionary mod-
els (Kandori et al., 1993; Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005),
where behavioral rules have a Markovian structure. Under the assumption
that we are observing response times generated by behavioral rules, and
since those are mere mappings from information (outputs and proﬁts in last
period) to actions, it is thoroughly irrelevant how exactly the input of the be-
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Figure 4.1: Classification of actions.
havioral rule is generated. The fact that participants were part of tetrapolies
which themselves were subgroups of certain blocks plays no role, for we are
testing response times which are generated after observation of the input.
Following this logic, the appropriate tests consider N = 128 individual sets
of observations (participants). For each of those, we compute the average
response time when following a given behavioral rule, conditional on conﬂict
or alignment as appropriate, and the average response time when following
a diﬀerent rule, conditional on the same case. We put an additional restric-
tions on creating those averages by requiring at least two observations of an
individual. This might exclude some subjects for the analysis but yields a
better interpretation of an individuals average which will not consist of just
one observation. We will report in case this additional requirement changes
our result.
Econometrically conservative readers will object that the appropriate unit
of observation is the group or even the block, because the inputs of decisions
depend on the output of decisions of other block members from previous
periods. We disagree with this view, but the point is moot. In the sequel,
and as a robustness check, we will always report the tests at the group level
(that is, where the unit of observation is the block, hence N = 16). Since
participants were separated into 16 diﬀerent blocks and they were rematched
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only within these blocks, this created completely independent observations.
The conclusions always remain unchanged when we test within blocks unless
it is stated otherwise. Further, we will later turn to a more detailed regression
analysis.
Before we proceed, we remark that the introduction of two informational
treatments served merely as a robustness check and there were no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences in behavior or response times. Recall that a possible concern
was the excessive priming for imitation in the BestOnly treatment. Partici-
pants made on average 15.64 imitation decisions in the BestOnly treatment
and 15.17 in the FullInfo treatment, which was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ac-
cording to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test (N = 128, z = 0.141,
p = 0.8880). Hence, there was no priming eﬀect for imitation in the Be-
stOnly treatment. Also, any concerns that the amount of numbers needed to
be processed for imitation could cause diﬀerences in response times proved to
be unfounded. The average response time of imitation decisions was 11.27 s
in the BestOnly treatment and 10.89 s in the FullInfo treatment (N = 127,
z = 0.993, p = 0.3206). That is, we observe no relevant diﬀerences across the
treatments and conclude that no presentational eﬀects were present.4 The
BestOnly treatment did not excessively prime the subjects to imitate and did
not cause mechanically faster response times for imitation due to diﬀerent
amount of numbers processed. Hence, for the rest of the analysis we will not
distinguish them anymore.
Figure 4.2 gives a descriptive overview of the observations and their raw
classiﬁcation according to the behavioral rules of imitation, myopic best re-
ply, and inertia. Table 4.2 shows the classiﬁcation according to conﬂict and
alignment and reveals that overall the majority of observations happened in
conﬂict situations while only few alignment situations are available for the
analysis.
4We also do not find significant differences between treatments for other behavioral
rules. The same is true when testing at the block level except for inertia showing weakly
significant more inertia decisions in the BestOnly (mean 168.88) than in the FullInfo
treatment (mean 142.88; WSR, N = 16, z = 1.682, p = 0.0927). Further tests conditioning
on conflict and alignment find no differences.
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Figure 4.2: Experiment 1, Overview of observations and their classification accord-
ing to different behavioral rules.





imitation errors 1,585 25.80%




We now turn to our main hypotheses. H1 states that in case of con-
ﬂict, correct decisions should be slower than errors following imitation.5 We
hence look at all situations where myopic best reply and imitation conﬂict,
and build two sets of decisions, those where the prescription of myopic best
reply was followed, and those where the prescription of imitation was fol-
lowed. For the purposes of this test, decisions following neither imitation
5Note that H1 and H2 yield specific directional predictions which allow us to test the
hypothesis using one-sided tests. However, we report two-sided p− values for the sake of
erring conservatively.
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 1, Average response times of correct responses and errors.
Notes. Left-hand side: Average response times of correct responses (myopic best replies)
and errors in line with following imitation in case of conflict. Right-hand side: Average
response times of correct responses and errors in case of alignment. Bars represent 1
Standard Error of the Mean. Stars indicate Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01.
nor best reply (noise errors) are discarded. The left-hand side of Figure 4.3
shows the response times averaged over subjects of the correct responses and
the imitation errors in case of conﬂict. As predicted, imitation errors are
signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses in conﬂict. The response time is
11.02 s for imitation errors and 12.66 s for correct responses. The diﬀer-
ence is highly signiﬁcant according to a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank (WSR) test
(N = 127, z = −5.063, p < 0.0001).6
Hypothesis H2 states that in case of alignment, correct decisions should
be faster than errors (not following myopic best reply and imitation). We
hence look at all situations in alignment, and build two sets of decisions,
6The final number of observations deviates from 128 because not all subjects had at
least two decisions following imitation and myopic best reply.
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those where the common prescription of myopic best reply and imitation
was followed, and those where something else was decided. The right-hand
side of Figure 4.3 shows the response times averaged over subjects of the
correct responses and the errors in case of alignment. As predicted, errors
are signiﬁcantly slower than correct responses. The response time is 13.57 s
for errors and 11.44 s for correct responses. The diﬀerence is again highly
signiﬁcant (WSR, N = 84, z = 3.233, p = 0.0012).
In summary, we conﬁrm the main predictions of the model of response
times in Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) and Alós-Ferrer (2018). Hence, our
experimental evidence is compatible with the interpretation that decisions in
our experimental Cournot oligopolies were the result of the interaction of two
behavioral rules, one more automatic or intuitive corresponding to imitation,
and one more controlled or reﬂexive corresponding to myopic best reply.
We now turn to a more detailed regression analysis. Our data forms
a perfectly balanced panel with 48 decisions per participant (N = 48 ×
128 = 6, 144 in total). Hence we turn to random eﬀects panel regressions
on response times, transformed logarithmically.7 We further (conservatively)
cluster standard errors at the block level.
We consider the conﬂict and alignment setup between imitation and my-
opic best reply and the following categories, identiﬁed by dummies in the
regressions, emerge. The reference group consists of the correct responses
in case of alignment. The dummy Conﬂict indicates that the decision corre-
sponds to a case of conﬂict between myopic best reply and imitation. In order
to directly test for our hypotheses without the recourse to post hoc tests, we
“split a dummy” and include the categories Error × Conﬂict and Error ×
Alignment.8 The category Error × Conﬂict corresponds to all errors in case
of conﬂict, that is, decisions where imitation was in conﬂict with myopic best
reply and the latter was not followed. This category includes both imitation
errors and noise errors. The dummy Noise further indicates the non-imitative
7The transformation yields distribution which is not as right-skewed and closer to a
normal distribution as the regular response times.
8That is, we choose an unconventional presentation of regression results for ease of
exposition. A more conventional presentation delivers exactly the same conclusions but
one needs to recompute the same coefficients through post hoc linear combination tests.
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Table 4.3: Experiment 1, Random effects panel regressions for ln(ResponseTimes).
ln(ResponseTimes) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conﬂict 0.1154∗∗∗ 0.1371∗∗∗ 0.1375∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0334) (0.0333)
Error x Conﬂict −0.1809∗∗∗ −0.1420∗∗∗ −0.1428∗∗∗
(0.0307) (0.0224) (0.0229)
Error x Aligned 0.1794∗∗∗ 0.1705∗∗∗ 0.1700∗∗∗
(0.0424) (0.0363) (0.0365)
Noise (in Conﬂict) 0.1794∗∗∗ 0.1299∗∗∗ 0.1299∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0238) (0.0242)
Full Info Treatment −0.0290 −0.0298
(0.0543) (0.0543)
Normalized Time −0.3839∗∗∗ −0.3839∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0327)
Part 2 −0.2211∗∗∗ −0.2299∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0224)
Part 3 −0.3653∗∗∗ −0.3640∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0261)
Payoﬀ Table 2 −0.0168
(0.0233)




Constant 2.2313∗∗∗ 2.6259∗∗∗ 2.6262∗∗∗
(0.0417) (0.0536) (0.0554)
R2 0.0310 0.1332 0.1343
Notes. Standard errors, clustered by 16 matching blocks, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
errors in case of conﬂict, that is, decisions which followed neither imitation
nor myopic best reply when both rules were in conﬂict (remember that these
decisions had to be excluded when testing for H1 above). The category Error
× Alignment corresponds to all errors in case of alignment, that is, decisions
which did not agree with imitation and myopic best reply in the cases where
those two rules prescribed the same action.
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Model 1 in Table 4.3 tests for the basic eﬀects. The coeﬃcient for Error
× Conﬂict directly represents the diﬀerence between imitation errors and
correct decisions in case of conﬂict. The coeﬃcient is negative and highly
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming Hypothesis H1. The coeﬃcient for Error × Alignment
directly represents the diﬀerence between errors and correct decisions in case
of alignment. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming
Hypothesis H2. The coeﬃcient for Conﬂict is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
This shows that correct decisions are slower in case of conﬂict than in case
of alignment, which is essentially the translation of the Stroop eﬀect to our
paradigm and is also predicted by the DPDM (Alós-Ferrer, 2018).
The Noise coeﬃcient is also positive and highly signiﬁcant showing that
noise errors are slower than the imitation errors. While we had no strong
hypotheses for this category, this could be an indication that the category
of noise errors is capturing higher cognitive, more complex decisions or be-
havioral rules, as e.g. level-k considerations (best-replying to the anticipated
best reply of others, etc; see Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2018).
Models 2 and 3 add further controls and show that the results just re-
ported are robust. We ﬁnd learning eﬀects, i.e. the participants become faster
the longer they play. This is reﬂected by the variable Normalized Time (a
fraction indicating how many rounds from a speciﬁc part had already been
completed) and the dummies for parts 2 and 3. Additionally, we control
for the possibility of some groups colluding by adding a dummy for groups
where collusion was observed. This, however, only aﬀected one group which
successfully maintained collusion in the very last part of the experiment. As
expected, their decisions were faster, but the inclusion of this dummy does
not aﬀect other results. The varying payoﬀ tables also did not aﬀect the
response times of the participants.9
9We also ran regressions with demographics and psychological characteristics which
yielded the same qualitative results and conclusions for our analysis. After the Cournot
oligopoly game was completed, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire in-
cluding demographics, the Faith in Intuition scale (Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2012,
2016), and a 15-item Big-Five questionnaire (see John et al., 1991; Lang et al., 2011, p.
560).
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The regression models conﬁrm our non-parametric analysis while control-
ling for other important features. Experiment 1 conﬁrms our Hypotheses H1
and H2 suggesting that two interacting behavioral rules with diﬀerent prop-
erties codetermine behavior, one being more automatic and bounded rational




The results of Experiment 1 suggest two interacting decision rules codeter-
mine behavior in a complex, dynamic setting such as the Cournot Oligopoly.
We found the response times asymmetry as predicted by the formal drift-
diﬀusion model and conclude that imitation, in a dual-process view, is a more
automatic, intuitive behavioral rule and myopic best reply a more controlled,
deliberative rule. Dual-process theories distinguish automatic and controlled
processes along the dimension of consuming cognitive resources. Automatic
processes require only few cognitive resources while controlled processes are
consciously reﬂected upon and consume relatively more cognitive resources.
In this second experiment we want to further investigate the diﬀerent nature
of imitation and myopic best reply. We, therefore, set out to manipulate
the cognitive resources available by implementing cognitive load and analyze
changes in behavior.
Manipulating cognitive resources is based on the idea that if the working
memory is exhausted, e.g. by an additional cognitive load task, the perfor-
mance decreases. Working memory is a brain system which provides tem-
porary storage and processing of information. Baddeley (1992) proposes a
reﬁned model that divides working memory into multiple components. The
most prominent system is the central executive which is the attentional-
controlling system that, among other features, is responsible for coordinat-
ing information. If the central executive is taxed and working memory is
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exhausted then processes which require cognitive resources cannot be ex-
erted.
Exhausting the working memory is implemented by adding a secondary
task surrounding the main decision task. Cognitive load tasks may consist
of memorizing a number sequence (targeting the phonological loop) or visual
pattern (targeting the visuo-spatial sketchpad) which has to be recalled after
the main decision has been made. These tasks are frequently used in psy-
chology and recently found its way into economics (Carpenter et al., 2013).
Carpenter et al. (2013) manipulated the cognitive resources by asking their
subjects to memorize a seven-digit number in the cognitive load treatment.
Subjects in the load treatment subsequently performed worse in a number
strategic games.
With respect to imitation and myopic best reply, the dual-process view
leads to the following predictions. Taxing the central executive with cognitive
load results in a shift to more automatic behavior and we will observe a higher
frequency of imitation decisions in the cognitive load treatment.
H3. Under high cognitive load, more imitative decisions will be observed.
In addition, the NoLoad treatment includes a replication of FullInfo treat-
ment of Experiment 1 and the Load treatment itself includes a robustness
check of the theoretical predictions tested in Experiment 1.
4.4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The cognitive load manipulation was implemented between subjects in two
treatments, NoLoad and Load. The NoLoad treatment was a pure replica-
tion of the FullInfo treatment of Experiment 1. The Load treatment had
an additional cognitive load task, but was in any other aspect just as the
NoLoad treatment (and FullInfo treatment of Experiment 1). Compared
to Experiment 1, we increased the exchange rate to 20 Eurocents per 1000
points10 and the subjects were rematched within blocks of 12 participants
after each part. The participants were rematched within a larger pool which
10The exchange rate was increased because the average payoff in Experiment 1 was
slightly below the wage rate demanded by experimental lab.
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further decreased the probability of collusion.11 Besides those points, the
most prominent change being the cognitive load task in the Load treatment,
there were no other diﬀerences compared to the FullInfo treatment of Exper-
iment 1 and the participants played 51 periods in three diﬀerent tetrapolies,
with 17 periods each.
The cognitive load task consisted of memorizing a seven-digit number
(as in Carpenter et al., 2013) before each decision in the Cournot Oligopoly.
The subjects had 10 s to memorize the number and had to recall the number
after the decision in the Cournot Oligopoly. A correct recall of the number
was rewarded with additional 750 points. We implemented the treatments
in separate sessions each containing one treatment because of the additional
task in the Load treatment.
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research and programmed with z-Tree. We recruited 144 participants (57
females; median age 23 years) using ORSEE. During recruitment, we ex-
cluded students majoring in economics, psychology, and business and stu-
dents who had already participated in 20 or more experiments. Six ses-
sions in short succession comprised each 24 participants. The sessions in the
NoLoad treatment lasted around 1 hour and 25 minutes while the sessions
in the Load treatment took longer and lasted around 1 hour and 45 minutes.
Average earnings, including the show-up fee of 2.50 EUR, were 13.61 EUR
and 20.12 EUR for the NoLoad and Load treatment, respectively. The par-
ticipants in the Load treatment earned more than the participants in the
NoLoad treatment due to the additional earnings of the cognitive load task.
After excluding the earnings of the cognitive load task, the average earnings
in the Load treatment was 14.06 EUR, including the show-up fee.12
11We are aware that this also reduces the number of the most conservative independent
block observations but our focus lies on the subject analysis based on the micro-foundations
of the DPDM (Alós-Ferrer, 2018).
12There were no significant differences in the earnings from the decision task between
the two treatments (MWW test, N = 144,z = −1.489, p = 0.1365).
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4.4.3 Cognitive Load and Behavior
Before we proceed with the analysis of cognitive load, we establish that the
manipulation was working. The participants took the cognitive load task
seriously and found it be of medium diﬃculty. At the end of the experiment
we asked how important and how diﬃcult the “additional task,” i.e. the cog-
nitive load task, was. The subjects considered the task to be of importance
with a mean answer of 8.73 on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all important)
to 10 (very important). The diﬃculty of the task was evaluated with a mean
of 4.58 also on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all diﬃcult) to 10 (very diﬃ-
cult). The medium diﬃculty of the task was also reﬂected in the error rates.





























Figure 4.4: Experiment 2, Overview of observations and their classification accord-
ing to different behavioral rules.
Notes. The left-hand side side depicts the no cognitive load treatment (NoLoad) and the
right-hand side depicts the cognitive load treatment (Load).
With the design as in Experiment 1 and Table 4.1, the identiﬁcation of the
behavioral rules is straightforward. Figure 4.4 gives a descriptive overview of
the observations by treatment and their raw classiﬁcation according to the
behavioral rules of imitation, myopic best reply, and inertia. H3 states that
under cognitive load, more imitative decisions will be observed. We hence
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Table 4.4: Experiment 2, Overview of observations in conflict and alignment situ-
ations.
No Cognitive Load Cognitive Load
Total 3,456 100.00% 3,456 100.00%
Conﬂict 2,864 82.87% 2,892 83.68%
correct 688 19.91% 684 19.79%
imitation errors 996 28.82% 1,078 31.19%
noise errors 1,180 34.14% 1,130 32.70%
Alignment 592 17.13% 564 16.32%
correct 257 7.44% 247 7.15%
errors 335 9.69% 317 9.17%
look at the number of decisions following imitation in the NoLoad and Load
treatment.
Pure imitation, i.e. decisions that follow only imitation and no any other
here identiﬁed behavioral rule, did not signiﬁcantly increase under cogni-
tive load. Participants made on average 5.44 pure imitation decisions in
the NoLoad treatment and 5.28 in the Load treatment, which was not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent according to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test
(N = 144, z = 0.229, p = 0.8187). The same conclusion is obtained when
looking at overall imitation. Participants made on average 17.40 imitation
decisions in the NoLoad treatment and 18.40 in the Load treatment (MWW,
N = 144, z = −0.450, p = 0.6527). Hence, there was no signiﬁcant increase
in imitation decisions due to cognitive load.13
Table 4.4 gives an overview of all decisions split by conﬂict and alignment
for each treatment and already indicates a strong similarity between both
treatments. H3 predicts an increase in imitation under cognitive load which
translates to more (imitation) errors in conﬂict and more correct decisions in
alignment situations under cognitive load than under no load. The left-hand
side of Figure 4.5 shows the relative frequencies of the errors and the correct
responses for both treatments conditional on being in conﬂict. Imitation
13Moreover, further tests also found no differences between treatments for myopic best
reply, positive reinforcement, inertia, or unclassified decisions.
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errors are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatments. In case of conﬂict,
there were 34.97% imitation errors in the NoLoad and 37.49% imitation errors
in the Load treatment (MWW test, N = 144, z = −0.452, p = 0.6516).14
The right-hand side of Figure 4.5 shows the relative frequencies of the correct
responses for both treatments conditional on being in alignment. As in the
case of conﬂict, the correct responses are not signiﬁcantly more frequent in
the NoLoad treatment (43.11%) than in the Load treatment (40.21%; MWW,
N = 144, z = 0.713, p = 0.4761).15
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence supporting Hypothesis H3. Not only do
we not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in frequencies for myopic best reply,
but also no change in behavior for other behavioral rules.
4.4.4 Replication and Robustness
Experiment 2 manipulates cognitive resources but also serves as a replica-
tion of the FullInfo treatment of Experiment 1 and a robustness check of
Hypotheses H1 and H2 under cognitive load. We follow the same steps as in
Experiment 1 and analyze the data for each treatment, NoLoad and Load,
separately. We calculated the average response times for each subject when
she made a correct response or error when myopic best reply and imitation
are in conﬂict or in alignment. Recall, H1 predicts faster errors in conﬂict
situations and H2 predicts slower errors in alignment situations.
The left-hand side of Figure 4.6 shows the response times for conﬂict and
alignment situations for the NoLoad treatment. As predicted by H1, imita-
tion errors (11.79 s) are signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses (14.67 s)
in conﬂict situations. The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant according to a
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test (N = 71, z = −4.991, p < 0.0001).16
14The correct responses in case of conflict are also not significantly across treatments
(NoLoad, 23.81% correct responses; Load 23.87% correct responses; MWW, N = 144,
z = 0.210, p = 0.8338).
15The analysis conditioning only on responses when the cognitive load task was recalled
correctly yields the same conclusion.
16The final number of observations deviates from 72 because not all subjects had at
least two decisions following imitation and myopic best reply.
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Figure 4.5: Experiment 2, Relative frequency of errors and correct responses for
NoLoad and Load treatments.
Notes. Left-hand side: Correct responses and imitation errors in case of conflict. Right-
hand side: Correct responses in case of alignment.
As predicted by H2, errors (14.79 s) are slower than correct responses
(13.08 s) when myopic best reply and imitation are aligned. The diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant according to a WSR test despite fewer observations (N = 44,
z = 1.926, p = 0.0542).17 In summary, we replicate the results of Experiment
1 in the NoLoad treatment with fewer numbers of observations.
The right-hand side of Figure 4.6 shows the response times in conﬂict and
alignment situations for the Load treatment. As predicted by H1, imitation
errors (8.27 s) are signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses (10.75 s) in con-
ﬂict situations. The diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant according to a Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test (N = 70, z = −4.878, p < 0.0001). As predicted by H2,
17If we do not require at least two observation to create an individual’s average the
resulting test yields only a non-significantly trend (mean errors 14.47 s, mean correct
responses 13.17 s; WSR, N = 61, z = 1.512, p = 0.1305).
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Figure 4.6: Experiment 2, Average response times of correct responses and errors.
Notes. Left-hand side: Average response times of correct responses and errors in case of
conflict and alignment in the NoLoad treatment. Right-hand side: Average response times
of correct responses and errors in case of conflict and alignment for the Load treatment.
⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
errors (11.65 s) are signiﬁcantly slower than correct responses (9.67 s) in align-
ment. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (WSR, N = 35, z = 2.375, p = 0.0176).
In summary, we also conﬁrm H1 and H2 in the Load treatment serving as
a robustness check. The evidence presented above shows that the interac-
tion of two behavioral rules, imitation being more automatic and myopic
best reply being more controlled, is robust to cognitive load manipulations
and codetermines behavior in a complex, dynamic setting such as Cournot
oligopolies.
Before we turn to the regression models as in Experiment 1, we want to
point out an interesting ﬁnding regarding the response times between the two
treatments. Figure 4.7 simply reorders the average response times as shown
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in Figure 4.6 and put for each decision the NoLoad and Load treatments
next to each other. The picture clearly shows that participants made their
decisions signiﬁcantly faster in the Load than in the NoLoad treatment. A
MWW test conﬁrms that response times are signiﬁcantly faster in the Load



































Figure 4.7: Experiment 2, Average response times for the NoLoad and Load treat-
ments.
Notes. Left-hand side: Conflict situations for the NoLoad and Load treatments. Right-
hand side: Alignment situations for the NoLoad and Load treatments. ⋆⋆ p < 0.05,
⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, MWW test.
These response time results in combination with the ﬁndings of non-
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in (choice) behavior show that the additional cognitive
load task made the participants faster while not changing their behavior.
This ﬁnding has also been explored in a series of cognitive load studies in
18Conflict situations: errors (p < 0.0001) and correct responses (p < 0.0001); Alignment
situations: errors (p = 0.0291) and correct responses (p = 0.0018).
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Achtziger et al. (2019), who also oﬀer an explanation and propose it as a
test of a successful cognitive load manipulation. The cognitive load, i.e. the
additional task of maintaining a number in the working memory, did not
slow down the participants but sped up the decision while not changing the
choice behavior.
We now turn to a more detailed regression analysis as in Experiment 1
and look at the random eﬀects panel regressions on the log-response times
while clustering the standard errors at the block level. We consider the same
regression models as in Experiment 1 with the one exception of a diﬀerent
treatment dummy. Starting with regression model 2, the Cognitive Load
dummy, i.e. being 1 in the Load treatment and 0 otherwise, is introduced to
the regressions.
Model 1 in Table 4.5 tests for the basic eﬀects. The coeﬃcient for Error
× Conﬂict directly represents the diﬀerence between imitation errors and
correct decisions in case of conﬂict. The coeﬃcient is negative and highly
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming Hypothesis H1. The coeﬃcient for Error × Alignment
directly represents the diﬀerence between errors and correct decisions in case
of alignment. The coeﬃcient is positive and highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming
Hypothesis H2. The coeﬃcient for Conﬂict is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
This shows that correct decisions are slower in case of conﬂict than in case
of alignment.
The Noise coeﬃcient is also positive and highly signiﬁcant showing that
noise errors are slower than the imitation errors. As in Experiment 1, we
take this as an indication that the category of noise errors is capturing higher
cognitive, more complex decision processes or behavioral rules.
Models 2 and 3 add further controls and show that the results just re-
ported are robust. The dummy called Cognitive Load is negative and highly
signiﬁcant showing that the decisions in the Load treatment are signiﬁ-
cantly faster than the decisions in the NoLoad treatment as seen in the
non-parametric analysis. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant time trend, i.e. the partici-
pants become faster the longer they play reﬂected by the variable Normalized
Time and dummies for parts 2 and 3. As in Experiment 1, we interpret this
as familiarity with the interface or other learning eﬀects, however, our main
146
Chapter 4 Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies
Table 4.5: Experiment 2, Random effects panel regressions for ln(ResponseTimes).
ln(ResponseTimes) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conﬂict 0.1691∗∗∗ 0.1621∗∗∗ 0.1627∗∗∗
(0.0304) (0.0251) (0.0250)
Error × Conﬂict −0.2548∗∗∗ −0.2060∗∗∗ −0.2060∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Error × Aligned 0.2068∗∗∗ 0.1717∗∗∗ 0.1718∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0313) (0.0307)
Noise (in Conﬂict) 0.2407∗∗∗ 0.1939∗∗∗ 0.1946∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0158) (0.0155)
Cognitive Load −0.3452∗∗∗ −0.3446∗∗∗
(0.0770) (0.0772)
Normalized Time −0.3116∗∗∗ −0.3117∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0308)
Part 2 −0.1701∗∗∗ −0.1701∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0209)
Part 3 −0.3054∗∗∗ −0.3046∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0313)
Payoﬀ Table 2 0.0245
(0.0278)




Constant 2.1329∗∗∗ 2.6304∗∗∗ 2.6067∗∗∗
(0.0757) (0.0675) (0.0693)
R2 0.0467 0.1836 0.1840
Notes. Standard errors, clustered by 6 matching blocks, in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
results remain robust. The collusion dummy is negative and highly signiﬁ-
cant, but the previous results and conclusions are not aﬀected. A post-hoc
linear combination test shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Payoﬀ Table
2 and Payoﬀ Table 3 (Linear Combination test, Payoﬀ Table 3 - Payoﬀ Table
2, coeﬃcient= 0.0186, z = 0.732, p = 0.4639.)19
19Additional regressions controlling for demographics and psychological characteristics
yielded the same qualitative results and conclusions.
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In summary, we ﬁnd strong evidence in our data suggesting multiple
behavioral rules codetermine behavior in Cournot oligopolies. In particular,
we ﬁnd evidence for imitation, a more automatic and intuitive behavioral
rule, and myopic best reply, a more controlled and rational behavioral rule.
4.5 Reinforcement
In this and the following Section we analyze our data with respect to two
other very prominent behavioral rules, i.e. reinforcement and inertia.
Reinforcement is especially important for economics since it captures the
focus on past performance. Positive reinforcement is the tendency to repeat
whatever has given good results in the past, without paying attention to
whether the conditions in which that action was successful have changed
(e.g., outcome bias, see Dillon and Tinsley, 2008).
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) showed that reinforcement corresponds
to a highly automatic process which competes with more controlled pro-
cesses when feedback has a win-loss valence. Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel (2018b)
showed that reinforcement can act as a cognitive shortcut instead of more
controlled behavioral rules in case both are aligned. In our paradigm, we can
identify decisions following positive reinforcement, namely those where the
player obtained the highest proﬁts in the previous period and repeats the
decision. That is, those are situations where imitation is aligned with inertia
(but not necessarily with myopic best reply), and the player imitates him- or
herself. This gives us an opportunity to diﬀerentiate between reinforcement
and imitation of others. Inertia could also be the driver of behavior which
we will address in the next section. In this section we focus on positive re-
inforcement and imitation of others. Evidence from neuroscience has shown
that reinforcement learning is associated with extremely fast and unconscious
brain responses (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Hence, we hypothesize that rein-
forcement is associated to a more automatic behavioral rule than imitating
others, which should be reﬂected in even shorter response times. Note that
the comparison is quite diﬀerent from the one between imitation and myopic
best reply, because positive reinforcement is a subcategory of imitation de-
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cisions. That is, whenever positive reinforcement is active, by deﬁnition it
yields the same prescription as imitation. Hence, when we disentangle deci-
sions following positive reinforcement from other imitative decisions we are
comparing two disjoint kinds of imitation (imitating yourself and imitating







































Figure 4.8: Average response times of reinforcement and imitating-others decisions.
Notes. Left-hand side: Experiment 1. Right-hand side: Experiment 2 separated by the
cognitive load treatments. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
Figure 4.8 displays the response times of decisions where participants
imitated themselves vs. those of decisions where they imitated others. The
ﬁgure shows three subsets of our data, i.e. the pooled data for Experiment
1 (left-hand side) and both treatments (NoLoad and Load) for Experiment
2 (right-hand side). We disentangle the comparison according to whether
imitation was in conﬂict or in alignment with myopic best reply in order to
test among comparable decisions, but we expect the same relation in both
cases (conﬂict and alignment refer to imitation and myopic best reply, while
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we are testing among two diﬀerent classes of imitative decisions). Within
each subset the left-hand side corresponds to the case where imitation was
in conﬂict with myopic best reply, and hence all imitative decisions were
“imitation errors.”
In Experiment 1, reinforcement decisions in this case took an average
of 10.28 s and were faster than imitating-others decisions, which averaged
11.91 s. The diﬀerence was highly signiﬁcant (WRS, N = 108, z = −3.807,
p = 0.0001). The right-hand side of each subset of data in Figure 4.8 corre-
sponds to the case where myopic best reply and imitation were aligned, hence
all imitative decisions were “correct.” Also in this case reinforcement deci-
sions (average 9.86 s) were signiﬁcantly faster than imitating-others decisions
(average 11.38 s; WSR, N = 18, z = −1.720, p = 0.0854).20
The analysis for Experiment 2 obtains the same conclusions. In the
NoLoad treatment, reinforcement decisions in conﬂict situations took an av-
erage of 10.70 s and were hence faster than imitating-others decisions, which
averaged 12.30 s. The diﬀerence was highly signiﬁcant (WRS, N = 65,
z = −3.075, p = 0.0021). In case of alignment in the NoLoad treatment,
reinforcement decisions (average 8.65 s) were also signiﬁcantly faster than
imitating-others decisions (average 13.55 s; N = 8, z = −2.521, p = 0.0117).
In the case of conﬂict, while under cognitive load, reinforcement decisions
took an average of 7.95 s and were hence faster than imitating-others deci-
sions, which averaged 9.54 s. Again, this diﬀerence was strongly signiﬁcant
(WRS, N = 65, z = −2.400, p = 0.0164). In the case of alignment, the re-
inforcement decisions (average 7.58 s) were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the
imitating-others decisions (average 7.39 s; N = 9, z = −0.178, p = 0.8590).21
In summary, we generally conﬁrm that decisions where a participant im-
itated him- or herself were signiﬁcantly faster than comparable decisions
20Notice that requiring at least 2 observations per individual and splitting the imitation
decisions into positive reinforcement and imitating others greatly reduces the number of
observations in alignment situations. As before we reported a two-sided test, however,
note that a one-sided test shows significance at a level of p = 0.0427.
21The number of observations is greatly reduced. Note that a test yields significant faster
reinforcement decisions (average 7.21 s) than imitating-others decisions (average 9.88 s)
when not requiring at least two observations per individual (WSR, N = 29, z = −2.562,
p = 0.0104).
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where the participant imitated another participant. This is compatible with
the view from psychology and neuroscience that reinforcement processes are
extremely fast and more automatic than other processes.22
4.6 Inertia
In the previous subsection we concluded that imitating oneself is faster than
imitating others. Decisions where a player imitates him- or herself are in line
with both imitation and inertia, because the previous action is repeated. It
is hence legitimate to ask whether the results regarding positive reinforce-
ment are just due to the involvement of a further behavioral rule, namely
inertia. Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016b) recently found that decision inertia causes
error-rate asymmetries in the belief-updating task of Achtziger and Alós-
Ferrer (2014), but the process is considerably weaker than reinforcement and
is washed away by the latter. Hence, we will exploratively test for the ef-
fects of inertia in the cases where it is not aligned with imitation, because
the alignment of imitation and inertia corresponds to positive reinforcement.
That is, we restrict the tests to decisions not aligned with imitation. In
case of conﬂict between imitation and myopic best reply, this means that we
test within correct decisions, i.e. decisions following myopic best replies. In
case of alignment between imitation and myopic best reply, it means we test
within errors.
Figure 4.9 shows the response times of decisions that are in line with in-
ertia (“stay” decisions) and those that are not (“shift” decisions). The ﬁgure
displays those response times for three subsets of our data, i.e. the pooled
data for Experiment 1 (left-hand side) and both treatments (NoLoad and
Load) for Experiment 2 (right-hand side). Within each subset the left-hand
side corresponds to response times of correct decisions which are diﬀerenti-
ated according to whether the decision followed inertia, resulting in a “stay”
best reply, or not, resulting in a “shift” best reply.
22While it is often useful to think of decision processes in dichotomous terms as “auto-
matic” or “controlled,” this is just a simplification. The automaticity dimension is best
conceived of as a continuum, and all that can be concluded when comparing different
processes is whether one is more automatic than another one or not.
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Figure 4.9: Average response times of of stay and shift correct decisions and errors.
Notes. Left-hand side: Experiment 1. Right-hand side: Experiment 2 separated by the
cognitive load treatment. Each subset shows stay and shift correct (myopic best reply)
decisions in case myopic best reply and imitation were in conflict and stay and shift errors
in case myopic best reply and imitation were aligned. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01,
WSR test.
In Experiment 1, stay best replies averaged 12.10 s compared to 12.24 s
for shift best replies, and the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (WSR, N = 79,
z = −0.117, p = 0.9066). Hence, there is no evidence for an involvement
of pure inertia in the correct decisions in Experiment 1. Now consider the
case of errors, for which the right-hand side within each subset shows the
response times of errors, i.e. non-best replies, in the case where myopic best
reply and imitation were aligned. In Experiment 1, stay (inertia) errors were
signiﬁcantly faster (mean 12.41 s) than shift errors (mean 14.62 s; WSR,
N = 50, z = −2.833, p = 0.0046). This diﬀerence is interesting. In case of
alignment between imitation and myopic best reply, errors do not follow from
imitation, and shift errors do not follow from inertia either. Although this is
152
Chapter 4 Multiple Behavioral Rules in Cournot Oligopolies
a post hoc interpretation, this result might point out that the shift errors in
this case possibly include some decisions following higher-order reasoning, as
in the case of the noise errors discussed in the regression analysis of Section
4.3. This suggests even more behavioral rules are at work than we focused
on in this work.
The results of the NoLoad treatment in Experiment 2 obtains the same
conclusions as in Experiment 1, as expected since it is a replication. In the
NoLoad treatment, stay best replies averaged 14.31 s compared to 14.58 s
for shift best replies, and the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (WSR, N = 43,
z = −0.169, p = 0.8658). In the case of alignment, stay (inertia) errors were
signiﬁcantly faster (mean 13.36 s) than shift errors (mean 16.08 s; WSR,
N = 21, z = −1.964, p = 0.0496). Hence, there is no strong evidence for
an involvement of a pure inertia process for the correct decisions while shift
errors might following higher-order reasoning in the NoLoad treatment.
In the cognitive Load treatment we ﬁnd the opposite to be true. In
the case of conﬂict, the response times of stay best replies (mean 9.81 s)
were signiﬁcantly faster than shift best replies (mean 11.43 s), in contrast
to the ﬁndings in Experiment 1 and the NoLoad treatment (WSR, N = 40,
z = −2.554, p = 0.0107). Hence, there is evidence for an involvement of
pure inertia in the correct decisions. We also ﬁnd a diﬀerent result for stay
and shift errors in case myopic best reply and imitation were aligned. Stay
(inertia) errors were not signiﬁcantly faster (mean 11.17 s) than shift errors
(mean 12.59 s), contrary to the ﬁndings in Experiment 1 and the NoLoad
treatment (WSR, N = 17, z = −1.112, p = 0.2659).23
The inﬂuence of inertia on decisions is aﬀected by the cognitive load ma-
nipulation. In Experiment 1 and the NoLoad treatment there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence for stay and shift best replies but there is one in the Load treat-
23Conservative tests at the block level generally obtain the same results and conclusions.
Only the comparison of stay and shift best replies in conflict situations in the Load treat-
ment yields a different conclusion on the block level and is non-significant (stay best replies,
mean 9.83 s; shift best replies, mean 11.14 s; WSR, N = 6, z = −0.943, p = 0.3454). Note
that the non-significant result for stay and shift errors in the Load treatment are not due
to the low number of observations. We also find a non-significant result when not requir-
ing at least two observations per individual (mean stay errors 11.43 s; mean shift errors
11.92 s; WSR, N = 50, z = −0.729, p = 0.4661).
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ment. This suggests that under cognitive load the alignment with inertia
promoted the use of the shortcut of the very fast heuristic and made deci-
sions signiﬁcantly faster. For stay and shift errors it is the opposite case, i.e.
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for stay and shift errors in Experiment 1 and
the NoLoad treatment but there is none in the Load treatment suggesting
that cognitive load reduced the complexity of some behavior leading to shift
errors. Hence, we ﬁnd another diﬀerence between the behavioral rules of
imitation and myopic best reply. The alignment with inertia (whether it is a
“stay” or a “shift” decision) aﬀects imitative decisions in a diﬀerent way than
myopic best reply decisions. With our cognitive load manipulation, we do
ﬁnd a diﬀerence between the more automatic and intuitive behavioral rule
of imitation and the more controlled one of myopic best reply. This ﬁnding
provides further evidence that these processes are diﬀerent and codetermine
behavior in Cournot oligopolies.
In any case, this is evidence that the interaction with inertia (whether
a decision is a “stay” or a “shift”) aﬀects imitative decisions in a diﬀerent
way than myopic best replies. Hence, we aim to conduct a robustness test
of our results regarding Hypotheses H1 and H2 controlling for the eﬀects of
inertia. Figure 4.10 shows the average response times for Experiment 1 and
both treatments of Experiment 2 while excluding all observations which were
additionally aligned with inertia. Let us start with H1, which concerns the
case of conﬂict between imitation and myopic best reply. We compare shift
best replies to imitating-others errors. The comparison is shown for Experi-
ment 1 in the left-hand side of Figure 4.10. Again, errors (mean 12.04 s) are
signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses (mean 12.61 s; WSR, N = 118,
z = −2.029, p = 0.0425), conﬁrming H1 even when all inertia decisions are
excluded from the analysis. Hypothesis H2 concerns the case of alignment
between imitation and myopic best reply. We are hence comparing shift best
replies (which were also imitating-others decisions) to shift errors. The com-
parison is shown in the right-hand side of the subset for Experiment 1 in
Figure 4.10. This time, errors (mean 15.20 s) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from correct responses (mean 13.82 s; WSR, N = 25, z = 1.063, p = 0.2879),
not conﬁrming H2 when all inertia decisions are excluded from the analy-
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Figure 4.10: Average response times of correct decisions and errors excluding inertia
decisions.
Notes. Left-hand side: Experiment 1. Right-hand side: Experiment 2 separated by the
cognitive load treatment. Each subset shows correct decisions and errors in case myopic
best reply and imitation were in conflict and in alignment. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05,
⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
sis.24 Hence, the predictions of the DPDM (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014;
Alós-Ferrer, 2018) are conﬁrmed.
Also in the NoLoad treatment of Experiment 2 we ﬁnd that in conﬂict
situations, errors (mean 12.41 s) are signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses
(mean 14.84 s; WSR, N = 68, z = −3.605, p = 0.0003), conﬁrming H1 even
when all inertia decisions are excluded from the analysis and replicating
the results of Experiment 1 with fewer observations. Regarding H2, we do
24Testing at the block level shows significantly faster errors than correct response in
conflict situations and significantly slower errors than correct responses in alignment sit-
uations. Also, the test on the individual level not requiring at least two observations
per subject yields significantly slower errors (mean 14.51 s) than correct responses (mean
12.88 s; WSR, N = 71, z = 2.131, p = 0.0330).
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not obtain signiﬁcant results and cannot conﬁrm the prediction. Shift errors
(mean 14.76 s) are not signiﬁcantly slower than shift best-replies in alignment
(mean 16.24 s; WSR, N = 13, z = −0.943, p = 0.3454).25
For cases of conﬂict in the cognitive load treatment, we ﬁnd that errors
(mean 9.35 s) are signiﬁcantly faster than correct responses (mean 10.70 s;
WSR,N = 62, z = −3.130, p = 0.0017). As in all the other conﬂict situations
we conﬁrm prediction H1. However, as before we do not obtain signiﬁcant
results for H2 in the Load treatment for alignment situations. Errors (mean
9.97 s) are not signiﬁcantly slower than correct responses (mean 8.51 s; WSR,
N = 10, z = 1.376, p = 0.1688), not conﬁrming H2 when all inertia decisions
are excluded from the analysis.26
One obvious explanation for not obtaining signiﬁcant results for Hypoth-
esis 2 is the strongly reduced amount of observations after excluding all stay
decisions. In case of alignment the number of overall decisions is already rel-
atively low compared to conﬂict situations and is further split into errors and
correct response. When excluding all decisions which are additionally aligned
with inertia the overall number of errors and correct response is very low (Ex-
periment 1: 491 errors and 121 correct responses out of 6,144 observations;
Experiment 2, NoLoad treatment: 227 errors and 70 correct responses out of
3,456 observations; Experiment 2, Load treatment: 185 errors and 74 correct
responses out of 3,456 observations). Not only are there few observations
left, there are also only few individuals who have more than one observation
for creating the average response times. We cannot conﬁrm the predictions
of H2, however, we conﬁrmed the predictions of H1 even when excluding
inertia decisions from the analysis in Experiment 1 and both treatments in
Experiment 2.
25The same conclusion obtains testing the block level.
26Tests at the block level yield the same conclusion for conflict situations and obtain
significant slower errors (mean 11.81 s) than correct responses (mean 9.87 s; WSR, N = 6,
z = 1.782, p = 0.0747) in contrast to the results on the individual level.
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4.7 Conclusion
In two experiments we found evidence suggesting that multiple behavioral
rules codetermine behavior. We apply the Dual-Process Diﬀusion-Model of
Alós-Ferrer (2018) which predicts an asymmetry in the response times when
diﬀerent postulated behavioral rules are either in conﬂict or in alignment.
This regularity has been previously found in an abstract belief-updating
task involving strictly individual decisions (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014).
The present work undertakes the analysis for a more complex, interpersonal
decision-making task, using Cournot oligopolies as the workhorse. In this
economically relevant setting, previous theoretical and experimental work
have shown convergence towards the outcomes associated with imitation,
even though the game-theoretic setting clearly makes best reply considera-
tions prominent. Hence, we postulated that imitation (being a more intuitive
or automatic) and myopic best reply (being a proxy for more rational, re-
ﬂexive, or controlled behavior) would be the relevant behavioral rules and
examined response times as indicators of behavioral involvement.
We found strong evidence for the eﬀects predicted by the dual-process
approach. This result contributes to the literature in two directions. First,
previous experimental literature on Cournot oligopolies (Huck et al., 1999,
2004; Oﬀerman et al., 2002; Apesteguía et al., 2007, 2010) has concentrated
on convergence towards Walrasian outcomes, predicted by theoretical mod-
els of imitative behavior (Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-Ferrer and Ania, 2005).
This is a relevant and legitimate way to test for the actual relevance of the
implications of imitative behavior, but it tests on predicted consequences
and not on actual behavior. In other words, the actual presence of imita-
tive behavior is indirectly deduced from the fact that one observes empirical
convergence to the outcomes which would be predicted if behavior followed
(noisy) imitation behavioral rules. In contrast, our analysis targets direct
correlates of individual decisions, without relying on (and actually actively
precluding) any convergence. In this sense, our response-times data delivers
novel evidence which is compatible with the involvement of imitative behav-
ior in economic situations as Cournot oligopolies.
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Second, our results ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant asymmetric eﬀects in response
times as predicted by Alós-Ferrer (2018). This is a subtler and more elaborate
prediction than the simple expectation that intuitive decisions should be
faster. The asymmetry hinges crucially on the existence of two interacting
decision rules with diﬀerent properties, one being more automatic/intuitive
and the other more controlled/reﬂexive. Hence, our results provide evidence
showing that multiple behavioral rules inﬂuence and codetermine behavior,
and that the dual-process approach arising in psychology delivers interesting
insights for economic decision making. Multiple behavioral rules are more
than a convenient metaphor, and the thinking and decision making should be
considered less as an instantaneous, punctual phenomenon and more as the
result of the interaction of diﬀerent behavioral rules and decision processes
in the human brain.
This view, however, does not reduce to a literal import of psychological
models into economics. In order to analyze economic decisions, dual-process
ideas need to be adapted and reﬁned. Where psychologists speak of low-level
processes, we are interested in high-level behavioral rules. While psycholo-
gists often concentrate on very short response times, economic decisions are
usually slower, and in complex paradigms as the one considered here they are
also slower than those typical in the literature on judgment and decision mak-
ing (in our case, decisions are mostly in the 10-15 seconds window, which is
considerably longer than decisions in, e.g., Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014).
Whether dual-process insights remain meaningful for these longer response
times is an empirical question, and the answer we have obtained here is
clearly positive.
In Experiment 2 we manipulated cognitive load to further investigate
diﬀerences between imitation and myopic best reply along another dimension.
We predicted that under cognitive load a direct increase in more automatic
behavior, i.e. more imitative decisions, will be observed. However, we did
not ﬁnd such a direct relation and since there was no change in behavior
Experiment 2 includes a robustness check. We are convinced that we had a
strong cognitive load manipulation as seen due to the eﬀect on response times
and which has successfully induced cognitive load eﬀects in other studies
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(Carpenter et al., 2013). The hypothesis H3 implicitly assumes that imitation
is the most automatic behavior and all other behavioral rules require much
more cognitive resources. However, behavior could shift from more controlled
behavior to more automatic behavior, as predicted, but cannot be identiﬁed
because a shift from from myopic best reply or other higher complex reasoning
to imitation can be negated by a shift from imitation to even more automatic,
intuitive behavior, e.g. random behavior. We did not ﬁnd such a direct eﬀect
of cognitive load, however, we ﬁnd that imitation and myopic best reply react
diﬀerently to lack of available cognitive resources. Another, more positive
interpretation of our results is that cognitive load makes decisions faster
while simultaneously it does not change the observed behavior in terms of
decision frequencies.
At a general level, our work adds to the growing body of evidence showing
that the dual view of behavior might be better suited to explain economic de-
cision making than either the assumption of fully-rational, optimizing agents
or the evolutionary approach replacing agents by boundedly rational behav-
ioral rules. Our results speak in favor of multiple behavioral rules, one of
them reﬂecting evolutionary ideas (in this case, imitative behavioral rules)
and the other being closer to rational optimization. The bottom line of our
research is that a dual-process model architecture can provide a useful synthe-
sis of previous approaches and help signiﬁcantly improve our understanding
of how economic decisions are made while showing that multiple behavioral




Cognitive Load in Economic Decisions:
How To Tell Whether It Works
5.1 Introduction
Every non-trivial task, and almost every consequential decision, requires cog-
nitive resources. For easy tasks and decisions, as when one decides on an
ice-cream ﬂavor at the parlor, the cognitive demands are low. In other cases,
as when one struggles to design an optimal investment plan to ﬁnance retire-
ment, cognitive demands are high, and cognitive resources might become a
binding constraint.
Economically relevant tasks and decisions might often belong to the sec-
ond category. In such cases, a decrease in performance is to be expected if
cognitive resources become more scarce. Research in psychology has devel-
oped a plethora of cognitive loadmanipulations to causally reduce the amount
of cognitive resources available for a task, hence illuminating the allocation of
resources within the human brain. The most common forms of cognitive load
involve taxing cognitive resources through an additional task, as e.g. keep-
ing a number or a graphical conﬁguration in memory or generating random
numbers out loud. It has been extensively shown in psychology that such
manipulations do impair performance in simple cognitive tasks (Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley et al., 1984; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Hinson
et al., 2002; Lavie and de Fockert, 2005; Barrouillet et al., 2007). These
manipulations are best understood in the framework of the working memory
model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974). Working memory is conceived of as a
(functional) brain system which processes and stores short-term information,
and is assumed to have a limited capacity. Baddeley (1992) divides working
memory into multiple subcomponents, which we will brieﬂy describe below,
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and cognitive load manipulations diﬀer according to which subcomponent is
targeted.
The fact that cognitive load decreases performance is, in itself, not ex-
traordinarily relevant for economics. However, it turns out that cognitive
load has the potential to substantially and systematically alter behavior in
ways which are of interest for economics. The reason can be explained in
a straightforward way following dual-process theories (see Kahneman, 2003;
Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014; see also Evans, 2008;
Weber and Johnson, 2009 for detailed reviews). These theories, in a simpli-
ﬁed version, postulate that the human mind is mainly inﬂuenced by two kinds
of processes, called automatic and controlled, with the former capturing in-
tuitive, impulsive, or heavily trained processes of an associative type (e.g.,
following stimulus-response patterns), and the latter corresponding to more
deliberative, reﬂective processes. In a less simplistic way, the automaticity
dimension is often viewed as a continuum (Bargh, 1989), and the actual pos-
tulate is that decision processes in the human mind diﬀer in their degree of
automaticity, and that often several competing processes inﬂuence decisions
and performance. A key dimension associated to automaticity is the degree
to which processes require the use of cognitive resources as working mem-
ory. More automatic processes place little or no requirement on cognitive
resources, and are eﬀectively always available. In contrast, more deliberative
ones make heavy use of cognitive resources as working memory, and hence
become unavailable if the latter are taxed away. Hence, the dual-process
view suggests that taxing working memory through cognitive load impairs
controlled processes, resulting in a shift to more automatic processes.
In many situations of interest in economics, such a process shift is conse-
quential. In terms of decisions and performance, automatic processes often
correspond to cognitive shortcuts or heuristics which might be aligned with
deliberation in some or many situations, but might conﬂict with it, leading
to biases, in economically relevant domains as decision making under risk or
uncertainty. Thus, tilting the balance toward automatic processes allows to
better understand such biases. In terms of preferences and motives, auto-
matic processes reveal intrinsic tendencies (sometimes informally referred to
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as a “default mode of behavior”), and hence a shift toward automatic pro-
cesses might help uncover the roots of many economically relevant human
tendencies as altruism or cooperation, to quote just two examples.
Studies relying on cognitive load rely on a triple hypothesis. First, the
key procedural assumption is that the particular cognitive load manipulation
implemented has taxed cognitive resources to a suﬃcient extent to induce a
shift in processes. While this is often clear in studies in cognitive psychology,
due to the sheer number of available studies one can compare to, it is usually
far less clear in economic settings, where the number of studies is limited
and tasks are far less standardized than in cognitive psychology. Second,
the assumption is that the shift to automatic processes will result in an ob-
servable change in behavior. This might not always be the case, however.
Automatic processes are in themselves not ﬂawed: rather, they have evolved
because they economize cognitive resources while delivering a good response
in evolutionarily typical situations. Hence, in many situations they will ac-
tually prescribe the same response as more deliberative processes. It is only
when they are used in an evolutionarily new situation that they will conﬂict
with the latter and prescribe erroneous or suboptimal responses. This gives
rise to the key distinction between alignment and conflict (see Achtziger and
Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-Ferrer, 2018): a decrease in performance is not to
be expected in a situation of alignment. The third assumption is that the
researcher has correctly identiﬁed the automatic and deliberative processes
playing a role in the speciﬁc decision situation, and their respective prescrip-
tions.
The two latter hypotheses are a matter of experimental design, and
whether they should be accepted or rejected should be determined on the
basis of the collected data within each individual study. Alas, this task be-
comes impossible in the absence of a clear criterion to decide whether the
ﬁrst hypothesis is correct, that is, whether the particular cognitive load ma-
nipulation that the researcher has used has actually successfully induced a
process shift. To date, for the class of tasks used in economic experiments,
there is no satisfactory test allowing such a conclusion. Actually, there is
anecdotal evidence that this problem might currently be a hidden bottleneck
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impairing research in experimental economics. A modest number of studies
have successfully used cognitive load in explicitly economic tasks (Milinski
and Wedekind, 1998; Carpenter et al., 2013; Duﬀy and Smith, 2014; Schulz
et al., 2014; Samson and Kostyszyn, 2015; Buckert et al., 2017; Døssing et al.,
2017), but others have found mixed results (Deck and Jahedi, 2015; Allred
et al., 2016), and a fair number of studies have reported no eﬀects (Greene
et al., 2008; Cappelletti et al., 2011; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Benjamin et al.,
2013; Glaser and Walther, 2014; Duﬀy et al., 2016; Hauge et al., 2016; Dri-
choutis and Nayga, 2017). It is reasonable to assume that publication bias
might have resulted in an additional number of unsuccessful studies not being
circulated.
In this work, we oﬀer a test of the single hypothesis that cognitive load has
been successful in inducing a shift toward a higher reliance in automatic pro-
cesses in the kind of complex tasks typically relevant for economic research.
At ﬁrst glance, this might appear to be an impossible task, because it is fun-
damental that this test works independently of whether the shift in processes
results in decreased performance or an actual shift in decisions (behavior) or
not. However, the test is possible if one relies on a diﬀerent kind of data:
response times. The intuition is simple. Independently of whether more
automatic processes favor diﬀerent responses as more deliberative processes
or just the same ones, one of the major consequences of automaticity (and,
one could easily argue, the reason it provided an evolutionary advantage) is
that more automatic processes are typically faster. Hence, elementary dual-
process logic dictates that, if a successful shift to more automatic processes is
induced, decisions must, on average, become faster. Hence, one obtains the
apparently paradoxical conclusion that, if cognitive load is successfully in-
duced, response times for the task of economic interest must become shorter.
This simple test of response times becomes the smoking gun showing that
cognitive load was successfully induced, which then allows to interpret the
behavioral (choice) data. In other words, if response times show that cog-
nitive load did induce a process shift but actual behavior dos not change
signiﬁcantly, the researcher is still justiﬁed in using the data to draw con-
clusions about the default mode of behavior, the characteristics of involved
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decision processes, or whether there is a process conﬂict at all. In the absence
of the response-time test, such conclusions would be unwarranted.
The test we propose has two clear boundary conditions. First, it will typ-
ically only apply to relatively complex tasks where decisions are relatively
long. This is because there needs to be a clear diﬀerence in response times
between the relevant automatic and controlled processes. It is typically as-
sumed that cognitive load causes an increase in response times in parts of the
decision process as process selection, task processing, or conﬂict detection and
resolution. Those eﬀects in response times will typically be small (for exam-
ple, electrophysiological correlates of conﬂict detection are measured within
200-300 ms of stimuli presentation; Achtziger et al., 2014). If the main task
is a fast one, however, this eﬀect might dominate, explaining why cognitive
load often results in longer response times in psychological paradigms (Gevins
et al., 1998; Baddeley et al., 2001; de Fockert et al., 2001) (and, why psychol-
ogists have never developed the test we propose). The latter paradigms are
set in rather simple settings compared to most economic decisions, and are
associated with extremely short response times (often below one second1)
compared to response times in economic experiments (which, in the cases
illustrated in this work, go up to over 20 s).
The second boundary condition concerns the type of manipulation. The
kind of cognitive load tasks we consider, which are the most widespread,
crucially require no concurrent motor activity or added time due to added
demands on attention while the main task is being carried out. The most
clear example is keeping a number or a graphical dot conﬁguration in memory,
but also internally generating random numbers while carrying out a task ﬁts
the bill. Potentially, one could conceive of manipulations where a concurrent
task is used, forcing the participant to interrupt the main task to perform
the competing one, e.g. answering some unrelated questions as the main
1Gevins et al. (1998) report response times in an EEG stimulus matching task between
441 and 933 ms. Baddeley et al. (2001) present response times between 35 and 175 s for a
block of 40 decisions of adding or subtracting 1 to a single-digit number. de Fockert et al.
(2001) report on an fMRI study with a visual selective attention task classifying names
with pop stars or politicians for which response times increased from 953 to 1, 394 ms
under cognitive load.
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task develops. This is done in so-called task-switching paradigms (Rogers
and Monsell, 1995; Monsell, 2003), which however are not usually considered
to be cognitive load manipulations. Obviously, such tasks place additional
requirements on e.g. attention and motor reactions or cause the main task
to be put on hold for a while, which will be reﬂected in increased response
times. Hence, task-switching paradigms of this type are not well-suited for
our test.
In this work, we report on four separate experiments in which we em-
ployed diﬀerent types of cognitive load manipulations in diﬀerent economic
experiments: belief-updating tasks, voting, and competitive games (Cournot
oligopolies). In all cases, the cognitive load manipulations resulted in shorter
response times, even though eﬀects on behavior and performance varied. We
also observed that more complex cognitive load tasks led to higher reductions
in response times.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. As a reference for
later sections, and for the reader’s convenience, Section 5.2 brieﬂy reviews the
basics and structure of working memory. This is important because diﬀer-
ent cognitive load manipulations target diﬀerent working-memory subcom-
ponents. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present two separate experiments on Cournot
oligopolies where we used two diﬀerent cognitive load tasks, a light load ma-
nipulation and a high load one. Section 5.5 presents a voting experiment with
the same cognitive load task as in that of Section 5.4. Section 5.6 presents a
belief-updating experiment with two diﬀerent cognitive load manipulations.
Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Working Memory and Cognitive Load
Understanding cognitive load manipulations requires a discussion of working
memory, which can be described as the set of functions and resources govern-
ing the selection and execution of decision processes. In order to provide the
theoretical background for the present studies, we brieﬂy introduce the work-
ing memory model of Baddeley (1986, 1996), which is a standard reference
in cognitive psychology. This model describes how diﬀerent working memory
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components might be responsible for automatic and controlled processes and
their selection. It suggests a supervisory system that controls the switch be-
tween automatic and controlled processes. The model distinguishes a central
executive system from two subordinate (slave) memory systems (components)
that are modality-speciﬁc. These two components are the phonological loop
and the visuospatial sketch pad. Each of the working memory components
has only limited (cognitive) capacity. Accordingly, an overload of these com-
ponents’ resources, for instance through cognitive load manipulations, results
in impairments in task performance.
The phonological loop, also known as verbal working memory, is respon-
sible for the retention of verbally coded material, independently of whether
it is presented in written or auditory form. It refreshes stored information
through e.g. inner-voice repetition (see e.g. Gathercole and Baddeley (1993)).
The storage and maintenance of information carried out by the phonologi-
cal loop corresponds to cognitive resources which are used more intensely
by more controlled processes. Most of the cognitive load manipulations em-
ployed in previous economic research target the phonological loop (typically,
keeping certain numbers in memory), and accordingly so did several of our
manipulations.
The visuospatial sketch pad is responsible for the retention of graphically
coded material, as e.g. images. Some cognitive load manipulations in psy-
chology avoid the phonological loop and target this subsystem instead by,
e.g., asking participants to keep a conﬁguration of dots in memory.
Last, the central executive integrates information from various sources
and is also seen as the supervisor or controller of the other two working
memory components. The functions of the central executive consume much
of the (restricted) cognitive resources (Norman and Shallice, 1986). It plays
the role of a supervisory system switching between controlled and automatic
processes. More generally, it governs the controlled selection or development
of strategies in situations which are new in the sense that no speciﬁc rules
have yet be learned, i.e. when automatic processes are not available. It
is also responsible for allocating attention to complex controlled processes
and implementing them. Hence, successfully performing complex completing
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cognitive tasks (e.g. by inhibiting automatic processes) can be assumed to
rely on functions of the central executive. Cognitive load manipulations
targeting the central executive are seen as particularly demanding. One of
our experiments included a manipulation of this type.
5.3 Experiment 1: Cournot Oligopoly Under Light Cognitive
Load
5.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
For the main decision task, participants interacted each round in 4-player
Cournot oligopolies (tetrapolies). Subjects participated in three diﬀerent
oligopolies (parts), with 17 rounds each (total of 51 rounds). For each part,
we computed a payoﬀ table using a Cournot oligopoly with zero costs and
a linear inverse demand function of the form P (Q) = a − Q, where P is
the price, a the saturated demand, and Q the total quantity in the market.
However, during the experiment a neutral framing was used and neither ﬁrm
nor quantities were mentioned. We reduced the action space to four possible
actions, i.e. A, B, C, and D with either increasing or decreasing quantities
from A to D.2 Hence, the whole payoﬀ table had dimensions 4 × 20, with
four rows representing the possible actions and 20 columns labeled AAA
to DDD representing the possible actions of the opponents. Payoﬀs were
expressed in points, with an exchange rate of 20 Eurocents per 1000 points.
The points achieved in all 51 rounds were accumulated and paid at the end of
the experiment. After the ﬁrst round the participants were informed about
the outcome of the previous round. Participants saw the full payoﬀ table,
their own choice and earnings from the previous round, and the previous
choice and earnings from the other three group members. While seeing all
this information they chose again A,B,C, or D. The ﬁrst round in each part
did not provide any information on the previous round and was therefore
2Payoff table 1: P (Q) = 150 − Q, A = 37.5, B = 33.25, C = 30, D = 18.75 (or
reversed); Payoff table 2: P (Q) = 175− Q, A = 43.75, B = 38.875, C = 35, D = 21.875
(or reversed); Payoff table 3: P (Q) = 200 − Q, A = 50, B = 44.5, C = 40, D = 25 (or
reversed).
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dropped for the analysis yielding 16 rounds in each part (total of 48 rounds)
relevant for the analysis.
In addition to the main decision task we implemented two treatments,
i.e. No Load and Load treatments, within subjects. Each part had 8 rounds
of No Load and 8 rounds of Load (excluding the very ﬁrst round of each part
which also did not have any cognitive load). During rounds with cognitive
load an additional task was implemented while no additional task was present
during no load rounds. The task consisted of two parts and enclosed the
main decision task in each round. The ﬁrst part required the participants to
memorize a single-digit number which was displayed for 5 seconds before the
Cournot oligopoly screen appeared. During the Cournot oligopoly decision
task the participants heard another single-digit number via headphones which
was played randomly between 1 and 10 seconds. The participants had to add
up the two numbers and enter the sum in another screen after the decision
task was done. The cognitive load task was incentivized and correct additions
earned additional points.3
After the experiment the participants ﬁlled out a questionnaire which
included questions concerning the importance and diﬃculty of the cognitive
load task, the Faith in Intuition scale (Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2012,
2016) and the Big Five questionnaire.4
Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel (2018a) use a similar set-up but focus the analy-
sis on two speciﬁc behavioral strategies, i.e. imitation and myopic best reply.
They use response times and the theoretical predictions of the Dual-Process
Diﬀusion Model (Alós-Ferrer, 2018) as evidence to show that imitation is
more automatic and myopic best reply is more controlled. In this work, we
focus on the eﬀects of cognitive load on response times during the Cournot
oligopoly. The within-subject design allows us to look at individual diﬀer-
ences of response times between the treatments and accounts for heterogene-
3Each correct addition earned additional 750 points. Participants earned on average
1200 points per round from the Cournot oligopoly decision.
4The German version of the Faith in Intuition questionnaire was taken from Keller et al.
(2000), who adapted it from Epstein et al. (1996). The German version of the 15-item
Big-Five scale was taken from Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) (see Lang et al., 2011, p. 560),
who shortened the 44-item version of the Big Five Inventory by John et al. (1991).
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ity in response times across subjects. The appropriate test is the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank (WSR) test on the individual level. Since we predict shorter
response times in the cognitive load treatment, we will report one-sided p-
values. In the sequel, and as a robustness check, we also report the tests at
the group level since those observations are completely independent because
the participants are separated into diﬀerent groups of 4 participants. For
reference, we also provide other common measures such as error rates and
questionnaire data regarding the cognitive load task.
Our main focus lies on response times. Nevertheless, we will also brieﬂy
report the eﬀect of cognitive load on the performance in the decision task. In
the Cournot oligopoly task we will use the payoﬀ of the participant as per-
formance measure, i.e. we will compare the payoﬀ for rounds with cognitive
load to rounds without cognitive load (excluding the additional payoﬀ from
the cognitive load task).
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (CLER), University of Cologne, and programmed in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015),
and were students from the University of Cologne excluding students with
a major in Psychology, Economics, and Advanced Business Administration.
64 participants (28 female; age range 18–33 years, mean 24.6 years), partic-
ipated in exchange for performance-based payment plus a show-up fee. On
average the participants earned 18.45 Euro (ranging from 15.00 to 26.50 Euro
including the show-up fee of 2.50 Euro) and a session lasted about 1 hour
and 45 minutes. The data was collected in two sessions of 32 participants
each. Participants played in 16 diﬀerent and independent groups.
5.3.2 Results
The self-reported questionnaire reveals that the cognitive load task was con-
sidered to be very important (mean 9.03, SD= 1.93 on a scale from 0 – not at
all important to 10 – very important) and that the task was very easy (mean
0.84, SD= 1.47 on a scale from 0 – not at all diﬃcult to 10 – very diﬃcult).
This is also reﬂected in the low error rates of the cognitive load task (mean
170
Chapter 5 Cognitive Load in Economic Decisions: How To Tell Whether It Works
error rate 2.41%, SD= 3.70, ranging from 0% to 20.83%). The questionnaire
and error rates show that the subjects took the cognitive load task seriously
but also had no diﬃculties with the task.
We now turn to the response times of the main decision task. The left-
hand side of Figure 5.1 depicts the average response time of decisions taken
in the No Load and Load treatments. The average response time for deci-
sions in the No Load treatment is 15.22 s while the average response time
for decisions in the Load treatment is 14.34 s. As expected, a WSR test
conﬁrms our prediction and shows that decisions are signiﬁcantly faster in
the cognitive load treatment (N = 64, z = 3.110, p = 0.0009).5 The test
suggests that the cognitive load task was successfully implemented in the
sense that a measurable shift in involved processes occurred. However, the
diﬀerence in response time, although highly signiﬁcant, is not very large in
value, and hence one can ask whether the process shift was suﬃcient to lead
to a measurable shift in behavior.
We now brieﬂy report on performance using payoﬀ in the Cournot
oligopoly rounds as the relevant measure (excluding the show-up fee, the ad-
ditional payoﬀ from the cognitive load task, and the payoﬀ from ﬁrst round of
each part). The participants earned on average 5.81 Euro during all rounds
in the No Load treatment and 5.73 Euro during all rounds in the cognitive
Load treatment. This diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant according to a WSR test
(N = 64, z = 0.595, p = 0.5517).6
5The conservative test at the group level also reveals significant shorter response times
in the Load treatment (WSR test, N = 16, z = 2.223, p = 0.0131).
6A conservative test at the group level shows a trend. The group earnings during No
Load was 23.23 Euro and during Load 22.92 Euro (WSR, N = 16, z = 1.500, p = 0.1337).
Note that a one-sided test with the hypothesis that cognitive load decreases performances
yields p = 0.0668.
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Figure 5.1: Experiment 1, Average response times and payoff.
Notes. The bars represent one standard error of the mean. Stars indicate a Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test. ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01.
5.4 Experiment 2: Cournot Oligopoly Under Heavy Cognitive
Load
5.4.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
In this experiment we used again the Cournot oligopoly setting but employed
a diﬀerent, more demanding cognitive load task. The design of the Cournot
oligopoly game was exactly as in Experiment 1. The more demanding cog-
nitive load task consisted of memorizing a seven-digit number, maintaining
the number in memory while making the decision in the Cournot oligopoly
game, and recalling the number after the decision. There was no auditory
load nor did the participants have to add up numbers. Memorizing a number
is a common cognitive load task and has been implemented in a variety of
experiments (Roch et al., 2000; Hinson et al., 2002; Lavie and de Fockert,
2005; Carpenter et al., 2013; Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel, 2018a). Carpenter
et al. (2013) found impaired behavior in a p-beauty contest while subjects
172
Chapter 5 Cognitive Load in Economic Decisions: How To Tell Whether It Works
memorized a seven-digit number. We therefore also required participants
to memorize a seven-digit number. The number was displayed for 10 sec-
onds before participants automatically entered the decision phase. After the
Cournot decision, the participants had to recall the exact number within 10
seconds. If they succeeded they earned additional 750 points. Rounds with
No Load were exactly as in Experiment 1 and consisted only of the Cournot
oligopoly decision.
60 Participants (36 female; age range 18–70 years, mean 26.3 years),
participated in exchange for performance-based payment plus a show-up
fee. The participants earned on average 17.67 Euro (ranging from 12.70
to 21.70 Euro including the show-up fee of 2.50 Euro) and a session lasted
about 1 hour and 45 minutes. The data was collected in two sessions with
28 and 32 participants at the CLER. The participants played in 15 diﬀerent
and independent groups.
5.4.2 Results
As in Experiment 1, the self-reported questionnaire reveals that the cognitive
load task was considered to be very important (mean 8.88, SD= 1.67 on a
scale from 0 to 10). The cognitive load task itself was considered to be
of medium diﬃculty (mean 3.68, SD= 2.56 on a scale from 0 to 10). The
increase in diﬃculty is also reﬂected in higher error rates for the cognitive
load task (mean error rate 13.26%, SD= 11.52, ranging from 0% to 54.17%).
We now turn to the response times of the main decision task. The left-
hand side of Figure 5.2 depicts the average response time of decisions taken in
the No Load and Load treatments. The average response time for decisions in
the No Load treatment is 14.90 s while the average response time for decisions
in the Load treatment is 9.89 s. As expected, a WSR test conﬁrms our
prediction and shows that decisions are signiﬁcantly faster in the cognitive
load treatment (N = 60, z = 6.589, p < 0.0001).7 This cognitive load task
had a very strong eﬀect on the response times of the main decision task.
7The conservative test at the group level obtains the same conclusion (WSR test,
N = 15, z = 3.408, p = 0.0003).
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Figure 5.2: Experiment 2, Average response times and payoff.
Notes.
⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
Experiments 1 and 2 only diﬀer in the cognitive load task which allows
us to compare the eﬀect of cognitive load across experiments. As intended,
the cognitive Load task was rated signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult in Experiment
2 (mean 3.68) than the task in Experiment 1 (recall, mean 0.84) accord-
ing to a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test (N = 124, z = −6.529,
p < 0.0001). The error rates are also signiﬁcantly higher in Experiment
2 (13.26%) than error rates in Experiment 1 (recall, Experiment 1 mean
2.41%; MWW, N = 124, z = −6.698, p < 0.0001). The response times
in the No Load treatment are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across experiments
(Experiment 1, mean 15.22 s; Experiment 2, mean 14.90 s; MWW, N = 124,
z = 0.460, p = 0.6455). We do, however, ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences for
the Load treatment. The task which was evaluated more diﬃcult also ex-
hibits signiﬁcantly faster responses in the main decision task (Experiment
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1, mean 14.34 s; Experiment 2, mean 9.89 s; MWW, N = 124, z = 5.775,
p < 0.0001).8
We observe a much stronger response time eﬀect for the main decision
task and now turn our attention towards performance. The participants
earned on average 5.60 Euro during all rounds of the No Load treatment and
5.57 Euro during all rounds of the cognitive Load treatment. This diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant according to a WSR test (N = 60, z = −0.272, p = 0.7853).9
Another possible measure of performance could be relative usage of certain
strategies, e.g. the research question might ask whether cognitive load shifts
behavior towards a speciﬁc strategy. Similar to Alós-Ferrer and Ritschel
(2018a) we could also test the relative frequency of the simple behavioral
rule of imitation under cognitive load. One might expect that participants
use such heuristic more often when cognitive resources are not available. In
fact, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more relative imitation in the Load (mean 34.96%)
than No Load treatment (mean 31.79%; WSR, z = 2.050, p = 0.0202).10
5.5 Experiment 3: Voting
5.5.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
For Experiment 3 we considered a complex voting decision. In Cournot
oligopolies the participants interacted with each other. In contrast, this study
was designed in such a way that the decision task was strictly individual,
because no feedback on voting outcomes was provided until the end of the
experiment. We followed Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996) (see also Granić, 2017)
for the design of our voting experiment. The main decision task was to cast
several votes using diﬀerent voting methods. The participants were split
into groups of 6 and voted on four diﬀerent alternatives in the voting task.
8A test concerning the difference in response times between treatments across Experi-
ments also is highly significant (Experiment 1, mean difference 0.88 s; Experiment 2, mean
difference 5.01 s; MWW, N = 124, z = 6.355, p < 0.0001). Tests at the group level obtain
the same qualitative conclusions.
9A conservative test at the group level obtains the same conclusion.
10This one-sided test is even more significant on the group level (p = 0.0006). These
tests are not significant in Experiment 1.
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Within a group the participants were further divided into three diﬀerent
types of voters with 2 participants each. We provided a table that indicated
the payoﬀs for each type of voter for each of the four diﬀerent alternatives,
i.e. a 3×4 payoﬀ table. The participants then ﬁlled in their ballot according
to the voting method.
The participants voted multiple times in two diﬀerent voting blocks with
a ﬁxed voting method but did not receive any feedback. Therefore, all vot-
ing decisions were unaﬀected by the previous vote because no feedback was
revealed and no information of the behavior of other players in the group is
revealed, ergo the task can be viewed as an individual decision task. Each
voting block consisted of 8 voting decisions each using plurality voting (PV)
and approval voting (AV) as voting method. In PV each participant voted
for exactly one of the alternatives and the alternative with the most votes
won. In AV each participant voted for as many alternatives as she approved
of and the alternative with the most approvals won. In case there was a tie
among the votes, a random device determined the winner of the vote. In
addition there was another “voting” method which always came at the end
and served as preference elicitation. For the analysis we only consider the
behavior in the PV and AV blocks. At the end of the experiment one vot-
ing round was randomly drawn and the winning alternative was determined
according to the voting method and the votes of all members of the group.
We implemented the same cognitive load task as in Experiment 2 within
subjects. They memorized a seven-digit number before entering the voting
stage, voted, and then had to recall the number. In each voting block, 4
diﬀerent payoﬀ proﬁles were presented twice, once with cognitive Load and
once with No Load. Overall, we collected voting behavior for 16 voting
decisions: 4 in the Load and 4 in the No Load treatment for AV and 4 in the
Load and 4 in the No Load treatment for PV. At the end of the experiment 1
of the 8 rounds with cognitive load was randomly drawn. If the participants
correctly recalled the number they earned additional points.11
11For a correct recall the participants earned 40 points while the earnings from the
voting decision ranged between 43 and 93 points.
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Since only one randomly drawn round was paid we will not use the payoﬀ
as an performance measure in this experiment. We will measure performance
as the number of sincere votes and in AV the number of votes cast. A sincere
vote is deﬁned as a vote which is in agreement with the subjects preferences
and does not include any strategic voting. With respect to cognitive load a
possible directional hypothesis could be that cognitive load reduces strate-
gic behavior because less cognitive resources are available. The decrease in
strategic behavior could be manifested by an increase in sincere votes for
both voting methods. A change in behavior could also be exhibited by a
change in the number of votes cast under approval voting.
60 participants (38 female; age range 18–32 years, mean 23.1 years) par-
ticipated in exchange for performance-based payment plus a show-up fee.
Students with a major in Psychology and who already participated in sim-
ilar voting experiments were excluded from the participants pool. The par-
ticipants earned on average 18.29 Euro (ranging from 12.00 to 22.20 Euro
including the show-up fee of 4.00 Euro) and a session lasted about 1 hour and
15 minutes. The data was collected in two sessions with each 30 participants
at the University of Cologne.
5.5.2 Results
The cognitive load task was the same as in Experiment 2 except that there
were only a total of 8 rounds with cognitive load compared to a total of 24
rounds in Experiment 2. The mean error rate is 9.58% (SD= 12.47, ranging
from 0% to 50.00%) and signiﬁcantly smaller compared to Experiment 2
(recall, mean 13.26%, MWW, z = 2.591, p = 0.0096).
The participants voted for only one alternative in plurality voting and
may approve of multiple alternatives in approval voting. By design the voting
decision in approval voting might potentially take longer and we decided to
split the response time analysis by voting method. Figure 5.3 shows the
average response time of all decisions in the No Load and Load treatments
for plurality voting (left-hand side) and approval voting (right-hand side). In
the case of plurality voting, the average response time is 21.77 s in the No
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Figure 5.3: Experiment 3, Average response times of voting decisions.
Notes.
⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
Load treatment and 15.32 s in the Load treatment. As expected, a WSR test
conﬁrms our prediction and shows that decisions are signiﬁcantly faster in
the cognitive Load treatment (N = 60, z = 5.683, p < 0.0001). For approval
voting, the average response time is 22.01 s in the No Load treatment and
15.25 s in the Load treatment. Again, a WSR test conﬁrms that response
times are signiﬁcantly shorter in the Load treatment compared to the No
Load treatment (N = 60, z = 5.897, p < 0.0001).
Figure 5.4 shows the relative frequency of sincere votes for both voting
methods and the number of votes under approval voting for the No Load
and Load treatments. As performance measure we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the amount of sincere votes between No Load and Load treatment
for both voting methods. Under plurality voting, the participants voted
on average 55.42% sincere in the No Load rounds and 64.17% sincere in the
Load rounds. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant according to a WSR test (N = 60,
z = −2.260, p = 0.0119). Under approval voting, the participants voted on
average 82.92% sincere in the No Load rounds and 87.50% sincere in the Load
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Figure 5.4: Experiment 3, Relative frequency of sincere votes and number of votes.
Notes.
⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, WSR test.
rounds. This diﬀerence is less pronounced but still signiﬁcant according to a
WSR test (N = 60, z = −1.683, p = 0.0462). Another indicator of change
in behavior in approval voting is the number of votes cast which signiﬁcantly
increased between treatments. The average number of votes cast is 1.75 votes
in the No Load treatment and 1.875 votes in the Load treatment. According
to a two-sided WSR test, this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (N = 60, z = −2.522,
p = 0.0117).
5.6 Experiment 4: Bayesian Updating
5.6.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
In Experiment 4 we changed again the economic setting and proposed two
diﬀerent cognitive load tasks. The main decision task used the Bayesian
Updating Paradigm as implemented in Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014).
For this paradigm we expected very short response times between 1, 000–
5, 000ms (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014) and therefore will report response
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times in milliseconds. These are very short response times compared to the
other experiments presented above. However, the decision task is much more
complex in comparison to the other cognitive load studies discussed in the
Introduction.
The main decision task was as follows. There were two urns (left and
right urn) each with 6 colored balls. The composition of the colored balls
in the urns depended on two diﬀerent state of the worlds. In the “up” state
of the world the left urn consisted of 4 black balls and 2 white balls and
the right urn of 6 black balls. In the “down” state of the world the left urn
consisted of 2 black balls and 4 white balls and the right urn of 6 white balls.
The probability of an up and down state was 1/2, known to the participants,
and independent across rounds. In each round the participants were asked to
choose which urn a single ball should be extracted from (with replacement),
and were paid if and only if the ball was of a prespeciﬁed color (e.g. black).12
Then they were asked to choose an urn a second time, a ball was extracted
again, and they were paid again if the ball was of the appropriate color. They
did this for 60 rounds and the participants earned 18 Eurocents for each ball
with the appropriate color drawn from the urns.
The interesting draw was always the second choice of the round. The par-
ticipant could have used the information of the extracted ball from the ﬁrst
draw to update the beliefs about the current state of the world or followed
a simple reinforcement heuristic, i.e. win-stay, lose-shift. The composition of
the urns were calibrated in such a way that both behavioral rules were either
prescribing the same action, they were in alignment, or prescribed diﬀerent
actions, they were in conﬂict. Drawing a ball from the right urn perfectly re-
vealed the state of the world and both rules prescribed the same action, i.e. if
a winning ball was extracted choose the right urn again, otherwise choose the
left urn. Drawing a ball from the left urn did not reveal the state of the world
with certainty and updating the beliefs about the state of the world led to a
diﬀerent action than reinforcement. If a winning (black) ball was extracted,
Bayesian Updating led to the conclusion that the upper state is more likely
12The colors of the balls for the composition of the urns and winning balls were coun-
terbalanced. Here we present the case of black being the winning color.
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and the best action was to switch to the right urn while if a losing (white)
ball was extracted, the down state was more likely and Bayesian Updating
prescribed to stay with the left urn. Therefore Bayesian Updating prescribed
win-shift, lose-stay, the exact opposite of reinforcement’s win-stay, lose-shift.
An error in this decision task was deﬁned as not choosing the urn prescribed
by Bayesian Updating in both conﬂict and alignment situations. For the
analysis we will condition on conﬂict and alignment situations and use as a
performance measure the error rates in conﬂict and alignment situations.
In this setting we implemented three treatments, one No Load treatment
and two diﬀerent cognitive load treatments. In the No Load treatment, par-
ticipants were not put under any kind of load. In the Phonological Load and
Central Executive Load treatments, participants were put under two diﬀer-
ent forms of load. The Phonological Load treatment required participants to
complete the main task while repeating the word “and” every 1.5 seconds, fol-
lowing the rhythm given by a metronome (this device was physically present
on the table, i.e. not integrated into the computer program). This manipula-
tion is known to speciﬁcally block the phonological loop, which should lead to
quick information decay (forgetting; Baddeley (1986), Gathercole and Bad-
deley (1993)) similar to memorizing a long sequence of digits. The Central
Executive Load required participants to name random numbers (from zero
to nine) aloud at the rhythm of the metronome. This manipulation is known
to seriously impair central executive functions and in addition tax working
memory capacity (e.g. attention) to a strong extent.
In all cases, participants received careful instructions on the decision task
and in addition were shown how to implement the cognitive load task. Partic-
ipants were asked to practice the load in the presence of the experimenter and
were instructed that successfully conducting this secondary task was a pre-
condition for payment in the main task. They also practiced the load together
with the main task (ﬁve practice trials). In the experiment itself, participants
ﬁrst started employing the cognitive load right before they started working
on the decision task. Accordingly, working memory capacity was already
limited by the load manipulation before participants started with the poste-
rior probability task. Participants in the No Load condition started with the
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decision task after instructions and practice trials. The articulation of the
load task was recorded by means of a computer and provided incentives for
actually conducting this task. After the experiment, it was checked whether
participants actually carried out the cognitive load task. No participant ne-
glected to perform the secondary task. After the experiment, participants
answered a questionnaire and their accumulated earnings were paid.
Participants were 58 university students (20 female, 38 male), randomly
allocated to three diﬀerent treatments, who performed the same Bayesian
Updating task.13 Participants earned on average 11.63 Euro and a session
lasted around one hour. The experiment was conducted at the LakeLab
(University of Konstanz).
5.6.2 Results
Figure 5.5 shows the average response times of the second draw in the No
Load, Phonological Load, and Central Executive Load treatments condi-
tional on conﬂict (left-hand side) and alignment (right-hand side) situations.
In conﬂict situations, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly shorter response times for the two
cognitive load treatments compared to the No Load treatment. The aver-
age response time is 2, 712 ms in the No Load treatment, 1, 374 ms in the
Phonological Load treatment, and 1, 617 ms in the Central Executive Load
treatment. The diﬀerences between the No Load and cognitive load treat-
ments are signiﬁcant according to Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests (No Load
vs. Phonological Load, N = 40, z = 2.624, p = 0.0087; No Load vs. Central
Executive Load, N = 38, z = 2.017, p = 0.0218).14
In alignment situations, we ﬁnd in general shorter response times than
in conﬂict situations. We do not, however, ﬁnd signiﬁcantly faster responses
in the cognitive load treatments than in the No Load treatment. The aver-
age response time is 1, 056 ms in the No Load treatment, 1, 110 ms in the
Phonological Load treatment, and 1, 558 ms in the Central Executive Load
13Two participants of the original 20 in the Central Executive Load treatment had to be
excluded from the analysis due to a failure of the recordings necessary to compute their
redundancy scores to determine the performance in the load task (we refer to Baddeley
(1966) for details).
14The one-sided p-values are Holm-Bonferoni adjusted.
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Figure 5.5: Experiment 4, Average response times of the second draw.
Notes. Response times conditional on conflict (left-hand side) and alignment situations
(right-hand side) . ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, MWW test.
treatment. The diﬀerences between the No Load and cognitive load treat-
ments are not signiﬁcant (MWW: No Load vs. Phonological Load, N = 40,
z = −0.974, p > 0.9999; No Load vs. Central Executive Load, N = 38,
z = −1.959, p = 0.9749).
Figure 5.6 shows the average error rates according to optimal behavior
(following Bayesian Updating) of the second draw in the No Load, Phono-
logical Load, and Central Executive Load treatments conditional on conﬂict
(left-hand side) and alignment (right-hand side) situations. In conﬂict situ-
ations, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence for the two cognitive load treatments
resulting in more errors compared to the No Load treatment. The average
error rate is 50.04% in the No Load treatment, 66.94% in the Phonological
Load treatment, and 55.66% in the Central Executive Load treatment. The
diﬀerence between the No Load and Phonological Load treatments just barely
misses signiﬁcance (MWW: N = 40, z = −1.922, p = 0.1093) and we do not
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ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for error rates between the No Load and Central






















Figure 5.6: Experiment 4, Average error rates of the second draw.
Notes. Error rates conditional on conflict (left-hand side) and alignment situations (right-
hand side). ⋆ p < 0.1, ⋆⋆ p < 0.05, ⋆⋆⋆ p < 0.01, MWW test.
In alignment situations, we ﬁnd in general much lower error rates. The
average error rate is 5.02% in the No Load treatment, 8.77% in the Phonolog-
ical Load treatment, and 21.02% in the Central Executive Load treatment.
The diﬀerence between the No Load and Phonological Load treatments is
not signiﬁcant (MWW: N = 40, z = −1.417, p = 0.1565), however, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for error rates between the No Load and Central
Executive Load treatments (MWW: N = 38, z = −2.512, p = 0.0240).16
15A directional hypothesis of cognitive load decreasing performance with an one-sided p-
value (and Holm-Bonferoni adjustment) finds significantly more errors under phonological
load than under no load (p = 0.0547). The conclusion for central executive load does not
change for one-sided p-values.
16One-sided p-values (and Holm-Bonferoni adjustments) find weakly significant more
errors under Phonological Load than under No Load (p = 0.0783) and significantly more
errors under Central Executive Load than under No Load (p = 0.0112).
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5.7 Discussion
In a series of experiments we showed that cognitive load signiﬁcantly reduces
response times in complex, economic decision tasks. This observation is con-
sistent across a variety of very diﬀerent economic paradigms such as behavior
in Cournot oligopoly, in plurality or approval voting, or in belief-based de-
cisions under risk. We also ﬁnd a consistent reduction in response times for
diﬀerent kinds of cognitive load tasks such as adding a number from memory
to a number heard, memorizing a seven-digit number, repeating “and,” and
generating a random number every 1.5 seconds. We varied the main deci-
sion task and the cognitive load task quite substantially across experiments
and always ﬁnd consistently that under cognitive load the response times
are signiﬁcantly shorter than under no load. Further, some experiments em-
ploying economic decisions under risk (lottery choice) have reported response
times and can be used to oﬀer further evidence in favor of our test. Whitney
et al. (2008) analyze the impact of cognitive load (memorizing a ﬁve-letter
string and recalling a speciﬁc letter) on framing eﬀects while choosing be-
tween a gamble and sure outcome, and report that response times decreased
signiﬁcantly from 2, 950 ms without load to 2, 796 ms with load. Gerhardt
et al. (2016) investigate risk attitudes in a lottery-choice experiment with
cognitive load. They employed a dot-pattern memorization task as cognitive
load manipulation, and report that response times decreased signiﬁcantly
from 3, 835 ms without load to 3, 449 ms with load. Both papers do ﬁnd
behavioral eﬀects of cognitive load (less gambling and less riskier decisions,
respectively). The eﬀect on response times in those papers was unexpected,
and the authors simply speculate that participants might have tried to speed
up their decisions in order to maintain accuracy in the cognitive load task.
We remark that Experiment 1 and 2 used the same economic paradigm
but diﬀerent cognitive load tasks which diﬀered signiﬁcantly in diﬃculty.
The load tasks in Experiment 2 was signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult than the task
in Experiment 1 according to self-reported questionnaires and error rates in
those load tasks. We reach the same conclusion with our analysis of response
times of the main decision task. The response time diﬀerence between the No
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Load and Load treatments was signiﬁcantly larger for Experiment 2 (with the
more diﬃcult task) than for Experiment 1 (with the less diﬃcult task). This
suggests a correlation of response time reduction and reduction of cognitive
resources as result of cognitive load task diﬃculty.
This measure of response times is a very direct measure of the cognitive
load eﬀect on the main decision task independent of the change in behavior.
It does not rely on a self-reported measure and also not on the performance
in the cognitive load task but directly establishes a link between the cogni-
tive load and the main decision of interest. We argue that the reduction in
response times under cognitive load is a direct indicator that a cognitive load
task has successfully induced a shift in the kind of decision processes used by
participants, as a consequence of a successful impairment of available cogni-
tive resources. Then, and only then, the researcher can consider whether and
how cognitive load aﬀected the behavior in the main decision task, and the
implications of behavioral change or lack thereof. This simple test is readily
available in almost all cognitive load experiments.
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